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Abstract
Against the backdrop of the historically dominant positioning of mitigation the 
international policy discourse on climate change is increasingly highlighting 
adaptation as an equally important response to climate change. This stronger 
attention to adaptation has not yet been adequately reflected in research on 
public perceptions of climate change. The present thesis aims to address this 
shortcoming. First, the relationship between public perceptions of adaptation 
and mitigation is examined, showing that intention to perform and support for 
both response types are overall positively connected but that their relative 
predictor patterns differ. Particularly noteworthy is the finding that individual 
intention to adapt is not necessarily reliant on belief in climate change. 
Differences are then explored in more depth testing whether an adaptation or 
mitigation frame affects the public’s overall engagement with climate change. 
When climate change is presented as a local issue the adaptation frame leads to 
more emotional engagement in right-leaning participants, while the mitigation 
frame decreases it. This effect is inversed for left-leaning individuals. Exploring 
the role of personal experience in more detail the thesis finally presents an 
analysis of the effect of the 2013/14 winter flooding on individual engagement. 
Findings indicate that experiencing flooding is strongly associated with flood 
adaptation intentions but not connected to mitigation intentions. Whether 
individuals attribute the flooding to climate change does not contribute to 
explain their engagement with climate change. The results are discussed arguing 
that a stronger focus on adaptation holds the potential to mobilise previously 
uninvolved audiences. If framed in the wrong way, however, it might also 
increase polarization. Transformative adaptation is highlighted as a potential 
mediator to avoid this latter scenario. This thesis concludes that more research 
in this line is needed to successfully exploit the current policy transition in order 
to comprehensively, adequately and sustainably address climate change.
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1Chapter 1 -Introduction
1.1 Climate change
Our earth’s climate is changing and among scientists there is unequivocal 
agreement that humanity plays a major role in that (Anderegg, Prall, Harold, & 
Schneider, 2010). Anthropogenic or human induced climate change has 
attracted considerable attention in politics and academia over the past decades. 
This attention to manmade climate change has been accompanied by a series of 
major assessment reports authored by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). The IPCC was founded by the United Nations Environment 
Programme and the World Meteorological Organization to assess the ever-
expanding climate science, with particular attention to the risks associated with 
anthropogenic climate change1 (Archer & Rahmstorf, 2010). The IPCC reports, 
currently in their fifth instalment, sit at the intersection of politics and science 
and they have been central to the debate around climate change ever since the 
First Assessment Report was published in 1990. They represent an extensive 
effort to collate scientific evidence of the human influence on climate change; its 
consequences and risks; and ways to address these. In today’s climate change 
discourse these reports “have become an authoritative source that sets agendas 
an acts as a legitimizing device for research” (Adger, 2006, p. 273). It is for this 
reason that this introduction builds heavily on the IPCC reports.
The latest advancement in this series of reports by the IPCC was 
published in 2014. This Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014b) more clearly 
than ever concludes that the human population is affecting the global climate. 
1 When referring to climate change in the present document, I intend anthropogenic climate 
change, unless explicitly stated otherwise. This follows an established trend in both the scientific 
and public discourse, which has used the term climate change interchangeably with that of 
anthropogenic climate change.
2It does so by releasing so called greenhouse gases (GHG) into the atmosphere.
Carbon dioxide is the most important and well-known GHG and its 
concentration in the atmosphere is increasing as a consequence of human 
activity. Other GHG are methane (CH4), nitrous dioxide (N2O), and 
halocarbons such as fluorocarbon. While carbon dioxide is not the most potent 
of GHG gases, methane being approximately twenty times more potent than 
carbon dioxide for example, it is the quantity released into the atmosphere and 
its permanence that makes it a major driver of climate change. The carbon 
dioxide concentration in the atmosphere now is 40% higher than in pre-
industrial times. The amount of GHG released into the atmosphere has in fact 
consistently risen since pre-industrial times and is currently higher than it has 
ever been in at least 800.000 years. 78% of this anthropogenic input of GHG 
into the atmosphere has occurred during 1970 to 2010. A large amount of this 
anthropogenic GHG production has happened as a consequence of fossil fuel 
combustion, which in turn is largely driven by economic and population growth 
(Archer & Rahmstorf, 2010; Dow & Downing, 2006).
The greenhouse effect describes the process by which anthropogenic 
emissions affect the climate. The greenhouse effect occurs naturally and is 
essential to the world’s temperature balance, adding around 33°C to what would 
otherwise be relatively inhospitable global mean temperatures. Human activity, 
more specifically, the emission of greenhouse gases reinforces this mechanism 
thereby interfering with the balance between incoming and outgoing radiation. 
A measure of change in this balance is the so-called radiative forcing. Radiative 
forcing, in essence, is an indicator for the net balance of energy retained by the 
Earth in relation to what is lost to space. Radiative forcing is measured in watts 
per square meter (W/m2) A radiative forcing value for a specific agent, such as 
carbon dioxide, thus indicates whether it adds to the world’s energy budget 
(positive sign), or subtracts from it (negative sign). Radiative forcing values 
3however cannot be translated one-to-one into the individual climate change 
contributions of the various emissions. Climate change in essence is determined 
by a combination of radiative forcing, climatic feedback effects and the rate at 
which the climate system stores energy (Dow & Downing, 2006; Emanuel, 2007; 
van Vuuren et al., 2011). 
With a clearly positive combined radiative forcing value for the various 
contributing factors it is however no surprise to find that combined land and 
ocean surface temperature measurements from 1880 to 2012 indicate a warming 
of 0.85°C during this period (IPCC, 2013). So called fingerprint studies then 
allow scientists to discern the effect of human drivers, such as anthropogenic 
GHG, on the climate system from other non-anthropogenic drivers, such as 
variations in solar radiation (Archer & Rahmstorf, 2010). Regarding the human 
contribution the Fifth Assessment Report states that there is a clear signal of 
anthropogenic GHG in the climate system and it is further extremely likely2, 
that the warming of the climate is largely due to anthropogenic GHG and other 
human drivers such as land use change (IPCC, 2014b). There is also high 
confidence that a positive feedback exists between CO2 output and the climate. 
This describes the fact that climate change, also acts as a driver itself as it 
negatively affects some of the mitigating processes, such as the CO2 reuptake by 
trees and thus further increases CO2 concentration in the atmosphere (IPCC, 
2013).
2 In IPCC reports three distinct ways of describing uncertainty are used. (a) When uncertainty 
is assessed qualitatively indicators for the quality and amount of evidence (limited to much 
evidence) and the degree of agreement are used (low to high agreement). (b) To describe the 
quantitatively assessed likelihood of an outcome the following terms are used: very low 
confidence (1 out of 10), low confidence (2 out of 10), medium confidence (5 out of 10), high 
confidence (8 out of 10), and very high confidence (9 out of 10). (c) Uncertainty for specific 
outcomes that has been assessed statistically or by expert judgement is expressed in the 
following ways: virtually certain (99-100% probability), extremely likely (95-100%), very likely
(90-100%), likely (60-100%), about as likely as not (33-66%), unlikely (0-33%), very unlikely (0-
10%), and exceptionally unlikely (0-1%). 
4When speaking of CO2 concentrations it is important to point out that in 
fact the oceans hold 30% of CO2 emissions, with another 45% in the atmosphere 
and the remaining 25% absorbed by the biosphere. There is an even more 
pronounced imbalance in how much of the energy surplus in the climate system 
feeds into the atmosphere and how much is absorbed by oceans. More than 90% 
of the energy amassed between 1971 and 2010 is stored in oceans (high 
confidence), compared to only 1% in the atmosphere (IPCC, 2013). This is an 
important fact directly linked to a phenomenon called thermal inertia. Thermal 
inertia describes the fact that rising air temperature does not immediately 
trigger an analogous rise in overall temperature as it is mediated through the 
inert warming of the oceans. What this means, is that the climate system does 
not yield the effect of today’s GHG concentrations. This is also why the world 
is already committed to more warming in the future, even if we were to stabilize 
the amount of GHG in the atmosphere today (Archer & Rahmstorf, 2010). 
One of the most prominent aspects of climate change, besides the 
temperature increase, certainly is sea level change, mostly discussed in terms of 
sea level rise. Sea level change is a function of two mechanisms: eustasy and 
isostasy. Eustatic sea level is determined by the global distribution of water. 
This distribution of water can change when the amounts of water stored in the 
oceans globally change, or when tectonic movements change an ocean basin’s 
shape and thereby affect the amount of water it can hold. If, for example, the 
earth’s climate cools, more water is stored on land in the form of ice. This 
redistribution of water would thus decrease current sea levels. This however is 
an incomplete view of sea level change, as one would have to assume that the 
earth is a rigid and non-rotating planet. In fact, staying with the example given 
above, increasing ice on land would exert a certain pressure on the land, which 
would cause it to sink slightly, resulting in a net sea level rise in affected areas 
(Nicholls et al., 2011; Shennan, Long, & Horton, 2015). 
5In terms of climate change induced sea level change two main 
contributing mechanisms can be described. First, as the oceans get warmer they 
expand, an effect called thermal expansion, which in itself is a rather small 
effect but is amplified by the depth and extent of the world’s oceans, which are 
on average 3800 m deep and cover approximately two thirds of the globe. 
Second, the influx of water from melting land ice equally causes sea levels to 
rise, the potential of which, if all ice in Greenland and Antarctica was to melt, 
corresponds to an increase of 65 metres. These two mechanisms taken together 
explain approximately 75% of the detected sea level rise globally (Archer & 
Rahmstorf, 2010; Nicholls et al., 2011).
The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report concludes that the speed of sea level 
rise since the mid-19th century exceeds that of the previous two thousand years 
(high confidence). It is further very likely that between 1901 and 2010 average 
sea levels have increased by 0.19 metres. Since the beginning of satellite 
measurements of sea level rise in 1993 until 2010 it is very likely that annual 
increase in sea level has been 3.2 mm. This provides further evidence of 
accelerating sea level rise when compared to the very likely rate of 1.7mm/year 
for the longer time frame spanning 1901 to 2010 (Archer & Rahmstorf, 2010; 
IPCC, 2013).
This evidence clearly shows that the climate is changing, that cumulative 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions are to a large extent behind the current warming 
and that this is a trend that will continue. Scientists’ understanding of the 
changes our planet has seen and what accompanied these changes however does 
not allow them to make any definite predictions about the future, as to do so 
would presuppose perfect knowledge of future GHG emissions. To circumvent 
this issue scientists rely on scenario-based models, which build on the vast 
knowledge of past changes in climate, associated with the field of 
paleoclimatology. Central to this kind of scenarios is a “what-if” clause, which 
6translates assumed socioeconomic and climate policy trajectories3 into future 
projections for the world’s climate (Archer & Rahmstorf, 2010).
1.1.1 Future climate change
For the Fifth Assessment report these scenarios have been 
operationalized as so called “Representative Concentration Pathways” (RCPs). 
The Fifth Assessment report builds on four RCPs with a time horizon spanning 
until the year 2100. The four RCPs are named after the amount of radiative 
forcing measured in W/m2 that atmospheric concentrations of GHG, air 
pollutant emissions and land use will impose on the climate system by 2100. 
RCP2.6, for example, describes a pathway that reaches a rather low forcing of 
2.6 W/m2 by the year 2100. The four RCPs in the Fifth Assessment report in 
detail are the following (van Vuuren et al., 2011): (1) RCP2.6 is described as 
the lowest mitigation scenario and it foresees a peak in radiative forcing at 
around 3 W/m2 and a subsequent decrease, to reach 2.6 W/m2 in 2100. (2)
RCP4.5 is labelled a medium stabilization scenario, which reaches stable levels 
of 4.5 W/m2 by 2100 without an overshoot before doing so. (3) RCP6.0
similarly can be considered a medium stabilization scenario without overshoot 
stabilizing at 6 W/m2 by 2100. (4) RCP8.5 is a rising scenario reaching a 
radiative forcing of 8.5 W/m2 in the year 2100. It is also described as a high 
emission scenario. Projected changes in climate are then modelled based on 
these RCPs and described for the period 2081-2100 in relation to 1986-2005. A 
selection of projected changes from the Fifth Assessment Report is presented in 
the following paragraphs.
3 It is important to note that these scenarios do not account for any non-human influences on 
the climate system, such as changes in solar activity.
7Temperature
Increase in temperature is likely to be higher than 1.5°C for RCP4.5, 6.0,
and 8.5; and likely to exceed 2°C for RCP6.0 and 8.5 (high confidence). 
Temperatures in the Arctic will increase more rapidly and mean warming over 
land will be larger (very high confidence). Further, it is virtually certain that 
there will be an increase in hot and a decrease in cold temperature extremes 
over most land areas; and it is very likely that the frequency and duration of 
heat waves will increase (IPCC, 2014b).
Ice Cover
For 2081-2100 year round reductions of Arctic sea ice content are 
projected ranging from 43% under RCP2.6 to 94% under RCP8.5 for the sea-ice 
minimum in September (medium confidence). Based on modelling that best 
reproduces the climatological mean state and the trend for Arctic sea ice extent 
between 1979 and 2012 a nearly ice free Arctic ocean in September before 2050 
is likely for RCP8.5. By 2100 the mass of glaciers worldwide, except those in the 
periphery of Antarctica, are projected to decrease by 15-55% under RCP2.6 to 
35-85% under RCP8.5 (IPCC, 2013).
Precipitation
Projections of changes in precipitation are extremely complex and not 
uniform. It is likely that in the mid-latitudes and dry subtropics mean 
precipitation will decrease under RCP8.5. In many wet mid-latitudes instead 
precipitation is likely going to increase under RCP8.5. Extreme precipitation 
events will very likely increase in frequency and intensity over most of the land 
in the mid-latitudes and over wet tropical regions (IPCC, 2014b). This 
naturally would trigger an increased incidence of flooding but paradoxically the 
other extreme, droughts are likely to increase as well. Archer and Rahmstorf 
8(2010) suggest that the land area currently affected by extreme drought 
conditions could increase from 1 to 30%. 
Sea Level
For all the RCP scenarios the pace of sea level rise will very likely 
surpass that of 1971-2010. Sea level rise will not be equally distributed across 
the globe. By 2100 however it is very likely that sea level will have risen in 95% 
of the area covered by oceans. The global mean of sea level rise will likely range 
between 0.26m (RCP2.6) and 0.98m (RCP8.5) by the year 2100. (IPCC, 2013).
1.1.2Climate change impacts and risks
Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human 
systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged 
people and communities in countries at all levels of development ... Risk of climate-
related-impacts results from the interaction of climate-related hazards (including 
hazardous events and trends) with the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural 
systems, including their ability to adapt. Rising rates and magnitudes of warming and 
other changes in the climate system, accompanied by ocean acidification, increase the 
risk of severe, pervasive, and in some cases irreversible detrimental impacts. (IPCC, 
2014b, p. 13)
The risks directly associated with climate change are not necessarily a 
sole function of change but rather the specific qualities of this change and 
related aspects. Archer and Rahmstorf (2010) underline four factors that make 
climate change as it is projected particularly dangerous: (a) The rate of 
temperature change in the 21st century will be up to fifty times higher than the 
overall maximum rate of temperature change in the Earth’s history, which was 
typically 0.1°C per century. (b) The temperature that current climate change is 
projected to reach will be outside the temperature range that most species have 
developed in and adapted to for millions of years. (c) The human population 
has heavily affected the planet through land use, making it very difficult for 
species to move into climatically favourable latitudes. (d) The amount of ocean 
9acidification4 is unprecedented and will lead to levels of acidity that will very 
likely exceed levels reached at any point in time during the past 20 million 
years.
In terms of how future climate change will affect the human population 
there is a variety of risks to consider. What is quite clear is that climate change 
will affect the most basic human needs, such as the provision of food and water. 
The production of major crops such as rice and wheat, for example, will be 
negatively affected by climate without adaptation, in case of temperature 
increases above 2°C relative to late 20th century levels, with the exception of 
some areas that might benefit (medium confidence). The reduction and 
redistribution of marine species will reduce the yield of fisheries and other eco-
system services (high confidence). And climate change will increase the scarcity 
of renewable surface water and groundwater resources in most dry subtropical 
regions (robust evidence, high agreement) (IPCC, 2014c).
Coastal and low-lying areas will be disproportionately affected by climate 
change. Developing countries and Small Island States will face a substantial 
increase in climate change-related risks. These areas will increasingly face 
impacts such as coastal flooding, submergence and coastal erosion because of sea 
level rise (very high confidence) and aspects such as population growth, 
economic development and increasing urbanization will further exacerbate the 
effects of these phenomena (high confidence). As climate change adds to 
existing pressures it will affect those most strongly that are already suffering 
from current climate variability and extreme weather events (Adger, 2006; 
4 An aspect of climate change, which has been gaining increasing attention, more recently, is 
ocean acidification. Ocean acidification describes the phenomenon of oceans turning more acidic 
by absorbing a substantial amount of the anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Acidity in oceans has 
increased by 26% since the onset of the industrial area (high confidence). Ocean acidification 
poses a serious threat to the eco-system of oceans around the globe in that it affects a variety of 
marine organisms that build their shells of calcium carbonate, the availability of which is 
reduced as a consequence of ocean acidification (IPCC, 2013).
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Paavola & Adger, 2006). This means, that climate change impacts will not be 
restricted to any particular geographies. Many climate change induced impacts
in fact concern urban areas (medium confidence) but equally rural areas will 
suffer major adverse effects (high confidence) (IPCC, 2014c).
The discussion of food security illustrates how climate change will impact 
humans in very direct ways, such as through ill health. This will happen mostly
by worsening existing health problems (very high confidence). More severe heat 
waves and fires for example will increase the likelihood of injury, disease and 
death; and risks from food- and water-borne diseases will analogously increase 
(very high confidence) (IPCC, 2014c). In an effort to summarize key risks, the 
IPCC (2014c) highlights five so called reasons for concern.
• Unique and threatened systems – The number of unique and threatened 
systems, such as cultures and ecosystems, already at risk from climate 
change (high confidence) will only increase with further warming.
• Extreme weather events – Risk from this kind of events is already 
moderate (high confidence) and will be high with a 1°C increase5 in 
temperature (medium confidence). 
• Distribution of impacts – Risks are distributed disproportionately, in that 
disadvantaged people and communities bear greater risks.
• Global aggregate impacts – For temperature increases of 1-2°C risks of 
global aggregate impacts are moderate (medium confidence). These 
impacts include effects on global biodiversity and the worldwide 
economy. For approximately 3°C warming extensive loss of biodiversity 
and the associated detrimental effect on ecosystem goods and services 
make for a high risk of global aggregate impacts (high confidence).
• Large-scale singular events – While climate change itself is incremental 
there is a risk of abrupt and irreversible changes for certain physical 
systems and ecosystems. The risk of triggering such events increases with 
further warming (medium confidence).
5 An increase relative to global average temperature between 1986-2005
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1.1.3Climate change impacts and risks in the UK
Translating the global climate changes to regional levels is difficult and is 
often associated with greater degrees of variability. Choosing a Medium 
Emission Scenario (MES) the UK climate projections science report predicts an 
increase of mean summer temperatures in parts of southern England ranging 
from 2.2 to 9.5°C and increases in winter precipitation of up to 33% are 
expected along the western side of the UK (Jenkins, Murphy, Sexton, & Lowe, 
2010)
The UK is already vulnerable to severe weather events, such as droughts 
and floods. While climate change will reduce certain risks, such as the 
probability of cold weather related deaths, it will further exacerbate existing 
risks. Flooding stands at the top of the list. Under MES flood risk is projected 
to increase with climate change and this is reflected in the top four of climate 
change threats in the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2012, which are all 
flood related. These risks include mental health consequences of flooding,
inability to obtain flood insurance for residential properties, expected annual 
flooding damages to residential property and the exposure of the insurance 
industry to the risk of flooding (Defra, 2012).
Annual damage from floods is currently £1.2 billions for England and 
Wales. Future projections foresee that this figure will range between £1.5 and 
£3.5 billions by the 2020s and between £2.1 and £12 billion by the 2080s. 
Beside these direct losses as a consequence of property flooding, the well being 
of vulnerable population strata, the integrity and operation of critical 
infrastructure, such as hospitals, but equally transport systems, energy and 
water supply, and many businesses located in floodplains will be substantially 
affected (Defra, 2012).
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1.2 Climate change measures
Starting in the early 90s climate change and the associated impacts 
triggered various national and international efforts to address the issue. At the 
heart of these is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC, 1992). In Article 2 of the UNFCCC the central goal with regards to 
climate change is described as the 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level 
should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally 
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 4)
On the face of it, this statement is a clear commitment to tackling the 
problem of anthropogenic emissions. A large part though stresses that an effort 
should be made to ensure that challenges to nature, food security and economies 
aren’t insurmountable. Clearly, this can be partly achieved by addressing 
emissions, thus reducing the extent of climate change. But the fact that we are 
already committed to a certain extent of climate change leaves substantial 
impacts that societies will have to deal with. It thus becomes equally important 
to increase the capacity of affected systems to deal with impacts of climate 
change. Even the central aim of avoiding dangerous climate change, is clearly, 
albeit indirectly, linked to what affected systems can cope with. Knowledge of 
what constitutes ‘dangerous’ climate change builds on projected biophysical 
impacts triggered by climate change but equally has to consider the extent to 
which natural and human systems deal with these impacts (Smit, Burton, 
Klein, & Street, 1999). It is thus no surprise to find that Article 4.1(b) of the 
UNFCC proposes “regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate 
change … and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change” 
(UNFCCC, 1992, p. 5) as appropriate responses.
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Mitigation6 is defined by the IPCC as a “human intervention to reduce 
the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases” (IPCC, 2014a, p. 1769).
Adaptation on the other hand describes the “process of adjustment to actual or 
expected climate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to 
moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In some natural 
systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and 
its effects” (IPCC, 2014a, p. 1758).
A third option to address climate change has gained increasing attention 
in recent years: geoengineering7 as the “deliberate, large-scale manipulation of 
the planetary environment in order to counteract anthropogenic climate change” 
(Shepherd, 2009, p. 1) is commonly divided into carbon dioxide removal (CDR) 
and solar radiation management (SRM) strategies. The main difference between 
these strategies is quite evident. CDR aims to remove CO2 from the 
atmosphere, akin to what is proposed in the second half of the mitigation 
definition cited above, which states that mitigation also seeks to enhance the 
sinks of GHG, thus sequestering CO2 from the atmosphere. SRM on the other 
hand does not address GHG but focuses on reducing or stabilizing the amount 
of energy uptake by the atmosphere. 
The fact that CDR and SRM are substantially different and that these 
strategies are further not clearly distinguished from adaptation and mitigation 
6 It is important to point out that an alternative use of the terms mitigation and to mitigate
very akin to that of adaptation exists (Smit et al., 1999). In the environmental hazards, 
insurance and engineering literature for example, mitigation refers to the reduction of 
vulnerabilities or “the lessening of the potential of adverse impacts of physical hazards 
(including those that are human-induced) through actions that reduce hazard, exposure, and
vulnerability” (IPCC, 2014a, p. 1769). As a practical example of this alternative meaning of 
mitigation one could refer for example to Kelly and Adger’s (2000) use of climate impact 
mitigation to describe the rehabilitation of mangroves aimed at improving the livelihood of 
residents but equally serving to enhance sea-defences. The current work, however, refers to 
mitigation in the sense of the above-mentioned emission-centred IPCC definition.
7 For a social science perspective on geoengineering see Corner and Pidgeon (2010).
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has led some authors to propose to abandon the geoengineering concept in 
favour of a new classification of responses to climate change (Boucher et al., 
2014; Heyward, 2013). Both classifications outline a distinction between 
emission reduction strategies (mitigation), strategies to remove CO2 (CDR), 
strategies aimed at modifying the climate (SRM) and adaptation. Heyward 
(2013) includes an additional category labelled rectification, which comprises 
measures aimed at compensation for losses incurred through climate change, 
measures that could be understood to fall under the broader adaptation 
category (compare Paavola & Adger, 2006).
1.2.1Adaptation 
In the international policy and science discourse on climate change, 
adaptation or the other ‘half’ of the convention, as Parry and colleagues (1998)
describe it, certainly received less attention than mitigation until the turn of the 
millennium (Burton, Huq, Lim, Pilifosova, & Schipper, 2002). Interest in 
adaptation was limited and, if present, mostly linked to mitigation (Kates, 
1997). The first two Assessment Reports of the IPCC, just as much as the 
UNFCCC, did include adaptation but it wasn’t until the publication of the 
Third Assessment Report in 2001 that adaptation emerged in a more prominent 
role alongside mitigation. The instalment of three separate funds geared mostly 
at adaptation in that same year at the seventh Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC then marked another important step towards a deeper engagement 
with adaptation (Huq & Burton, 2003; Paavola & Adger, 2006). To answer the 
question of why adaptation has been peripheral to the climate change policy 
debate various explanations have been put forward.
One prominent proposition to explain the halting development of a 
committed adaptation agenda points toward the persistent worry of involved 
actors that adaptation could be understood as a form of admitting defeat, or as 
an ethical compromise (Parry et al., 1998; Pielke, Prins, Rayner, & Sarewitz, 
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2007; Schipper, 2006; M Thompson & Rayner, 1998; Tol, 2005). A view that is 
aptly reflected in a quote by Al Gore stating that: “believing that we can adapt 
to just about anything is ultimately a kind of laziness, an arrogant faith in our 
ability to react in time to save our skin” (Gore, 1992, p. 240). This bias reflects 
the conviction that mitigation, in fact, represents the best adaptation strategy,
building on the fact that mitigation affects all climate-sensitive systems as 
opposed to more selective adaptation measures (Dewulf, 2013; Füssel, 2007). 
Directly related to this and another aspect that inhibited the development of a 
more committed adaptation agenda, it has been argued, is the preoccupation 
that an increasing focus on adaptation could potentially undermine societal 
interest and support for mitigation efforts (Klein, Schipper, & Dessai, 2005). 
Klein et al. (2005) further posit that the belief that adaptation would be 
triggered as a sort of automatism induced by processes such as natural selection 
and market self-regulation further hindered the explicit and active development 
of adaptation policies.
A factor that also has a history plaguing efforts to advance mitigation is 
the inherent uncertainty of climate science and the associated predictions 
(Barnett, 2001; Biesbroek, Swart, & van der Knaap, 2009; Stehr & von Storch, 
2005). This has been used as an argument to focus on the development of better 
climate modelling at the expense of promoting the development of adaptation 
(Adger & Barnett, 2009; Burton et al., 2002). Research in this line of thought 
has looked at how to further minimize uncertainties, while neglecting to 
promote a more naturalistic approach of making informed decisions given 
uncertainties (Kates, Travis, & Wilbanks, 2012).
Differences in complexity between adaptation and mitigation are also 
thought to have contributed to the weak positioning of adaptation. Compared 
to mitigation, where the sources of emissions are clearly laid-out, limiting the 
quantity of strategies to combat emissions to a manageable number, adaptation 
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can appear more complicated because of the wide array of adaptation measures 
and impacts to consider. This goes hand in hand with the afore-mentioned 
difficulty in evaluating the effectiveness of adaptation. Taken together, these
aspects might have led to initial reluctance in engaging with this type of 
responses (Füssel, 2007; Parry et al., 1998).
The last 15 years however, have seen a consistent erosion of this 
opposition to climate change adaptation, as scholars have put forward a variety 
of arguments for putting the spotlight on adaptation. The anthropogenic signal 
in climate change is now undeniable and future environmental risks are now 
better understood than ever which has led to clear calls for international action 
from those who will be facing the brunt of negative impacts, when they are not 
necessarily at the forefront of contributing economies in terms of GHG 
emissions (Pielke et al., 2007). This also helps to rebut the above-mentioned 
voices that argue for more precise forecasting before actions on climate change 
are determined. Irrespective of this, the fact that the negative impacts from 
climate change cannot be fully quantified yet, does not mean one can exclude 
the potential for significant environmental changes (Nelson, Adger, & Brown, 
2007). More importantly, it is increasingly recognized that adaptation-, as well 
as mitigation decisions need to be made even if sufficiently definite climate 
predictions are not available yet (Barnett, 2001; Biesbroek et al., 2009). In this 
respect findings on the knowledge-ignorance paradox (Ungar, 2000) prove 
informative as they describe how expanding knowledge, simultaneously increases 
uncertainty and ignorance. Any efforts to increase knowledge will thus be 
counterproductive, as increasing volumes of what is known and is not known
slows down the process of determining and implementing a given course of 
action. In fact, overly precise predictions might actually lock development into 
undesirable pathways that result in maladaptation (Dessai & Hulme, 2009). 
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Further, other and often more pressing challenges besides climate change 
exist, such as expanding settlements in coastal and drought affected areas, 
increasing poverty, the exploitation and increasing scarcity of resources (Pielke 
et al., 2007). Often these challenges will trump climate change in terms of how 
much priority they should be given in the short-term, in particular in 
developing countries (Biesbroek et al., 2009; Swart & Raes, 2007). These issues 
however, do not only compete for attention and allocation of resources but they 
also exacerbate the vulnerability to, and costs of, climate change impacts (Stehr 
& von Storch, 2005). In these regions and countries that already suffer from 
present day climate variability adaptation offers the opportunity to consider 
both present and future climate impacts contemporaneously (Füssel, 2007). It 
has been argued that knowledge about adaptation is generally more robust and 
of more practical value (Stehr & von Storch, 2005) and so some adaptation 
measures also present highly desirable ‘no regret’ or ‘robust’ measures, as their 
wide scope allows policy-makers to address a variety of current issues while at 
the same time proofing systems for future impacts (Wilbanks & Sathaye, 2007). 
This type of measures are usually cost-effective measures that involve co-
benefits besides addressing climate change and thus do not rely on overly 
precise modelling of the future, since they yield benefits in a variety of future 
scenarios. These measures are also referred to as win-win or no-regret measures 
and are central to adaptation conceptualizations that understand the reduction 
of vulnerability and building of adaptive capacity as central goals of adaptation. 
(Wilbanks & Sathaye, 2007).
The reality of political setbacks like the USA’s unwillingness to commit 
to the Kyoto Protocol emission targets have only added to strengthen the
conviction that adaptation will be a very important policy response. Stehr and 
Storch (2005) propose that actually politically realistic mitigation efforts to curb 
GHG emission will leave the brunt of climate change to be dealt with by 
18
adaptation. These limits to mitigation combined with the inertia of the climate 
system illustrate the necessary complementarity of adaptation and mitigation 
are potentially one of the most prominent arguments for intensifying adaptation 
efforts. A rationale that is succinctly reflected in the following quote by Stehr 
and Storch (2005, p. 539): “The risk and dangers associated with failed 
mitigation efforts may indeed be great. The risks and dangers of failing 
mitigation without any adaptive strategies will be even more serious”. Assuming 
even optimal mitigation trajectories the lag in impacts from anthropogenic 
emissions dictates that despite intensive mitigation efforts climate change will 
be unavoidable for many decades (Stehr & von Storch, 2005). If the ultimate 
goal of the UNFCCC is to avoid dangerous climate change, an objective that 
according to current scholarly expertise will not be achieved by mitigation 
alone, adaptation becomes inevitable (Wilbanks & Sathaye, 2007), in particular 
since adaptive responses can certainly reduce impacts more substantially in the 
short term than mitigation can (Parry et al., 1998; Stehr & von Storch, 2005).
This inevitability of adaptation as a response to climate change has 
translated into growing scholarly and political attention over the last two 
decades (Bassett & Fogelman, 2013; Burton et al., 2002; Janssen, 2007; Parry et 
al., 1998; Pielke et al., 2007). Preston, Westaway, Dessai and Smith (2009) for 
example, documented a dramatic increase from only 2 to 62 annual adaptation 
plans in the USA, Australia, Canada and UK between 2000 and 2008. An 
analysis of the adaptation actions undertaken by 117 signing parties to the 
UNFCC, as communicated by national governments to the UNFCCC 
secretariat during the period 2009-2010, showed that adaptation has found its 
place in national policy agendas. The study found 709 recommendations for 
action plus 3395 discrete adaptation initiatives and a median number of 27 
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initiatives and recommendations per country. A majority (43%) of these 
initiatives were classified by the authors as groundwork level8, that is, impact 
and vulnerability assessments. A smaller proportion (23%) of the initiatives 
were actual adaptation actions (Lesnikowski, Ford, Berrang-Ford, Barrera, & 
Heymann, 2015).
The scientific community mirrors this trend with an exponentially 
increasing number of scientific publications on adaptation during the last two 
decades (Bassett & Fogelman, 2013; Berrang-Ford, Ford, & Paterson, 2011). 
Janssen (2007) for example finds a relatively stable number of publications until 
the early 1990s, when the number of adaptation papers starts increasing, with a 
particularly accelerated increase after the year 2000. Scientific work on climate 
change adaptation according to Smit and Wandel (2006) can be classed into 
four research streams: (1) Studies analysing the extent to which adaptation can 
be expected to counterbalance projected climate impacts. (2) Research that 
focuses on particular adaptation measures in specific systems. (3) Scholarly 
work, which investigates the adaptive capacity of particular societal or 
geographical entities by comparing them on a set of pre-determined variables. 
(4) And research that addresses more practical questions in trying to provide 
the necessary information for the implementation of adaptation initiatives. It is 
important to point out that scholarly work on adaptation has not emerged as 
result of the recent climate change debate. A review of existing literature on 
adaptation clearly shows that the current surge of interest in adaptation in the 
context of climate change must be understood as a renaissance of the concept 
rather than a novel development. Adaptation has been researched for decades in 
fields as diverse as geography, anthropology, engineering, history, sociology, 
8 “Groundwork level actions are those initiatives considered critical for informing and preparing 
for adaptation” (Lesnikowski et al., 2015, p. 280)
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archaeology and psychology (Adger, 2006; Klein et al., 2005; Orlove, 2005; Smit 
et al., 1999; Tol, 2005). Individuals, societies, eco-systems, organisms have 
always been adapting to changing circumstances (Füssel, 2007; Nelson et al., 
2007; Orlove, 2005). Described as an “anthropological constant” and  “traditional 
form of social conduct” (Stehr & von Storch, 2005, p. 538) in human social 
evolution, irrigation, insurance, and weather forecasting for example, represent 
some of the early adaptive societal responses that have developed in response to 
pressures from climatic variation (Adger & Barnett, 2009). Against the 
backdrop of this historical foundation of social adaptation, climate change 
adaptation, according to Füssel (2007) does however stand out as a consequence 
of several new aspects. Climate change adaptation will have to address 
unprecedented climate conditions, describing the fact that many regions will 
experience climatic conditions never experienced before. These conditions will be 
met by unprecedented knowledge owed to societies’ technological and scientific 
advancements. The complex, dynamic and uncertain nature of climate change, 
however, introduces unprecedented methodological challenges, which will 
demand new approaches. Further, the global nature of climate change means 
that new actors have to engage with the issue and will have to do so with 
entirely new measures.
Smit and Wandel (2006) trace the origin of the term adaptation as it is 
used in today’s climate change literature back to the field of evolutionary 
biology and studies on the development of behavioural and genetic aspects that 
enhance an organism’s evolutionary fitness in light of changing environmental 
conditions. The first to apply the term adaptation to humanity, discussing 
societal adjustments in subsistence practices to changes in the natural 
environment, was the anthropologist and cultural ecologist Julian Steward
(Butzer, 1989, as cited in Smit & Wandel, 2006). Reflecting this historic view of 
climate change adaptation as a constant transaction between changes in the 
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environment and the socio-ecological system Klein and colleagues (2005, p. 580)
speak of adaptation as “an ongoing process to reduce vulnerability to natural 
climate variability as well as human-induced climate change”
As cited above the IPCC defines adaptation in a less dynamic manner as 
“the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects” in 
human and natural systems. Its aim is to “moderate or avoid harm or exploit 
beneficial opportunities” (IPCC, 2014a, p. 1758). Similarly Pielke (1998, p. 159)
specifies that adaptation concerns adjustments “in individual groups and 
institutional behaviour in order to reduce society’s vulnerability to climate".
Doria and colleagues (2009, p. 810) less stringently define adaptation as
“any adjustment that reduces the risks associated with climate change, or 
vulnerability to climate change impacts, to a predetermined level, without 
compromising economic, social, and environmental sustainability”. Contrasting 
it with mitigation Heyward (2013, p. 24) states that “whereas mitigation deals 
with the causes of climate change, adaptation deals with its effects”. It seeks to 
“reduce the harmful impacts that a changed climate is likely to have on people’s 
lives “ and responds to environmental changes rather than preventing them.
In a comprehensive effort Nelson et al (2007, p. 396) expand the 
definition of adaptation beyond adjustments to include “the decision-making 
process and the set of actions undertaken to maintain the capacity to deal with 
future change or perturbations to a social-ecological system without undergoing 
significant changes in function, structural identity, or feedbacks of that system 
while maintaining the option to develop”.
Similarly Moser and Ekstrom (2010, p. 22026) point to “changes in social-
ecological systems in response to actual and expected impacts of climate change 
in the context of interacting non-climatic changes.”
Common to all these definitions is the idea of a system that reacts in 
some form to certain pressures from changes in the environment, addressing in 
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essence three questions that have been proposed to describe adaptation 
measures (Füssel & Klein, 2006; Smit, Burton, Klein, & Wandel, 2000): ‘Who 
adapts?’, ‘To what?’, and ‘How?’.
Who adapts?
Regarding the question of ‘who adapts’ most authors refer to some form 
of system. This term is applied to entities ranging from households and 
particular species to societies (human systems), eco-systems (natural systems),
or a combination of the latter two; the socio-ecological system. Smit and 
colleagues (1999) specify that it is the sub-units such as species, communities 
and individuals that adapt and not systems as a whole. The term socio-
ecological system, alternatively referred to as social ecological system or coupled 
human-environmental system however, rather than representing a single acting 
unit, echoes the assumption that human behaviour and societal processes stand 
in constant transaction with nature, making a distinction between the two 
components futile (Adger, 2006; Gallopin, 2006). Adaptation will thus depend 
on the typology of impacts but equally on the nature of the system, its extent, 
complexity, location and a range of other factors that further define it (Smit et 
al., 2000). Several of these factors are often used in vulnerability assessments of 
a particular system; a common practice in both scholarly and applied contexts 
to describe an adapting system in more detail (Smit et al., 1999). 
Adaptation to what?
Adaptation in systems can be triggered in response to a variety of 
climate stimuli such as climate change itself, particular weather phenomena but 
equally by the societal and ecological knock on effects. There are various 
dimensions on which climate stimuli can be distinguished from direct or indirect 
to proximate or distant. It is essential to specify a particular stimulus, as its 
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effect will differ from other stimuli depending on its characteristics on these 
dimensions. Additionally, specifying the impact will help to establish its 
relevance with regards to the adapting system (Smit et al., 1999). 
Differentiating the various climatic stressors also proves useful when considering 
which type of adaptation needs to be employed. The type of measures which are 
deemed appropriate will depend largely on the combination of climatic stressors 
and their profiles on various dimensions. A useful distinction in this regard is 
achieved by ordering climatic phenomena in terms of timescale. Smit et al. 
(2000) group climatic phenomena into the following categories: (1) Long term 
trends in climate change, (2) climate variability within a range of a few years to 
several decades and (3) extreme weather events. While the majority of climate 
change literature is concerned with long-term trends, adaptation in particular 
demands attention to current variability and extreme weather events. 
Adaptation is also mostly triggered in response to extreme events, extreme 
events that need to be considered in a context of natural climate variability and 
the anthropogenic forcing on climate change (Füssel, 2007). Other temporal 
dimensions that have been discussed include the rate of onset, predictability 
and duration of the adaptation trigger. This relates to questions of spatial 
extent, where localized impacts, such as weather events, can be distinguished 
from global changes, such as an increase in mean temperature, which itself 
relates back to the size of the system in question (Smit et al., 1999).
How does adaptation occur?
Several scholarly efforts have focused on how climate change adaptation 
occurs to describe various forms of adaptation. Smit and colleagues (Smit et al., 
1999) summarize a multitude of classifications based on differentiations of  
adaptation measures on dimensions such as temporal scope (e.g. short term vs. 
long term), spatial scope (localized vs. widespread), the function they serve (e.g. 
retreat, accommodate, change, restore), their form (e.g. structural, legal, 
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financial, technological) and their performance (e.g. cost, effectiveness, 
efficiency, equity).
Two somewhat related dimensions have stood out in classifying
adaptation actions: timing and purposefulness. Based on the time point that 
measures take effect in relation to the stimulus that they address the following 
forms of adaptation can be distinguished: reactive adaptation, concurrent 
adaptation and anticipatory adaptation. Reactive adaptation refers to measures 
that are triggered ex post, i.e. adaptation that is triggered as a reaction to a 
climate impact that has already happened. Concurrent adaptation, on the other 
hand, is a set of measures which address a certain climate stimulus as it affects 
the system. Anticipatory adaptation takes effect ex ante, that is, it addresses an 
anticipated climate impact (Smit et al., 1999, 2000). This distinction however 
might not be as clear in practice as the case of an adaptation measure that is 
deployed after an extreme weather event to prepare for future events of this 
kind illustrates (Füssel, 2007)
Regarding the dimension of purposefulness two commonly accepted 
categories of climate change adaptation measures have been proposed. 
Autonomous/spontaneous adaptations, which could be described as ‚naive’ 
reactions of an affected system to changes as they occur. This type of 
adaptation is prevalent in unmanaged natural systems. Planned adaptations on 
the other hand represent deliberate efforts to apprehend actual and expected 
changes; actions that are pertinent to how public agencies react. (Smit et al., 
1999, 2000).
The concept of autonomous adaptation however has encountered 
criticism in the latest IPCC report as it has been used ambiguously, referring to 
actions in the above-mentioned sense but also to adaptations that were induced 
in absence of an external trigger. Instead a new fundamental distinction 
between incremental and transformative adaptation has been introduced. The 
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following paragraphs are dedicated to a brief discussion of incremental and 
transformative adaptation building on a canvas of two interpretations of 
vulnerability: outcome vulnerability and contextual vulnerability.
Vulnerability
The concept of vulnerability has been discussed and applied in various 
disciplines without any agreement on a uniform definition (Gallopin, 2006). The 
most current IPCC definition of vulnerability serves as a good starting point for 
a discussion of existing conceptualizations in the wider climate change 
literature. The Fifth Assessment report (IPCC, 2014a, p. 1775) defines 
vulnerability as the “propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected” and 
distinguishes contextual vulnerability and outcome vulnerability. In making this 
distinction the IPCC report addresses the conflation of two distinct approaches 
to conducting vulnerability assessments. 
Outcome vulnerability conceives of vulnerability as the result of a linear 
cost-benefit analysis that seeks to summarize the impact of climate change after 
the implementation of available adaptation measures aimed at offsetting this 
impact. In other words, outcome vulnerability describes the net impacts on a 
system after measures designed to reduce these have been employed. 
Unsurprisingly this interpretation of vulnerability has been dominant in 
previous IPCC reports as it provides a straightforward way of illustrating the 
net outcome of climate change and defining what constitutes dangerous climate 
change. Vulnerability in this sense is the final assessment in a concatenation of 
analyses from climate projections and scenarios, to biophysical impact studies 
and the evaluation of available adaptation options (Adger, 2006; Kelly & Adger, 
2000). 
Contextual vulnerability instead, investigates the underlying causes and 
mechanisms that create vulnerability in the first place. This focus on 
vulnerability as it already exists, also described as the wounded soldier
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approach, seeks to identify characteristics of the socio-ecological system that 
impede the current ability to cope with external pressures from a changing 
climate (Kelly & Adger, 2000). In doing so, this approach looks beyond the 
mere biophysical components and climatic stressors to include “social, economic, 
political, institutional and technological structures and processes; i.e. contextual 
conditions” (O’Brien, Eriksen, Nygaard, & Schjolden, 2007, p. 76). 
Vulnerability has drawn scholarly attention from two separate scientific 
communities, with fundamentally different framings of the climate change 
problem. O’Brien and colleagues (2007) distinguish scientific framings and 
human-security framings. Central to the scientific framings is the question of 
human impacts on the global climate system. Society and nature are conceived 
as strictly separate from one another with a disproportionate focus on the 
quantification of impacts on nature. Vulnerability in this research tradition is 
best addressed by sectorial and technical adaptation measures, as well as 
mitigation. Human-security framings conversely concentrate on climate change 
as a continuous transaction between biophysical and social components and 
thus replace the scientific framing’s view of the nature-society relationship as a 
duality with a mutuality. Climate change is understood as affecting individuals 
differently, as the effects are not solely determined by biophysical factors but 
rather embedded in “dynamic social, economic, institutional and technological 
structures and processes; i.e. contextual conditions” (O’Brien et al., 2007, p. 76). 
This interpretation does not allow a static understanding of vulnerability as 
residual climate impacts but conceives of vulnerability as a dynamic product of
biophysical and social processes (O’Brien, Eriksen, Schjolden, & Nygaard, 2004; 
O’Brien, 2000).
Incremental and transformative adaptation
From these distinct understandings of the climate change problem which 
are climate change as a human security issue vs. climate change as a scientific 
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issue, it follows that applying one or the other concept of vulnerability dictates 
a different diagnosis and in consequence a different cure to climate vulnerability 
and essentially the issue of climate change as a whole (O’Brien et al., 2004). 
Clearly, differing conceptualizations of vulnerability have major implications for 
how adaptation is conceived and in fact the wider political responses proposed 
with regards to climate change (O’Brien et al., 2007). Critical climate change 
literature analyses how viewing vulnerability as an outcome defines adaptation 
as a determinant of vulnerability. The idea of contextual vulnerability instead 
inverts this relationship, as the interplay of climatic pressures and the “inherent 
social and economic processes of marginalization and inequalities as the causes 
of climate vulnerability” determine viable and appropriate adaptation options, 
the scope of which goes well beyond the usual climate change focus (O’Brien et 
al., 2004, p. 5). To some extent this development certainly is a consequence of a 
general shift in climate change literature from the view of climate change as an 
environmental problem to an interpretation of climate change as a human-
influenced developmental issue (Biesbroek et al., 2009).
The conventional outcome vulnerability approach highlights climate 
change as the problem and adaptation as the solution. This interpretation of 
adaptation and the associated concept of outcome vulnerability have attracted 
criticism in recent years (Bassett & Fogelman, 2013; Brown, 2011; Füssel, 2007; 
Kelly & Adger, 2000; O’Brien et al., 2007; O’Brien, 2012; Ribot, 2011). When 
Bassett and Fogelman (2013) speak of a déjà vu, examining the predominant 
conceptualization of adaptation in the climate change literature, they refer to 
the many parallels between the hazards school’s understanding of adaptation 
(Burton, Kates, & White, 1978) and the current perspective on adaptation in 
the IPCC reports. Political ecologists viewed the hazards school’s understanding 
of adaptation as “palliative measures that did not address the social structural 
causes of vulnerability”, adaptation as adjustment, as opposed to the political 
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economy perspective of adaptation as transformation (Bassett & Fogelman, 
2013, p. 45). The political economy critique of the hazards school’s 
understanding of adaptation as proportionate adjustments focuses on four
aspects: (1) the idea that the social processes of adaptation are the sum of 
individual decisions, (2) the conservative political interpretation of adaptation 
as an instrument to maintain the existing political-economic system, (3) the 
emphasis on impacts rather than the root cause of vulnerability to these 
impacts (4) and consequently undue attention on biophysical aspects of natural 
disasters, at the expense of social components. The critical climate change 
adaptation literature, echoing the political economy critique of the natural 
hazards school’s understanding of vulnerability has voiced very similar concerns.
Füssel et al. (2007) conclude that the hazards based approach has been useful in 
describing what the risks from climate change are. The assessments carried out 
in this vein however, mostly lack explicit attention to other pressures such as 
current climate variability and do not offer high spatial and temporal 
resolution; deficits that make them of little practical value to decision makers 
and actors.
These parallels between political ecology scholarship and critical climate 
change adaptation literature extend to the revised concepts that have been 
proposed in response. Liverman (1994), in addressing the political ecology 
critique, proposed a distinction between biophysical vulnerability and social 
vulnerability, akin to the recently introduced IPCC distinction of outcome and 
context vulnerability. Before this distinction had been made Burton and van 
Aalst (2004) proposed two adaptation perspectives that resonate with this 
evolution of framing climate change. (1) The Convention perspective, central to 
the UNFCCC’s and IPCC’s approach, is linked to outcome vulnerability. 
Accordingly, this perspective of adaptation focuses on expected future changes 
in climate and the associated impacts. It assumes adaptation as a part of the 
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wider mitigation strategy and is concerned with incremental adaptation and 
measures rather than policies. (2) The Development perspective is linked to 
contextual vulnerability and it considers both current climate variability and 
weather extremes and long-term climate change. Evaluation of adaptation from 
this perspective is based on consideration of both vulnerability and poverty
(Burton & Van Aalst, 2004). This brief description illustrates how the 
traditionally more established Convention perspective of first generation climate 
change adaptation research understood adaptation as “a handmaiden to impacts 
research in the mitigation context” (Burton et al., 2002, p. 146) and as such, by 
definition, forced adaptation into the backseat. 
As the revised concepts of outcome and context vulnerability have found 
their way into the latest IPCC report it is only logical that it does also include 
a distinction between transformational and incremental adaptation. Incremental 
adaptation refers to “actions where the central aim is to maintain the essence 
and integrity of a system or process at a given scale” and transformational 
adaptation describes “adaptation that changes the fundamental attributes of a 
system in response to climate and its effects” (IPCC, 2014a, p. 1758). Bassett 
and Fogelman (2013) very similarly distinguish between what they call 
adjustment and transformative adaptation but add a third transitional category, 
namely reformist adaptation. (1) Adjustment adaptation constitutes the 
traditional IPCC understanding of adaptation, closely related to the Convention 
perspective of adaptation, outcome vulnerability and a techno-scientific 
problematisation of climate change. (2) Reformist adaptation is best described 
as a hybrid of adjustment and transformative adaptation, acknowledging
biophysical, as well as socio-political determinants of vulnerability. Its measures 
seek to reduce vulnerability but do so within the confines of the existing socio-
political system. (3) Transformative adaptation’s aim equally is to reduce 
vulnerability and to address the processes that effect it by contesting existing 
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social structures and the associated power relations that represent barriers to 
vulnerability reduction.
A fault line seems to be looming between these two understandings of 
transformative and transformational adaptation. While Basset and Fogel (2013)
explicitly stress the need for transformation, in particular with regards to equity 
issues and power relations that generate vulnerability; the IPCC definition of 
transformational adaptation focuses on “options and strategies that human 
actors can exploit to reorganize systems when incremental adaptation has 
reached its limits” (Klein et al., 2014, p. 922). An absence of socio-political 
aspects is also evident in some of the literature the IPCC distinction builds on. 
Kates (2012) for example distinguishes three classes of adaptations that are 
described as transformational: (1) Adaptation measures that are applied at a 
much larger scale, (2) adaptation actions new to a particular geography or 
system and (3) adaptations that change places and/or locations. In essence, only 
the latter typology is truly qualitatively different from incremental adaptation,
and this category too, only proposes transformations that lack any reference to 
the socio-political system. This raises the question whether transformational 
adaptation is in fact understood as an up-scaled version of incremental 
adaptation. A suspicion that is only further strengthened by the authors’ 
comment that transformational adaptation “may alternatively include 
fundamental changes in institutional arrangements, priorities, and norms” 
(Kates et al., 2012, p. 7156) – making the essence of what distinguishes 
reformist from transformative adaptation an option rather than a defining 
criterion. It is thus questionable whether the IPCC understanding of 
transformational adaptation, which actually might be better described as
reformist adaptation, really reflects an in-depth engagement with alternative 
conceptualizations of and discourses around adaptation. The reality of the 
scholarly discourse on climate change adaptation certainly suggests that there is 
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a strong imbalance towards incremental adaptation. Basset and Fogel (2013)
categorized articles concerned with adaptation from four climate change, placing 
a majority of 70% into the adjustment category. Only 27% and 3% respectively 
fall into the reformist and transformative category.
The same applies to policy discourses, an indicator of the IPCC’s 
dominance in informing the political response to climate change. Dewulf (2013)
identifies three pairs of contrasting frames in current policy debates on climate 
change adaptation, which largely follow the present discussion. He describes (1) 
the adaptation vs. mitigation frame, which relates to the historical 
discrimination of adaptation in favour of mitigation. (2) Two frames, which 
conceive of climate change adaptation as a tame technical problem vs. a wicked 
problem of governance. Frames that resonate with understandings of adaptation 
as auxiliary method to better understand climate impacts, as opposed to stand-
alone measures to reduce these impacts. (3) A last pair of frames, which 
contrasts state security and human security, a differentiation that resonates 
with the final discussion of incremental adjustment adaptation intended to 
preserve the status quo as opposed to transformative adaptation. Supporting 
this picture of a predominant outcome vulnerability/incremental adaptation 
approach a discourse analysis of the United Kingdom Climate Impacts 
Programme technical report on climate change adaptation finds that adaptation 
is predominantly problematized as a techno-scientific issue (Oppermann, 2011)
but that a competing, albeit less pronounced, view of adaptation from a socio-
systemic perspective exists. Similarly, Lesnikowski and colleagues (2015) in an 
analysis of national communications on adaptation initiatives to the UNFCCC 
find that only little attention is paid to vulnerable groups.
In summary the current work on adaptation in both academia and 
politics seems to suggest that while the wider climate change debate is 
overcoming its biased stance towards adaptation a new rift is opening. The 
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discourse around adaptation has moved from a disproportionate focus on 
mitigation to arrive at the next hurdle, manifest in a problematic focus on 
incremental adaptation, applying an outcome vulnerability interpretation. This 
sort of approach will allow societies to bear the impacts of climate change over 
a certain time period but in doing so it increases the risk of locking development 
into unsustainable and potentially maladaptive pathways (Brown, 2011; Burton 
& Van Aalst, 2004). This is due to a variety of aspects. 
Adjustment to expected impacts necessarily entails some form of 
knowledge of future climate making adaptation, a predictive exercise more than 
a responsive one. Narrow techno-scientific adaptation approaches paired with 
the uncertainty of climate change, the possibility of increased climate variability 
and more frequent extreme weather events, however, means that some 
adaptation measures determined today will inevitably turn out to be 
maladaptive (O’Brien et al., 2004). In a similar vein overly rigid adaptations 
aimed at ensuring business as usual would certainly struggle to deliver positive 
outcomes going into the extremes of climate change projections (M. S. Smith, 
Horrocks, Harvey, & Hamilton, 2011; Travis, 2010). This relates to the 
distinction between inadvertent and directed transformation, where the former 
is “more likely to lead to undesirable system states with low productivity and 
less human well-being” (Nelson et al., 2007, p. 403). A solely impact-focused 
approach in fact reduces flexibility essential to reacting to future scenarios that 
diverge from what is predicted (Oppermann, 2011, p. 80). Scholars argue that 
instead of concentrating on particular future impacts, the focus should be on 
reducing current vulnerability, which will naturally increase the capacity to 
cope with stresses from future climate change (Burton et al., 2002, p. 154). This 
point gains in importance if one considers that climate change isn’t the only 
stress that societies face (Adger & Barnett, 2009). A techno-scientific 
adaptation approach that does not understand climate change in the context of 
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multiple pressures runs the risk of perpetuating, and in the worst case, 
exacerbating the exact vulnerabilities it seeks to reduce as underlying 
inequalities and processes of marginalization equally affect access to adaptation 
(Adger, Arnell, & Tompkins, 2005; Brown, 2011; Eriksen & O’Brien, 2007; 
O’Brien et al., 2004).
The common logic behind these arguments is that adaptation as 
recurrent adjustments will quite probably set societies up for much deeper and 
thus more challenging transformations than could be induced presently. From 
this perspective transformative adaptation aimed at reducing current 
vulnerability in a starting-point sense bears considerable advantages. 
Addressing current issues this type of adaptation does not rely as heavily on 
knowledge of future climate change. Their broad scope aimed at the social 
dimensions of vulnerability further retains some form of flexibility and provides 
an excellent opportunity to implement the above mentioned “robust” or “no 
regrets” policies (O’Brien et al., 2004; O’Brien, 2000).
An ideal adaptation policy quite probably comprises both forms of 
adaptation. O’Brien and colleagues (2007) argue that outcome vulnerability and 
contextual vulnerability are products of different discourses and substantially 
different in their conceptualizations and thus cannot be unified. They remark 
that the two approaches are to be understood as two different but 
complementary aspects of climate change and that the focus should be on 
acknowledging the value of the variety of perspectives they entail. Likewise 
Burton and Van Aalst (2004) argue for a harmonization of the convention and 
the developmental perspective.
1.2.2Adaptation and Mitigation
The following paragraphs expand on differences and trade-offs between 
mitigation, that is emission reduction strategies in the wider sense including 
CDR, and adaptation in line with an incremental adaptation definition, as 
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studied in this thesis. The section then moves to address similarities and 
potential synergies between these two types of climate response strategy.
One way the relationship of mitigation and adaptation can be 
characterized is by defining their interaction in addressing impact costs. 
Mitigation and adaptation strategies can be alternatives, complementary, or 
competitive (Wilbanks & Sathaye, 2007). Attention to this kind of comparisons 
is rather novel as adaptation and mitigation have previously been conceived as 
different and separate approaches, largely ignoring the potential for synergies 
and trade-offs, despite their complementary nature (Swart & Raes, 2007). This 
has been described as the mitigation-adaption dichotomy (Biesbroek et al., 
2009). Biesbroek and colleagues (2009, p. 236) argue that this dichotomy is a 
function of “real or perceived differences in knowledge production, time and 
spatial scales, and actors involved, as well as the proposed policy strategies.”
A table taken from Fuessel and Klein (2006) summarizes some of these
key differences between mitigation and adaptation for various aspects.
Table1
CharacteristicsofMitigationandAdaptation
Mitigation Adaptation
Benefited systems Allsystems Selectedsystems
Scale of effect Global Localtoregional
Life time Centuries Yearstocenturies
Lead time Decades Immediatetodecades
Effectiveness Certain Generallylesscertain
Ancil lary benefits Sometimes Mostly
Polluter pays Typicallyyes Notnecessarily
Payer benefits Onlylittle Almostfully
Monitoring Relativelyeasy Moredifficult
Note. Adapted from “Climate change vulnerability assessments: An 
evolution of conceptual thinking”, by H. Füssel and R. Klein, 2006, Climatic 
Change, 75, p. 303.
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Clearly there are substantial differences between mitigation and 
adaptation, some of which can be highlighted by addressing the following 
questions (Wilbanks & Sathaye, 2007):
Who makes and implements decisions? - Actors, stakeholders and 
policy types
Mitigation is mostly planned and implemented at the international level 
but does trickle through to the individual level. Adaptation instead is mostly 
carried out at local, national or regional levels (Biesbroek et al., 2009; Moser, 
2012; Schipper, 2006; Tol, 2005). Mitigation, to a very large extent, 
concentrates on the transportation and energy sector and involves a restricted 
number of actors. Adaptation by contrast involves a variety of sectors, from 
tourism to agriculture and public health; and actors at multiple levels, from the 
individual to governmental agencies (Klein et al., 2005).
This difference in administrative levels and actors is reflected in the way 
mitigation and adaptation are implemented and managed. Mitigation is more 
often than not conceived as a top-down processes, characterized by international 
agreements and a restricted number of decision makers (Tol, 2005; Wilbanks & 
Sathaye, 2007). In light of poor success of top-down environmental policy, 
bottom-up approaches to both mitigation and adaptation have gained traction 
in the climate change policy arena (Wilbanks & Sathaye, 2007). As so many 
adaptation alternatives are identified locally and at a relatively small-scale, 
bottom-up approaches however, lend themselves more naturally to adaptation 
(Schipper, 2006; Wilbanks & Sathaye, 2007). A bottom-up approach is not 
without its drawbacks either. Adaptation characterized by multilevel 
governance can be rather laborious as it involves a variety of stakeholders with 
differing views and goals engaging in participatory decision making (Adger, 
2001; Biesbroek et al., 2009; Gupta, 2007; Tol, 2005). From a standpoint of 
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political feasibility top-down mitigation approaches can thus be more desirable 
(Biesbroek et al., 2009; Swart & Raes, 2007).
Who pays and who benefits? - Determining costs and benefits
A major difference regards the assumption of costs for the two climate
change responses. For the majority of costs incurred through mitigation the
polluter pays principle applies. It is conceivable how the major contributing 
countries in terms of GHG emissions, in particular with regards to historical 
emissions, should shoulder a large share of the costs, even if mitigation benefits 
are global and not specific to the temporal and spatial origins of mitigation 
efforts. Adaptation instead does not address GHG directly, but the climate 
impacts they drive, which are manifold in nature and mediated/moderated 
through a variety of factors. This makes determining who has to pay for 
adaptation a much more daunting task. More easily established is that the 
benefits of adaptation are usually experienced in the system they were deployed 
in, an aspect that is referred to as the payer benefits principle (Biesbroek et al., 
2009; Füssel & Klein, 2006; Klein et al., 2005).
An important facet of this discourse, however, is the fact that a lot of the 
expenses linked to adaptation efforts are, and more importantly, will have to be,
borne by nations that have played only a minor role as emitters, due to the 
emission-intensive past of developed countries in combination with the longevity 
of GHG in the atmosphere. This raises questions of historic responsibility, the 
application of the polluter pays principle to adaptation and discussion of 
equality of opportunity (Adger, 2001; Neumayer, 2000) and clearly 
demonstrates how discussions around climate change action, and adaptation in 
particular, necessarily include a consideration of equity issues (Wilbanks & 
Sathaye, 2007).
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How do measures work? - The temporal and spatial scales
Adaptation and Mitigation differ substantially in terms of the spatial and 
temporal scale they work on. Adaptation plans are put into action most 
noticeably at local levels and tend to come to the foreground as levels of 
analysis become more fine-grained (Biesbroek et al., 2009; Moser, 2012; Tol, 
2005). Consequently the benefits of mitigation are mostly global, whereas the 
benefits of adaptation usually materialize on the level of the impacted system 
(Klein et al., 2005). Accordingly adaptation and mitigation also differ in terms 
of time scale. As mitigation addresses long-lived GHG this naturally dictates a 
long-term perspective, whereas adaptation conventionally focuses on short-term 
adaptation needs. Additionally adaptive measures mostly take effect after a 
considerably shorter lead-time than mitigation measures. The time-scale of the 
effects generated will thus reflect these differences. Short-term measures with 
short-term benefits are predominant in an adaptation portfolio. Mitigation, 
equally, is fuelled by short-term investments, which conversely yield long-term 
benefits (Klein et al., 2005; Moser, 2012; Tol, 2005). Differences in time-scale 
are further accentuated by conceptualizing adaptation as mainly reactive, 
whereas mitigation is mostly discussed in terms of an anticipatory approach
(Biesbroek et al., 2009). This could however be owed to the immediacy of 
adaptation, when in fact true insight into the costs and benefits of adaptation is 
more limited than for mitigation (Biesbroek et al., 2009). Differences regarding 
the benefits, their much shorter onset time for adaptation measures than for
mitigation efforts, also helps to boost the political legitimacy of adaptation 
(Stehr & von Storch, 2005; Wilbanks & Sathaye, 2007).
These differences mean that the evaluation of mitigation and adaptation 
will differ accordingly. For mitigation efforts the clear-cut goal of reducing the 
amount of GHG in the atmosphere provides a straightforward evaluation 
criterion. For adaptation instead, the contested goals and lack of quantifiable 
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objectives regarding adaptation and the associated uncertainty as to how much 
human activity adds to increase climate variability, make for a much more 
complex task in determining what constitutes successful adaptation (Biesbroek 
et al., 2009; Klein et al., 2005).
Trade-offs and synergies
In considering the differences only, the mitigation adaptation dichotomy 
fails to acknowledge the existence of trade-offs and synergies between 
adaptation and mitigation. Trade-offs can be direct and immediate, or indirect 
and delayed (Moser, 2012). Tol and Dowlatabadi (2001), for example, focusing 
on increased malaria-risk in Africa provide evidence for scenarios where GHG 
emission abatement may actually increase the impacts from climate change. The 
authors show how reducing the size of the economy and allocating more money 
towards mitigation, both add to limit the resources for adaptation to increasing 
rates of vector borne diseases like Malaria. A more straightforward example for 
a mitigation measure that negatively affects efforts to adapt is increasing the 
density of housing and other infrastructure. While this can help to reduce 
motorized vehicle travel and increase the efficiency of public transport, thereby 
reducing emissions, it equally increases the urban heat island effect and impedes 
drainage of floodwater, issues that will further exacerbate existing adaptation 
pressures. This form of negative transaction likewise works from adaptation to 
mitigation, as projections of increasingly emission-intensive adaptation efforts to 
maintain coastal settlements in face of rising sea levels, clearly demonstrate 
(Moser, 2012).
Increasing scholarly attention has been drawn to similarities between
adaptation and mitigation in an effort to prioritize measures that facilitate 
both. Research in this vein has looked at ways to harmonize both measures 
(Moser, 2012) in order to define synergies in climate policy which are “created 
when measures that control atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations also 
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reduce adverse effects of climate change, or vice versa” (Klein et al., 2005, p. 
582). Planting trees in urban areas serves as a typical example of such a 
synergistic climate measure. As trees grow they sequester carbon mitigating 
climate change, while at the same helping to adapt to higher temperatures by 
providing a cooling effect (Klein et al., 2005). Renewable energy resources are 
another common example. The use of renewables helps to curb GHG emissions 
(mitigation) and simultaneously helps to reduce the overall-risk of power 
outages and falling victim to these in conventional centralized energy
infrastructure. Similarly new building codes and strategies can help to increase 
energy efficiency while at the same time helping to increase the resilience of 
structures to stress from environmental impacts such as flooding and extreme 
heat (Moser, 2012).
Stehr and Storch (2005, p. 537) describe adaptation and mitigation as 
protecting society from nature and protecting nature from society respectively. 
Both responses to climate change are thus embedded in social processes as 
climate change is conceived as “a societal problem that has an environmental 
constituent”. As such, a common denominator for adaptation and mitigation is 
the assumption that the climate is changing and that cultural variation is the 
way humanity adjusts to this change. Wilbanks and Sathaye (2007) state that 
adaptation and mitigation both play crucial roles and are in fact generally 
supportive of each other. Mitigation will not respond in a timely manner to 
prevent the majority of impacts. In turn, these impacts are likely to exceed the 
potential of adaptive measures without any mitigation. They argue, however, 
that complementarity in addressing climate change does not mean that 
synergistic effects can be achieved for adaptation and mitigation. Existing 
differences between mitigation and adaptation make identifying synergies and 
ways of integrating mitigation and adaptation a rather complicated process. 
Beside these contextual factors the complicated nature of the horizontal and 
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vertical cooperation necessary, paired with lacking consensus on conceptual and 
methodological aspects, only adds to make this type of approach more arduous. 
(Biesbroek et al., 2009; Wilbanks & Sathaye, 2007). As the discussion of 
differing adaptation interpretations further up showed, this latter aspect 
notably concerns debates around adaptation, which build on a smaller, and 
more contested knowledge base, owed to its historically younger development 
and critically differing conceptual understandings. Biesbroek, Swart and van der 
Knaap (2009) point out that it is in fact not the incoherency of adaptation and 
mitigation that hinders efforts to integrate both approaches but rather the 
engrained web of agreements, institutions and policies that has established as a 
consequence of the mitigation adaptation dichotomy.
Some authors do in fact suggest that the development and 
implementation of adaptation and mitigation should be kept separate in most 
cases (Klein et al., 2005; Moser, 2012; Tol, 2005). Klein and colleagues (2005), 
for example, question whether focusing on synergies is a particularly cost-
effective approach to the development climate change policy. They argue that 
firstly, the multitude of actors involved and institutional complexity that comes 
with implementing measures in this context could confine their efficiency. 
Secondly, if one is to rely solely on synergistic measures it is doubtful whether 
sufficient levels of mitigation and adaptation could be provisioned. Thirdly, 
they contend that a risk of synergies might also be that, at equal costs, the 
synergistic effect turns out to be smaller than if adaptation and mitigation were 
carried out separately. The bottom line of this criticism is that an unduly focus 
on synergies might create a policy environment where available resources would 
be inefficiently used to implement synergistic measures when these resources 
could be much more efficiently used for stand-alone adaptation and mitigation 
(Klein et al., 2005; Moser, 2012). 
41
It has been argued that rather than on synergies the focus should be on 
interactions of climate change measures in general, a practice that has yet to be 
firmly established in policy assessments and evaluations (Warren, 2011). With 
regard to this authors have suggested to apply a systems perspective in 
evaluating mitigation and adaptation measures (Moser, 2012; Warren, 2011). 
Moser (2012) specifically proposes that the development and implementation of 
a single climate policy should by default include an evaluation of how it affects 
the ability to implement other complementary policies.
The question thus-rather than focusing on potential synergies between 
adaptation and mitigation-concentrates on what constitutes an optimal mix of 
adaptation and mitigation. Various authors have asserted that there is no single 
optimal mix for adaptation and mitigation (Biesbroek et al., 2009; Klein et al., 
2005). An ideal combination will differ between countries and change over time. 
Further, characteristics of climate change, such as the long time horizons, the 
multitude and diversity of parties involved and the existence of non-linear and 
irreversible effects add to the challenge of agreeing on an ideal combination of 
mitigation and adaptation. These contextual differences are embedded within a 
variety of belief and value systems so that an ideal combination will also depend 
on the views of the person or society that makes this decision, an aspect that is 
particularly relevant to psychological research, as presented in this thesis. In 
any case a decision would ideally be based on relatively accurate forecasts of 
future climate change impacts that would help to analyse the costs and benefits 
of various strategy mixes for various time frames. Since this is a virtually 
impossible task and given the difficulties of establishing what constitutes an 
optimal mix, even if the future was certain, other approaches to establishing an 
optimal balance between adaptation and mitigation haven been put forward. 
The current dialogue, in particular around adaptation, focuses on what is often 
referred to as ‘no regret’ or ‘robust’ measures, which do not rely on this sort of 
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premises (Klein et al., 2005; Lempert & Schlesinger, 2000; Wilbanks & Sathaye, 
2007). 
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1.3 Risk perception
This chapter first turns to risk, the objective quantifiable assessment it 
seemingly represents, which will inevitably lead to a discussion of risk 
perception. The concept of risk has its origins in medieval times and early days 
of explorations, imperialist missions and trade. It was then used in finance and 
moneylending contexts and was soon linked to increasingly sophisticated 
probability mathematics and early developments of insurance (Taylor-Gooby & 
Zinn, 2006). This idea of probability is still present in most contemporary 
definitions of risk. Risk is commonly conceived to imply two dimensions: 
probability and effect. A risk can thus be understood as a combination of 
probability information on the occurrence of an adverse event and the amount 
of harm it can cause (Breakwell, 2007). As Breakwell (2007) points out, these
components do not necessarily have to be simultaneously present; a statement 
that resonates well with the Royal Society Report which in fact defines risk as 
“the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a stated period of 
time, or results from a particular challenge” (Royal Society Study Group, 1992, 
pp. 2–3). This definition misses a clear quantifiable component relating to the 
magnitude of the adverse event and is understood as the statistical probability 
solely. Adams (1995) in discussing this definition states that what is commonly 
spoken of as risk, is labelled ‘detriment’ by the Royal Society Study Group. 
Detriment is defined as “the integrated product of risk and harm” (Royal 
Society Study Group, 1992, p. 3), or in the words of Adams (1995, p. 8) “a 
compound measure combining the probability and magnitude of an adverse 
event”. Risk has been studied predominantly with a focus on events, 
technologies, situations, substances, processes and so forth that entail some form 
of negative consequences, variously referred to as hazard, harm, adverse event 
and similar. It is, however, important to add that the notion of risk has not 
been exclusively discussed in a context of negative outcomes. The idea of risk 
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and the associated decision process in particular necessarily entail a positive 
aspect as individuals weigh the potential rewards against adverse consequences 
(Adams, 1995). In fact much of the 19th century discussion of risk evolved 
around an idea of risk-taking as a premise for success in life reflected in the 
proverb ‘nothing ventured, nothing gained’. An attitude to risk that still 
resonates in contemporary concepts of entrepreneurial risk taking (Taylor-
Gooby & Zinn, 2006). The predominant discourse that emerged in the 20th
century focuses on adverse outcomes and is characterized by increasing 
attention to manmade technologies and environmental degradation as the 
primary source of hazards (Dake, 1992).
In economy risk has traditionally been studied applying a model of 
rational action. This approach however was soon revised, as empirical evidence 
emerged of plural rationalities that transcend the single layered economic 
rationale and seem to provide equally valid bases for decision making about 
risks (Pidgeon, Hood, Jones, Turner, & Gibson, 1992, p. 94). In this light, 
economic scholars shifted their attention to the constraints of rational action in 
order to study human responses to risk more accurately. Some of these 
constraints lay in limits to peoples’ cognitive capacities to process information 
and calculate probabilities (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006). 
A substantial number of insights into the inadequacy of the rational 
action approach to risk come from psychology. Psychological research on risk is 
embedded in the wider social science approach to risk, a counterpoint in the 
major dichotomy in risk research, contrasting the technical approach to risk. In 
a psychological research tradition risk has been studied at the individual level 
mostly, applying experimental, survey and interview methods. Social psychology 
in particular has had a substantial impact on risk research, showing that it is 
not only the objective risk qualities and probabilities that define risks for 
laypeople but also other risk characteristics such as dread, controllability and 
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familiarity (Slovic, 2001). Work in this line, according to Breakwell (2007), 
investigates various issues such as individuals’ differences in the beliefs they 
hold about certain risk and how they perceive them, social and psychological 
factors that influence risk decision-making, the role of emotion in reactions to 
risks, the communication of risks and how social environments shape these; the 
role of human behaviours in creating risks and risks in institutions or complex 
organisations.
What is absent from this research is the intention to objectively measure 
or quantify risk. This omission represents a crucial stress point between 
technical and social analyses of risk (Kasperson, 1992, in Tansy, 1999). From 
risk assessment as something performed by experts in a systematic analytical 
way striving for an objective measurement of risk, the focus shifts to risk 
perception, reflecting the notion that risk is an inherently subjective concept. In 
fact it is not a resignation on attempts to measure risk but rather the appraisal 
that subjectivity can never be excluded from any risk assessment. Social 
analyses of risk and the concept of risk perception contest the idea of a 
quantifiable and objective risk. Pidgeon et al. (1992, p. 89) combine 
psychological as well as sociological aspects to state that “risk perception 
involves people’s beliefs, attitudes, judgements and feelings, as well as the wider 
social or cultural values and dispositions that people adopt towards hazards and 
their benefits”. This challenges the concept of objective risk, as any judgement 
of risk that involves human actors will necessarily contain a subjective 
component (Pidgeon et al., 1992). The psychometric paradigm can be 
understood as one of two central approaches in this line of thought.
1.3.1 Psychometric paradigm
The psychometric paradigm was central to this shift in the 
conceptualization of risk. The psychometric paradigm originated in seminal 
work by Slovic, Fischhoff and colleagues in the 1970s (Fischhoff, Slovic, 
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Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980). 
The psychometric paradigm is rooted in the development of the expressed 
preferences approach as an alternative approach to the revealed preference
method in trying to answer the question ‘How safe is safe enough?’. The 
revealed preference method proposes that individuals determine an acceptable 
level of a hazard, activity or technology etc. by weighing risk and benefit 
against one another; an approach that is owed to the engineering, planning and 
design research this work builds on. The revealed preferences approach further 
assumes that the end product of these individual cost-benefit evaluations can be 
read from economic data on risks and benefits, which will reveal socially 
acceptable risk-benefit trade-offs (Starr, 1969). This part of the analysis is thus 
not so much about how a certain risk is judged by a single individual but more 
so about what constitutes an acceptable risk on an aggregate societal level.
The unit of analysis for this type of investigation into risk perceptions is 
constituted by historical records of accidental deaths arising from technology 
use, which are conceived as revealing consistent patterns of trade-off between 
social preferences and costs. The measuring unit is defined as the chance of 
death per hour of activity or exposure to a technology, while benefit is 
calculated as the amount of the annual income individuals spend on, or gain 
from said technology or activity (Starr, 1969). To estimate the risk of a new 
hazard, technology, activity etc. a hazard with an established acceptable level of 
risk or benefits can then be used as a form of yardstick (e.g. risk of death by 
disease). 
Research applying the revealed preference method yielded a few 
consistent principles of what defines an acceptable risk (Starr, 1969):
• The degree of a risk people are willing to accept is proportional to the 
cubic function of the benefit attached to it.
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• At constant benefit levels risks taken voluntarily are more readily 
accepted than involuntarily taken risks at an approximate ratio of 1 to 
1000.
• The statistical risk of death from disease can be understood as a form of 
psychological yardstick to evaluate various other risks (e.g. risks 
voluntarily taken are equally tolerated as risk of death from disease). 
• The acceptance of a risk is influenced by the amount of public awareness 
of its benefits, the latter of which Starr (1969) determines from an 
analysis of advertising, the number of people involved and usefulness.
Critiques of the revealed preferences approach (Fischhoff, Slovic, 
Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978) concentrate on the fact that this approach 
does not distinguish between what might be optimal risk levels or only accepted 
with reservation. Starr (1969, p. 1232) apprehends this critique by asserting 
that his approach does not “serve to distinguish what is ‘best’ for society from 
what is ‘traditionally acceptable’. According to Fischhoff et al. (1978), however, 
the more fundamental question this raised is whether the lay public is 
knowledgeable and capable enough to actually determine acceptable levels of 
risk. Further, as an approach that looks at historical data, the revealed 
preferences are inevitably anchored in the past. This method is thus very 
limited in its ability to reflect quick changes in risk acceptability that spring 
from an ever-increasing number of new technologies and practices that enter our 
daily routine. Finally Fischhoff et al (1978) critically point out how the 
arbitrarily set manner in which benefits and risks are extrapolated from 
historical data might serve as a source of great variability, producing rather 
unreliable measures of acceptable risk. Their critique feeds into the proposition 
of the expressed preferences approach, which aims to measure attitudes towards 
risks and benefits through questionnaires. This method of eliciting risk 
judgement is central to the psychometric paradigm, which is defined as 
a theoretical framework that assumes risk is subjectively defined by individuals who 
may be influenced by a wide array of psychological, social, institutional and cultural 
factors. The paradigm assumes that, with appropriate design of survey instruments, 
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many of these factors and their interrelationships can be quantified and modelled in 
order to illuminate the responses of individuals and their societies to hazards that 
confront them (Slovic, 2010, p. xxv).
In a series of questionnaire studies Fischhoff and colleagues (1978) asked 
respondents to rate various natural and technological hazards concerning their 
(1) perceived benefit to society or (2) perceived risk and (3) the acceptability of 
their current level of risk. In order to generate a richer picture of the various 
components of risks as they are perceived by individuals, this line of work 
moved beyond conventional risk benefit calculations and using rating scales 
asked respondents to assess various hazards in reference to nine risk 
characteristics:
• Voluntariness of a risk - To what extent are risks undertaken 
voluntarily?
• Immediacy of effect – To what extent is the risk of death immediate?
• Knowledge about risk (personal) – To what extent are risk known by 
people exposed to it?
• Knowledge about risk (scientific) – To what extent are the risks fully 
understood by science?
• Control over the risk – To what extent is it possible to avoid death by 
diligence and skill when engaging in the relative activity?
• Newness – Are the risks new or old?
• Chronic-Catastrophic – Is it a hazard that kills a large amount of people 
at once or individuals one at a time?
• Common-Dread – Is it a risk that evokes great dread in people, or one 
that people have gotten accustomed with?
• Severity of consequences – How likely are the consequences of exposure 
to the hazard going to lead to fatal consequences?
Analysis of the averages for each scale across participants indicated that 
certain characteristics are highly related across hazards. In other words, if a risk 
was rated high on one risk characteristic it was very likely to be rated high on 
specific other risk characteristics and these relationships persisted for 
evaluations of various hazards. More sophisticated statistical analysis then 
revealed that these interrelations between risk judgements are in essence 
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explained by two groups of risk characteristics ratings. In other words, 
similarities and differences concerning risk judgements between hazards can be 
explained by the profile of the hazards on two separate factors, constituted by 
specific risk characteristics. The first factor, commonly named familiarity, 
discriminates risks that are new, involuntarily taken, poorly understood and 
associated with delayed consequences. The second factor distinguishes risks with 
certainly fatal outcomes from risks with less dire consequences, a factor that 
was labelled dread.
A follow up study in which further risk characteristics as well as various 
other hazards were added confirmed these two factors and also found an 
additional third factor, that related to the pervasiveness of a hazard, i.e. how 
many people were exposed to it, and was thus named exposure (Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980). These findings then allowed the various 
hazards to be plotted along the three dimensions of risk characteristics 
according to their mean ratings on these factors.
Fischhoff, Slovic and colleagues (1978; 1980) re-examined some of Starr’s 
(1969) key findings. They found that the role of the degree of voluntariness with 
which one exposed oneself to a hazard was peripheral rather than central. 
Voluntariness was only one of the characteristics that influenced risk estimates 
and acceptable risk levels. In fact, statistically controlling for the influence of 
benefits associated with a hazard eliminated any effect voluntariness had on 
perceived risk. The severity of consequences, as well as the dread of a hazard 
instead, were strongly associated with higher risk perceptions. For acceptable 
levels of risk, and again statistically controlling for the benefits associated with 
the hazard, voluntariness along with the immediacy of a hazard, its 
controllability, familiarity and the knowledge about it predicted higher 
acceptance. The authors argued that the central role Starr (1969) ascribed to 
voluntariness is most likely a consequence of other characteristics such as the 
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potential for catastrophic loss of life, lack of control and inequity as more 
fundamental dimensions that characterize involuntary hazards (Slovic et al., 
1980). Another central role of risk characteristics emerged in findings on what is 
termed the signal value/signal potential of accidents (Slovic et al., 1980; Slovic, 
1987). While early research initially assumed that the amount of public 
reception an unfortunate event gets and the social impact it generates are a 
direct consequence of parameters such as number of deaths, extent of property 
damage and so forth, further studies showed that it was to a large extent 
determined by the specific characteristics of the hazard
Similarly to the findings on voluntariness the benefit of a hazard did not 
feature as a key factor in how individuals established acceptable levels of risk. 
Work on expressed preferences instead found that the degree to which people 
demand a reduction in risk to reach an acceptable level is directly proportional 
to the magnitude of perceived risk (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic et al., 1980). 
Regarding the acceptability of risk levels overall, current risks were rated 
unacceptably high for most activities and technologies. This finding lends 
further support to the fundamental critique of extrapolating acceptable risk 
levels from historical data on risk benefit trade-offs, which argues that these do 
not necessarily represent optimal risk levels.
Slovic et al (1980) in summarizing their results state that the method of 
expressed preferences makes perceived risk quantifiable and predictable. In this 
respect Vlek and Stallen (1981) advise caution when handling averaged group 
ratings of risk as they point out that risk is understood differently for different 
hazards and by different individuals. In fact much of the work in this research 
tradition relies on aggregate data, i.e. data which is based on mean values 
across participants, and as such it allows only limited predictions regarding the 
risk perception of individuals (Michael Siegrist, Keller, & Kiers, 2005). Siegrist, 
Keller and Kiers (2005) address this issue by investigating interrelations 
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between hazards, between individuals in how they perceive these hazards and 
between rating scales (i.e. risk characteristics) used to elicit risk judgements.
They find two hazard components described as unobservable hazards and old 
hazards; two rating scale components, which essentially indicate unknown risks
and dread risks; three person components, one for participants that rate
unobservable hazards as highly unknowable (unpredictability of unobservable 
hazards), one that identifies individuals which perceive old hazards as highly 
unknowable (unpredictability of old hazards) and a last component which seems 
to characterize people that generally rate hazards as more dreadful (dread 
potential of all hazards, in particular unobservable hazards). This research 
reconfirms the two major risk characteristic dimensions but underlines the 
importance to move beyond these to explore inter-individual differences in how 
risks are perceived.
Research applying the psychometric paradigm did in fact offer a more 
differentiated picture of how individuals substantially differ from one another in 
the way they understand and evaluate risks. Studies of how lay people and 
experts evaluate hazards showed that experts with their background in abstract 
technological approaches to risk assessment tend to evaluate hazards based on a 
single technical criterion such as the expected annual mortality rate, whereas
lay people rely on a broader set of risk characteristics (Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1979). Risk characteristics thus do not only mediate much of the 
difference in risk ratings between hazards but the specific weight they are given 
is also central to disagreement between individuals concerning certain hazards.
As the focus shifted from differences between how hazards were perceived 
to how individuals differed in their perceptions the 1980s saw a new strand of 
research on inter-individual differences in risk perception emerge. Various 
explanations for differences in risk perception were proposed consequently. As 
differences between lay people and experts would intuitively suggest varying 
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risk perceptions were initially thought of as errors in judgement based on a lack 
of education and rationality. A proposition that has been termed the rationality 
perspective (Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, & Satterfield, 2000). This view was 
prevalent in early work on measuring risk and deemed any deviation in 
judgement from an objective measure of risk, fatality rates for example, ill-
informed and a consequence of ignorance. As studies found gender differences in 
risk perception among highly educated experts this assumption was no longer 
tenable (Kraus, Malmfors, & Slovic, 1992; Slovic et al., 1995; Slovic, Malmfors, 
Mertz, Neil, & Purchase, 1997). Further a majority of studies actually found a 
positive correlation between knowledge about a certain hazards and perceived 
risk (Davidson & Freudenburg, 1996). Research on inter-individual differences 
yielded a strong focus on gender differences as studies consistently found that 
men and women judge risk differently. Specifically, men show a robust pattern 
of lower perceived risk and concern (see Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999 for a 
meta-analysis). 
Various accounts of how gender differences in risk perception arise have 
been put forward. Davidson and Freudenburg (1996) in related work on 
consistently higher female concern regarding environmental and technological 
risks list a series of hypotheses that aim to explain these gender differences. The 
safety concern hypothesis attributes higher concern levels among women to their 
traditional role as nurturers and caregivers, which induces heightened salience of 
health and safety. This theoretical approach to explaining gender differences in 
risk perception according to Davidson and Freudenburg (1996) has received the 
clearest and most consistent support out of all theories explaining gender 
differences. Similar explanations have also come from evolutionary 
psychologists, rebranded as the offspring risk hypothesis (Harris, Jenkins, & 
Glaser, 2006). It conceptualizes women’s hypersensitivity to risk as evolutionary 
conditioned as a function of increased reproductive success of mothers who are 
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better in safeguarding their offspring by virtue of greater risk awareness. 
Complementary to this other evolutionary accounts have concluded that 
alongside heightened risk aversion in women, it may be reduced male risk 
aversion that equally contributes to the found gender differences. Male openness 
to risk can be understood as a consequence of higher reproductive success 
overall for risk taking males (Wilson & Daly, 1985). This theoretical approach is 
largely based on the theory of parental investment (Trivers, 1972) which 
explains how males and females are subjected to distinct reproductive pressures. 
While males, with a minimal investment in reproduction have to increase their 
reproductive fitness by taking risks, females instead face a high investment in 
reproduction and are thus pushed to a more conservative approach in risk 
taking. Explanations building on feminist theory conversely propose that women 
see a world of inherent interconnections making them more attentive to links 
between potential hazards and the things they value, whereas men tend to see 
the world in a more abstracted way, separate from context, making them less 
sensitive to potential risks (Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993).
The Institutional Trust Hypothesis assumes that women are less trusting 
of science, technology and government institutions and this lower trust levels 
are what negatively affects their risk perception then. A view that is the second 
most supported in the literature reviewed by Davidson and Freudenburg (1996). 
The Economic Salience Hypothesis presumes that a preoccupation with 
economic issues, which the authors argue applies in particular to men as they 
are more likely to be the economic providers for the family, reduces concern for 
other issues, such as the environment. Finally, the Parental Roles Hypothesis
states that the proposed effects of the Safety Concerns Hypothesis and the 
Economic Salience Hypothesis are amplified as individuals actually accept their 
parental roles. Davidson and Freudenburg (1996) argue that due to the 
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changing nature of traditional sex roles it is no surprise to find that the latter 
two hypotheses only find partial support.
Scholarship on inter-individual differences in risk perception eventually 
emancipated from this narrow focus on gender differences to include racial 
differences finding what is described as the so called white male effect. Research 
in this line showed that aside from a strong gender component in individual risk 
evaluations there is an equally crucial racial aspect and an even stronger 
interaction effect of gender and race (Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994). Both 
gender differences and racial differences exist in risk perception, in that women 
show higher risk estimates across racial categories, while non-white participants 
equally show higher risk estimates across genders. More specifically however the 
evidence indicates that white men, in comparison to white women, but also non-
white men and women, significantly underrate risks for all presented hazards. 
This difference is so distinct that it trumps any other differences found based on 
gender or race. In other words, white women and non-white men and women 
are more similar in their perceptions when compared to white men, indicating 
that differences in risk perception are qualified by an interaction between racial 
background and gender (Flynn et al., 1994). This insight, along with others, 
which revealed inter-individual differences, partially addressed a major criticism 
levelled at the psychometric paradigm. This critique highlights that 
psychometric studies assume the risk characteristics to be attributes of the 
hazards themselves as opposed to being construed by individuals and thus at 
least to some extent a product of differences between these individuals. This is 
due to a general lack of attention to inter-individual differences in this line of 
research and the methodological difficulty involved in relying on aggregate data 
(Marris, Langford, & O’Riordan, 1998).
This distinct risk perception of white men was reconfirmed in further 
studies and a more detailed analysis showed that the white male effect was in 
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fact driven by about one third of the white males who skewed overall white 
male risk judgements by giving extremely low risk ratings (Finucane, Slovic, et 
al., 2000; Flynn et al., 1994). The researchers further determined that this 
particular subgroup of white males was highly educated, wealthier and 
politically more conservative. They also expressed more individualistic and 
hierarchical attitudes, more trust in institutions and authorities and less 
favourable views towards involving the public in decision making on hazards 
(Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Flynn et al., 1994). This 
strongly suggests that the white male effect, rather than being a combined effect 
of gender and race, is actually driven by particular value orientations, 
worldview and cultural preferences individuals subscribe to. 
1.3.2 Heuristics and ‘risk as feelings’
Parallel to the work of Slovic and colleagues, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) made a major contribution to the research area dealing with risk 
perceptions and judgment and decision-making. They uncovered various mental 
strategies, so called heuristics, which individuals rely on for the evaluation of 
risks and for decisions on risk taking. These heuristics, often described as 
mental shortcuts, serve to simplify the often overly complex task of assessing 
the various components, probabilities and further characteristics that define a 
risk. This oversimplification however comes at a price of occasionally 
committing judgement errors. Three such commonly described heuristics are: 
the availability heuristic, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic and the 
representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Anchoring and adjustment describe the processes by which individuals 
depart from an initial value, anchor, to then reach a final estimate by making 
adjustments to this initial anchor value. These adjustments, however, are 
typically insufficient and so a particularly high or low anchor value will lead to 
an overestimation or underestimation respectively.
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The representativeness heuristic describes a judgement process by which 
the probability of B originating from A is based on B’s similarity with A. 
Utilizing this heuristic a description of a man as very shy, withdrawn, 
invariably helpful, orderly, structured and passionate about details will lead to a
high probability estimate that this particular man is a librarian. This reasoning 
however ignores certain established probabilities, such as base rates. For 
example, the information that farmers are far more numerous in the population 
should affect the probability estimate regarding the chance of the described man 
being a librarian. Studies have shown, however, that this information is 
systematically ignored.
The availability heuristic describes a reasoning process by which 
individuals judge the probability of an event by how easy it is to them to recall 
an occurrence of such an event. This can lead to a series of biases. Biases due to 
the retrievability of instances describe the fact that more readily remembered 
instances will be judged to be more frequent. Equally, if retrieving a particular 
memory of an occurrence is cognitively more challenging or simply hard to 
imagine this will unduly affect frequency estimates.
It has been suggested that an alternative explanation for the availability 
heuristic is described by the affect heuristic (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2004), which states that judgement is also a function of the 
strength and type of emotions of the images associated with a certain decision 
problem. The affect heuristic (Finucane, Alhakami, et al., 2000) closely parallels 
work by Loewenstein and colleagues (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 
2001) who propose the ‘risk as feelings’ hypothesis, which equally suggests that 
emotions play a vital role in risk perceptions and risk decision-making.
The affect heuristic assumes that feelings inform our risk decisions. These 
feelings are determined by characteristics of the individual, the decision task at 
hand and the interaction of these two components. Affect is defined as “the 
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specific quality of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ (1) experienced as a feeling state (with 
or without consciousness) and (2) demarcating a positive or negative quality of 
a stimulus” (Slovic et al., 2004, p. 312). Affective responses are triggered quickly 
and do not rely on cognitive effort. Both mechanisms, the affect and the 
availability heuristic, are to some extent described in dual-process theories of 
thought (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996) as characteristic of the experiential 
system. Dual-process models distinguish two systems of thought, an analytical 
system and an experiential system. Alternatively these types of processing are 
referred to as System 1 (experiential) and System 2 (analytic) processes of 
reasoning. (Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000). The experiential system 
is defined by quick, intuitive, potentially unconscious and effortless processing, 
which is laden with emotions. The experiential system is older, in that it 
constitutes an evolutionary legacy, which relies on real-world experience and 
associates stimuli, based on temporal or spatial proximity with their affective 
responses. The analytical system, on the other hand, is characterized by slow, 
sequential, conscious and effortful processing. It’s younger in its origin and relies 
on normative judgement and decision-making rules, as specified, for example, in 
expected utility theories. (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Sloman, 1996; Slovic et al., 
2004; Weber, 2006). 
The two systems work in conjunction and it has been shown that the 
experiential system, and in particular the ability to rely on emotions as input to 
decision making, are vital to normal decision-making. Research around 
Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 
1997; Damasio, 1996) showed that specific brain lesions that impair individuals 
from experiencing certain somatic reactions as the physiological substrate of 
emotions, but leave other cognitive functions mostly unaffected, lead to 
substantial deficits in risk judgement and decision making. The ‘risk as feelings’ 
hypothesis further draws attention to the possibility that the outputs from the 
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two systems can diverge. When this occurs it is usually the experiential system 
that prevails over the analytic system in the final decision. Beyond the first 
encounter with a certain stimulus, or decision problem, emotional reactions also 
guide future encounters/decisions with that same stimulus through conditioned 
responses and memory (Loewenstein et al., 2001). The risk as feelings 
hypothesis further identifies certain contextual aspects that specifically affect 
emotional reactions, while only playing a minor role for cognitive evaluations. 
Among these is the vividness with which a situation presents itself or is 
imagined. Vividness is directly related to the strength of anticipatory emotions 
and is both dependent on inter-individual differences regarding the ability to 
envision a particular issue but equally on how vivid a certain issue presents 
itself or is presented (Loewenstein et al., 2001). 
In this regard the importance of personal experience becomes evident. In 
particular with regard to natural hazards, such as flooding, personal experience 
has been highlighted as one of the most factors influencing risk perceptions 
(Wachinger, Renn, Begg, & Kuhlicke, 2013). In their review dealing with risk 
the perception of natural hazards literature, Wachinger et al. (2013) find that 
direct experience appears to be one of the most influential variables. Wachinger 
et al. (2013) make an important distinction between two types of experience: 
direct experience, which is described as internal; and indirect experience, which 
is defined as external. Their analysis of the available literature finds that 
personal experience of hazards is generally associated with higher risk 
perceptions. Flood victims in Italy have been found to have higher risk 
perceptions than individuals who have not experienced damage in earlier floods
(Miceli, Sotgiu, & Settanni, 2008). Confirming these findings, another study 
finds that persons with flood experience tend to overestimate danger, whereas 
the opposite is true for people without such experience (Ruin, Gaillard, & 
Lutoff, 2007). However, direct experience, under certain circumstances, can also 
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decrease risk perceptions. Individuals who have lived through a hazard event 
without suffering any personal damage, for example, exhibit decreased risk 
perceptions afterwards (Hall & Slothower, 2009; Scolobig, De Marchi, & Borga, 
2012). Indirect experiences of a hazard event, often related through a variety of 
media, can help recall previous hazard events and the associated experiences but
unsurprisingly have a weaker effect on risk perceptions that quickly fades away
and only plays a minor role if direct experiences exist. The short period of 
heightened risk perceptions after a natural disaster is often referred to as a 
‘window of opportunity’ that represents an ideal point in time for risk 
communication and risk education efforts (Felgentreff, 2003; Shaw, Kobayashi, 
& Kobayashi, 2004).
Research has shown that personally experiencing adverse consequences, 
by means of changing the emotional reaction to a risk, adds to the explanation 
of self-protective behaviour, beyond what can be explained as a function of 
simply providing conscious cognitive input to decision-making (Weinstein, 
1989). The process of how personal experiences influence and shape engagement 
with a certain type of risk or similar has been described in theories on the so-
called experiential learning pathway. Experiential learning essentially 
corresponds to what has been discussed in dual-process theories of thought as 
the function of the experiential system. In the context of climate change 
engagement studies the experiential learning pathway describes the seemingly 
intuitive theoretical assumption that individuals can understand and relate to 
climate change through observations that fall out of their subjective range of 
what constitutes regular weather. Since experiential learning happens 
automatically, does not require much effort, and possesses more immediate and 
personally relevant qualities compared to analytic processing, it is much more 
likely to occur (Marx et al., 2007). Both the availability and the affect heuristic 
have been discussed in relevant literature as facilitators of the effect that 
60
personal experiences of a certain hazard have on individual engagement (Keller, 
Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2006). The evidence base regarding this link between risk 
perceptions and personal action is, however, quite inconsistent. Wachinger et al. 
(2013) discuss this as the risk perception paradox and propose three 
explanations for results that often indicate a weak connection, or no connection 
at all, between risk perceptions and personal action: (1) The benefits of 
accepting a certain risk, living close to a river for example, outweigh the 
potential negative impacts. (2) Individuals simply do not feel responsible for
action. (3) Individuals do not feel able to address the risk. 
As has been shown, direct experience of risk and even high-risk
perceptions do not automatically lead to personal action. That is why efficient 
risk communication to create the necessary awareness and induce personal 
action has been central to the scholarly debate around risk. Risk communication 
is defined as a social process that accounts for the message characteristics, the 
sender, the audience, the social context, the hazard characteristics and the 
mode/channel of delivery (Höppner, Buchecker, & Bründl, 2010, p. 45).
Höppner et al. (2012, p. 1755), in assessing the current state of risk 
communication, state that it is “an increasingly complex activity which is 
moving beyond the one-way provision of information and the building of trust 
in risk-managing bodies towards a two-way exchange of knowledge and views”. 
Applying the concept of social capacity building, the authors highlight a series 
of characteristics that distinguish successful risk communication. This includes 
the format of the communication, where personal communication has been 
found to be more effective than communication via the media (Moser, 2010; 
Parker, Priest, & Tapsell, 2009) but equally how messages are framed (Spence 
& Pidgeon, 2010). Two-way (as opposed to one-way) communication has 
generally been found to be more effective, particularly with regard to building 
trust. The same applies to continuous communication efforts as opposed to one-
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off communication (Buchecker, Meier, & Hunziker, 2010; Conchie & Burns, 
2008; Höppner, Frick, & Buchecker, 2007). Defining risk communication as a 
two-way process necessarily implies that various audience characteristics also 
have to be considered. These include the mental models of certain risks that 
people hold, their personal problem frames, knowledge, beliefs and values (Bier, 
2001; Kolkman, Veen, & Geurts, 2007). With regard to the adverse 
psychological effects of natural hazards, risk communication scholars suggest 
that an optimistic and energetic language as opposed to one characterized by 
fear and helplessness and the provision of knowledge on how to act in critical 
situations can attenuate some of these (Ereaut & Segnit, 2006; Höppner et al., 
2012).
Linking literature on direct experiences of risk and risk communication,
Höppner et al. (2012) in their review of risk communication practices reveal 
that a majority of communications are flood-related. They attribute this to the 
pervasiveness of flood events in most European countries. This has led to a risk 
communication literature specific to flood risks. Messling et al. (2015), for 
example, propose a series of principles central to engaging the public with flood 
risks in the context of climate change. They argue that climate scientists can 
help to quantify the anthropogenic input for individual flooding events but also 
that risk communications can build on the increasing common public perception 
that links climate change and flooding. Risk communications around flooding, 
however, should ideally happen before flood events and more generally, should
be designed and carried out with diligence so they do not backfire. In 
communicating flood risks, it is important to strike a balance between local and 
global aspects and communications must seek to empower people to adapt to 
future flood risks. ‘Peer’ messengers and stories from affected communities then 
offer strong narratives to foster engagement and learning. 
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Orr et al. (2015), in reviewing literature on flood risk communication,
underline the importance of considering how audiences might react differently 
and identifying the factors that determine these differences. They argue that 
peoples’ attitudes and values shape their reactions to risk communication. It is 
therefore essential to identify specific audiences, to describe their attitudes, 
interests, values and concerns and to then design communications which suit 
these. A discussion of factors influencing how individuals respond to information 
about flooding starts with a useful distinction of three different theoretical 
frameworks of how people perceive flood risk outlined by Wood et al (2012): (1) 
individual level theories focus on the role of the individual and internal factors 
in shaping responses; (2) interpersonal level theories focus on other people’s role 
and external factors; and (3) community and group level theories consider the 
influence of the wider social context and communities, focusing on factors 
within the wider social systems. The next chapter presents a major theory in 
risk perception research that, to some extent, incorporates all these 
perspectives, starting with an initial focus on individuals themselves as opposed 
to the psychometric paradigm’s starting-point of hazard characteristics.
1.3.3 Cultural theory of risk
A strong focus on how individuals’ rather than hazards themselves shape 
risk perception has been central to Cultural theory, which builds on scholarship 
in anthropology and sociology. The Cultural Theory of Risk originates in work 
by Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) which aimed to explain increasing 
environmental concerns and risk awareness during the late 1960s and 1970s. 
The observation that this trend was in fact contrasted by increasing quality of 
life, increasing life expectancy and increasing control over hazards lead the 
authors to propose that these preoccupations are in fact social in origin (Tansey 
& O’Riordan, 1999). Cultural theory, in essence, provides a theoretical 
framework to better understand what is termed the social construction of risk. 
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The concept of social construction of risk is derived from the more general 
assumption of the social constructions of meaning or social construction of 
reality describing the idea that all perceptions, knowledge, language, every 
aspect of human living, is in fact socially construed (Dake, 1992; Tansey & 
O’Riordan, 1999). Cultural theory’ investigates these social constructions of risk 
of how groups choose risks and how they choose to frame them by describing 
social relations between individuals (Tansey & O’Riordan, 1999).
This research focus is reflected in two central assumptions of cultural 
theory: (1) Adherence to a certain form of how social relations are organized is 
related to a specific way of social construction; of viewing, interpreting the 
world, so called cultural biases, which logically includes how individuals perceive 
risks. Cultural biases describe the idea that “competing cultures confer different 
meanings on situations, events, objects, and especially relationships” (1992, p. 
27). The idea of ‘competing cultures’ expresses the underlying assumption that 
the varying social constructions of risk are functional in that they maintain and 
legitimize a preferred form of social relations, culture, or way of life, while 
weakening the others (Michael Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990; Wildavsky 
& Dake, 1990). The relationship of societal relations and cultural biases is 
reciprocal and mutually reinforcing in that cultural biases legitimize a chosen 
pattern of societal relations, which in turn favour certain cultural biases. This 
interplay of cultural biases and societal relations is sometimes summarized as a 
particular way of life – alternatively described as worldview or ideology – that 
individuals subscribe to (Dake, 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983; Marris et al., 
1998; Michael Thompson et al., 1990). (2) Cultural theory further posits that 
four distinct ideology groups can be described by their specific profile on two 
dimensions. The group dimension reflects the strength of allegiance to a group. 
The grid dimension indicates the amount of prescriptions an individual is 
confronted with in a particular social environment. In other words the group 
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characteristic reflects the degree to which a person forms part of a collective. 
Grid on the other hand describes to what extent a person’s life is determined by 
norms and regulations. The group/grid taxonomy, as Cultural theory is 
sometimes alternatively referred to, in its core includes four possible 
combinations of high/low group/grid characteristics: hierarchy (high group, 
high grid), egalitarianism (high group, low grid), individualism (low group, low 
grid) and fatalism (low group, high grid) (Dake, 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1983; Marris et al., 1998; Michael Thompson et al., 1990).
Figure1.Thefourgroup/gridtypologies
The four group/grid typologies as shown in Figure 1 can be described in 
more detail by the “distinctive myths of nature, specific types of rationality, and 
particular risk management strategies” they hold (Dake, 1992, p. 28). Central to 
hierarchical groups is the belief in the myth that nature is perverse or tolerant, 
which describes the idea that nature is robust up to certain limits. Groups are 
organized hierarchically as compliance flows up the ranks and commands flow 
down. Sustainable development with expert decision makers to prescribe limits 
and regulations is thus the strategy of choice in managing the environment. 
Egalitarian groups conceive nature as fragile. Egalitarian groups are concerned 
with outcome equality and thus critical of hierarchical decision processes. 
Discussions of risks concentrate on ethical aspects, as a way of examining the 
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social and political aspects of technologies and scrutinizing the role of 
institutions in risk management. It follows that the preferred environmental 
management strategy is anchored in precautionary principles. Adherents of the 
individualist group subscribe to the myth of nature as benign. They assume that 
if individuals are freed from imposed constraints arising from group and grid 
pressures they will find abundance; and any hazards created in the process of 
getting more of the good will be outweighed by the benefits accrued. 
Deregulation is thus favoured in environmental management in order to act 
freely in self-regulated networks with as little external interference as possible.
Central to the fatalist typology9 is the myth of nature as capricious. Nature 
cannot be controlled and fatalists’ behaviour is controlled by external entities 
they do not or choose not to form part of. Consequently this group yields little 
interest in management strategies as they withdraw into isolation and 
disengagement (Dake, 1992; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). 
Empirical work on Cultural theory has looked at how these specific 
worldviews affect the perception of specific risks in comparison to other 
predictors of risk perception, namely knowledge, personality traits and 
demographic characteristics. The general finding is that “however 
conceptualized-whether as political ideology or cultural biases-worldviews best 
account for patterns of risk perceptions” (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990, p. 56). 
‘Patterns of risk’ refers to the finding that risk perceptions emerge from an 
interplay of cultural biases and the type of hazard that is being evaluated. 
Particular risks are more salient to individuals from one group than they are to 
individuals from another. Wildavsky and Dake found (1990) that overall 
egalitarianism is positively related to the mean perceived risk, and negatively 
9 The fatalist typology is not discussed in much detail in relevant research. Tansley and 
O’Riordan (1999) attribute this to the fact that fatalists are uncoupled from political debate.
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related to the average benefit, of technologies. In particular, egalitarians are 
most concerned about technical and environmental risk. Specifically, 
egalitarianism is most strongly associated with concern for ‘environmental 
pollution’, ‘dangers associated with nuclear energy’ and the ‘threat of nuclear 
war’. Egalitarianism correlates with high risk-estimates for environmental 
threats with potentially catastrophic outcomes such as ‘nuclear power’ and the 
‘ozone depletion’; and unnatural risks, such as ‘genetic engineering’ and ‘micro 
wave ovens’ (Dake, 1992; Marris et al., 1998).
Hierarchism and individualism by contrast are positively associated with 
technological risk-taking and correlate with average ratings regarding 
technological benefits. Distinctive of individuals is that they dread the risk of 
war more than others and individualism is generally more highly correlated with 
concern for economic issues such as the ‘lack of a stable investment climate’. 
Individualism correlates with low risk perceptions for environmental threats and 
what the authors interpret as personal risks, such as alcoholic drinks, car 
driving etc. Hierarchists are most preoccupied with forms of social deviance and 
insubordination as a particularly strong correlation between hierarchy and 
concern for ‘loss of respect for authority’ suggests. The hierarchical worldview is 
associated with high risk perceptions concerning social threat such as terrorism 
and mugging (Dake, 1992; Marris et al., 1998). 
Integrating both the psychometric paradigm and cultural theory Marris 
et al. (1998) expanded this line of work to provide a valuable comparison of the 
relative predictive power of the two approaches in explaining risk perceptions. 
The authors found that qualitative risk characteristics of the psychometric 
paradigm explain a substantially larger proportion of risk perceptions than do 
cultural biases. They explain the relatively low power of cultural biases in 
predicting risk perceptions pointing to the relatively distant nature of the 
operationalization of cultural biases when compared to measures of risk 
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perception and the various risk characteristics which could be argued to 
measure much more similar constructs. The authors further add that the more 
interesting results do in fact pertain to the differences found between cultural 
biases, yielding distinct patterns of risk perceptions in line with previous 
research and predictions of cultural theory. 
In summarizing how cultural biases lead to these distinctive patterns of 
risk perceptions Wildavsky and Dake state that
hierarchists favour technological risk taking because they see this as 
supporting the institutions that they rely on to make good their promises, to 
wit: technology can promote a stronger society and a safer future provided that 
their rules (and stratified social relations) are maintained. Individualists also 
deem technology to be good. They hold that following market principles (and
individually negotiated social relations) will allow technological innovation to 
triumph, conferring creative human value on otherwise inert resources. They 
also believe that the enormous benefits of technological innovation will convey 
their premise that unfettered bidding and bargaining leaves people better off. If 
they believed that free market institutions are intrinsically ruinous to nature, 
individualists could no longer defend a life of minimum restraints. By the same 
token, egalitarians are opposed to taking technological risks because they see 
them as supporting the inegalitarian markets and coercive hierarchies to which 
they are opposed (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990, p. 52)
Just like the psychometric paradigm cultural theory has attracted 
criticism. A first criticism focuses on what is labelled the ‘impossibility 
theorem’, the idea that only the four forms of social organization (egalitarian, 
hierarchical, individualist and fatalist) represent stable enough combinations of 
high/low group/grid characteristics. As Dake (1992) points out, however, 
relaxing this strict classification does not conflict with the core assumption of 
functional interdependency of social relations and cultural biases. This criticism 
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relates to discussions around two interpretations of cultural theory. (1) The 
stability version of cultural theory assumes that individuals adhere to one 
worldview across different spheres and periods of their life. (2) The mobility 
conceptualization instead accepts that adherence to certain cultural biases can 
change over time and will also depend on the particular sphere of life the 
individual lives. In support of this latter interpretation of cultural theory 
Marris, Langford and O’Riordan (1998) find that only approximately a third of 
respondents can actually be clearly subdivided according to the group/grid 
taxonomy. They conclude that “the four cultural biases may be best interpreted 
as extreme reference points” (Marris et al., 1998, p. 646). The majority of 
respondents adhere to multiple cultural biases, lending support to Dake’s (1992)
proposition of relaxing categorical assumptions. The finding itself is not 
necessarily surprising considering that the scales used to measure preference for 
a particular worldview are not independent of each other. In particular, 
individualism shows a strong negative correlation with egalitarianism and a 
strong positive association with hierarchism. Many of these criticisms actually 
relate to the operationalization of cultural theory and with regards to this 
informed criticism needs to acknowledge some of the caveats and constraints 
explicitly referred to in cultural theory summarized by Tansey and O’Riordan 
(1999). Firstly, the grid/group model is not designed to explain individual 
behaviour. The tendency to focus on individual behaviour in explaining social 
action, labelled methodological individualism is dominant in social sciences but 
cultural theory instead focuses on what people who form groups have in 
common. Cultural theory thus cannot provide insight into what particular 
personality type is attracted by a particular form of social organization. 
Secondly, cultural theory is static and does not attempt to describe how 
changes in cultural orientation happen. Thirdly, cultural theory’s value is 
heuristic in nature, rather than being an analytical tool. Finally, cultural theory 
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should be applied to social environments rather than societies as a whole 
(Tansey & O’Riordan, 1999).
The value of cultural theory, as has been pointed out by Marris et al 
(1998) lies in the sophistication it allows in analysing how groups of individuals 
differ in their risk perception of particular hazards. The authors are able to 
show that these differences between cultural biases extend to how certain 
characteristics are rated. In particular the aspect of ‘harm to future generations’ 
yielded numerous significant correlations with the various cultural biases. In 
accordance with cultural theory egalitarianism correlated positively with risk 
ratings concerning this characteristic for 7 out of 13 risk issues while both 
individualism and hierarchism correlated negatively with most of these. High 
ratings regarding the feature ‘harm to future generations’ for ‘terrorism’ and 
‘mugging’ by contrast, were strongly associated with hierarchism but not with 
any other cultural bias (Marris et al., 1998). This clearly illustrates how cultural 
biases, more than just producing biased risk perceptions do in fact influence the 
way hazards are interpreted. 
1.4 Adaptation behaviour and engagement 
with climate change
Since adaptation is often also a form of individual behaviour, this last 
section concentrates on a short discussion of the psychological literature on the 
factors driving individual adaptation behaviour. It is important to note, though, 
that for adaptation climate change does not represent a necessary analytical 
context. As has been outlined in chapter 1.2.1, adaptation is a form of response 
to changing environmental conditions that existed long before climate change 
entered the picture. As such, there are various psychological research areas that 
have looked at adaptation responses in a non-climate change related way. 
Environmental stress literature, for example, explores how organisms 
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react/adapt to environmental stressors such as noise or pollution. Equally,
research on human engagement with natural hazards has looked at how 
individuals respond to natural hazards, such as flooding, which potentially offers 
considerable overlap with research on adaptation to climate change impacts. 
With this thesis’ background in social psychology, and environmental 
psychology in particular, the work presented here tries to situate climate change 
adaptation within the wider literature on pro-environmental behaviour, in order 
to explore the applicability of this research tradition to climate change 
adaptation. 
For the application of a of a pro-environmental behaviour framework to 
adaptation, Stern (2000) offers a helpful and crucial distinction between intent-
and impact-oriented behaviour. Intent-oriented pro-environmental behaviour is 
primarily motivated by the intention to change the environment, whereas its 
impact-oriented counterpart is driven by a clear determination to actually 
change the environment. I understand the mitigation and adaptation intention 
measures employed in this study as proxies for impact-oriented behaviour. This 
however does not preclude the possibility that participants’ responses to the 
actions proposed in the questionnaire are in fact motivated by intention more 
than they are by the impact they should achieve. It could also be hypothesized 
that mitigation as the more established category of climate change measures is 
more strongly embedded in attitudinal and value networks and thus, already 
more strongly dissociated from its purpose/impact than adaptation is.
Stern et al. (1999) further distinguish between activist and non-activist 
behaviour. The latter is then further subdivided into consumer behaviour, 
environmental citizenship and policy support. This distinction offers a valuable 
addition of nuances to behaviour that is often measured, neglecting peculiar 
variances in behaviour types that potentially exhibit different predictor 
patterns. That said, Stern et al. (1999) do not propose how these might differ 
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for the various dimension. Applying the terminology of Stern et al. (1999), this 
research will focus on non-activist behaviour and consumer behaviour and 
policy support in particular.
Value belief norm (VBN) theory (Stern, 2000) has been proposed as one 
of the principal theories in the environmental psychology literature to explain 
pro-environmental behaviour. VBN theory offers an overarching framework for 
including variables from other theories on environmentalism and the broader 
social psychology literature. It describes a causal chain of five variables that 
lead to pro-environmental behaviour. The model builds on (1) personal values, 
which are assessed with a scale based on measures by Schwartz and colleagues 
(1987; 1994) and adapted to the context of pro-environmental values. Personal 
values then inform a person’s (2) ecological worldview, which is measured by the 
NEP-scale (Dunlap & Vanliere, 1978). Both of these constructs can be described 
as belonging to what is often referred to as human values in social psychology. 
Depending on these values, an individual can then exhibit (3) awareness of 
consequences for a valued object (AC), which is operationalized here as affective 
engagement. (4) Ascription of responsibility to the self then leads to (5) pro-
environmental personal norms, which serve as a direct precursor of pro-
environmental action. 
While to the best of my knowledge no specific theory of climate change 
relevant behaviour exists yet, various aspects and theories have been discussed 
in the wider literature examining individuals’ engagement with climate change. 
Debates about the reality of climate change in particular have sparked 
interesting discussion of psychological constructs that could help explain 
peoples’ engagement with climate change. It seems, that as evidence of human 
influence on global climate is increasing, so are the voices that question, doubt 
or straight-out reject the idea of anthropogenic climate change (Dunlap & 
McCright, 2008; N. Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012). Tendencies like these have been 
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referred to as climate change scepticism or climate change denial. The latter 
term of denial has a long history in psychological research going back to early 
psychoanalytical work and commonly describes “a defence mechanism involving 
a disavowal or failure consciously to acknowledge thoughts, feelings, desires, or 
aspects of reality that would be painful or unacceptable …” (Colman, 2009, p. 
199). Scepticism, from what is/was once conceived as an essential virtue of 
scientific scrutiny (Merton, 1973) has instead increasingly been turned into a 
label to describe the behaviour, attitudes and beliefs of those disengaged or 
dismissive of climate change science. This chapter will discuss the issue of
climate change scepticism and related constructs largely in line with the above-
mentioned definition of denial as a defence mechanism. I understand climate 
change scepticism as attitudes and beliefs that challenge established scientific 
facts regarding climate change. These challenges can vary in extent and 
intensity, from a complete negation of the problem10 to less pronounced forms 
such as doubt and uncertainty over certain aspects of climate change. 
In this vein various taxonomies of climate change scepticism have been 
proposed. Rahmstorf (2004) for example, distinguishes three types of sceptics: 
(1) Attribution Sceptics, who doubt climate change is caused by humans, (2) 
Impact Sceptics, who contest the negative effects climate change will have and 
(3) Trend Sceptics, who doubt there is such a thing as climate change. A 
similar form of classification is outlined by Opotow and Weiss (2000) in their 
work on denial and moral exclusion in environmental conflicts. They describe 
three forms of denial in environmental conflicts applicable to climate change 
scepticism: (1) Denial of outcome severity, similarly to impact scepticism it does 
not acknowledge negative impacts or harmful consequences. (2) Denial of 
10 I argue that the term denial applies to this form of climate change scepticism only, whereas 
scepticism illustrates the various degrees of sceptic beliefs more accurately.
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stakeholder inclusion legitimizes moral exclusion and hence reduced concern, on 
the basis of unfavourable evaluations of others, who are often labelled as 
‘outsiders’ or ‘extremists’ in this context (3) Denial of self-involvement closely 
parallels the attribution sceptic typology and describes a mechanism whereby 
the individual negates any responsibility or even ability to act. More recently
Capstick and Pidgeon (2014b) in an effort to refine the concept, have proposed 
two forms of climate change scepticism: (1) Epistemic Scepticism, relating to 
uncertainty about the science and overall matter of climate change itself and (2) 
Response scepticism, summarizing doubts regarding the efficacy of climate 
change measures. It could be argued that the latter form of scepticism might be 
very similar to what is often also discussed as efficacy beliefs. These types of 
beliefs are traditionally understood as a precondition to action and express
whether a person judges a certain behaviour to be effective and/or whether 
he/she thinks, that he/she is actually able to perform the respective behaviour. 
These parallels between scepticism and efficacy beliefs add a valuable new 
perspective to efficacy beliefs contrasting the idea that efficacy beliefs are 
typically grounded in an objective evaluation of the actions in question.
The above-mentioned typologies of scepticism offer insight into the 
various forms of scepticism but do not provide us with a procedural account of 
how climate change triggers these responses and what function they might 
serve. Stoll-Kleemann, O'Riordan, and Jaeger (2001) looking at the constituting 
components of climate change denial in more detail argue that it builds on four 
interrelated so-called interpretations: (1) The comfort interpretation describes 
the reluctance of individuals to give up certain accustomed ways of living that 
are closely linked to one’s definition of self. (2) The tragedy of the commons
interpretation is based on the idea that individual action is of little value and 
that while the individual tries to maximize the collective long-term interest, 
others will maximize their own personal benefit, thus justifying their inaction 
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and/or unsustainable practices. (3) The “managerial fix” interpretation is 
characterized by the belief that the issue of climate change will be resolved by 
future technological and administrative innovations. (4) The governance distrust
interpretation builds on the conviction that while the individual will have to 
contribute; the state will not live up to its commitments. Apart from the 
comfort interpretation however, these explanations seem to represent 
descriptions of the various pathways via which scepticism can be expressed, 
rather than explaining the underlying mechanism and its purpose. The comfort
interpretation instead suggests that scepticism is much more than just a 
different view on the issue of climate change but that it serves a self-serving 
purpose.
Taking a broader perspective one could argue that scepticism falls within 
a wider set of climate change perceptions that is often referred to as the 
psychological distance of climate change (Haden, Niles, Lubell, Perlman, & 
Jackson, 2012; Spence, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2012). This describes the 
consistent finding that the majority of people think of climate change as a 
threat that is uncertain, most likely to affect other people, far-away 
communities and countries more heavily, and in a distant future. Concern for 
climate change generally is quite widespread but when compared to other 
concerns in life, so called issue importance, climate change consistently ranks 
comparatively low (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Nisbet & Myers, 2007; Pidgeon, 
2012). Emotional engagement likewise seems to be of a rather detached nature.
Negative emotions are dominant but are not intensely felt and primary, visceral 
emotions such as fear or anxiety appear to be lacking mostly (Leiserowitz, 
Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Smith, 2010a, 2010b; Leiserowitz, 2006; Lorenzoni, 
Leiserowitz, Doria, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2006; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & 
Whitmarsh, 2007; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Poortinga, Spence, 
Whitmarsh, Capstick, & Pidgeon, 2011).
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Research has shown that there are instances that can ameliorate these
psychologically distant perceptions and lack of affective processing which relate 
to the above-mentioned experiential learning pathway. Prime examples are
extreme weather events, such as flooding, which can provide the avowedly 
questionable opportunity for this sort of processing and shift in perceptions, 
which can induce greater engagement with climate change (Spence, Poortinga, 
Butler, & Pidgeon, 2011; Zsamboky, Fernández-Bilbao, Smith, Knight, & Allan, 
2011). In most cases though, and thankfully so, in absence of traumatic extreme 
weather events, the nature of climate change remains abstract and makes it 
difficult for individuals to gather real-life experience.
The concept of psychological distance itself is most prominently linked to 
Construal Level Theory (CLT) (Trope & Liberman, 2010). CLT assumes that 
so-called mental construals of a certain issue are established in relation to the 
self in the here and now as a reference point characterized by four dimensions of 
psychological distance: time (present to future), space (here to there), social
distance (us to them) and hypotheticality (certain to uncertain). Trope and 
Liberman (2010) propose that for individuals to transcend their egocentric 
viewpoint they have to rely on these mental construals, which gain in 
abstraction from low level construals to high level construals as distance on the 
above-mentioned dimensions increases. Mental construals are separate from 
immediate experience and entail contents such as memories, predictions and 
speculations. Research in this domain has highlighted three main findings: (1) 
The above-mentioned dimensions of distance are cognitively linked to one 
another and (2) these dimensions and mental construals reciprocally affect each 
other. (3) Furthermore these dimensions influence predictions, preferences and 
actions in similar ways (for a review see Trope & Liberman, 2010). As shown 
above climate change perceptions seem to be consistently located at the more 
distant end of these. It is thus important to note that distant public views on 
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climate change should not be understood as overly flawed or misinformed. If one 
is to apply the theoretical insights from CLT to the issue of public perceptions 
of climate change, it becomes conceivable how for the average citizen of a 
wealthy state this phenomenon does in fact lend itself much easier to a distant 
and abstract perception. The process of climate change is slow and associated 
with inertia. Future generations are most likely to be more affected than we are 
now and on a societal and geographical dimension it is reasonable to think that 
less wealthy countries, remote from respondents’ realities, will face the brunt of
climate impacts. Finally, uncertainty like for any other science is inherent in 
climate science itself. 
1.5 Summary, research aim and structure
1.5.1 Summary
The overwhelming majority of scientists today agree that humanity is 
affecting the world’s climate and it does so mostly by releasing greenhouse gases
(GHG), such as carbon dioxide, into the atmosphere. It is virtually certain that 
this increase in GHG there will lead to an increase in temperature extremes 
over most land areas, and it is very likely that the frequency and duration of 
heat waves will increase. Similarly, extreme precipitation will very likely 
increase, both in frequency and intensity. This creates a paradoxical state of 
future climate in which societies will be simultaneously confronted with more 
flooding events and more periods of drought. Sea level rise will only further add 
to these challenges, as its pace is very likely to surpass that between 1971 to 
2010.
Two major climate change response strategies, adaptation and mitigation 
can be highlighted. Mitigation is defined as a “human intervention to reduce the 
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases” (IPCC, 2014a, p. 1769). 
Adaptation instead is described as a “process of adjustment to actual or 
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expected climate and its effects” (IPCC, 2014a, p. 1758). Since this thesis’ focus 
is on public perceptions of and responses towards adaptation the introduction 
explored the concept of adaptation and its history in more detail. Historically 
the international debate on climate change paid less attention to adaptation 
until the turn of the millennium. Interest in adaptation before that was limited 
and if adaptation was dealt with then mostly in its function as “a handmaiden 
to impacts research in the mitigation context” (Burton et al., 2002, p. 146). 
The past 15 years, however, have seen an increasing interest in 
adaptation. Various reasons have been put forward for why adaptation needs to 
be considered to the same extent. Potentially the most prominent arguments for 
intensifying adaptation efforts are related to the limits of mitigation, the 
complementarity of mitigation and adaptation in addressing climate change and 
the inertia of the climate system, committing future societies to a considerable 
amount of climate change, even if societies were to execute very stringent 
mitigation plans today. The political reality of setbacks in international 
negotiations on emission reductions only adds to the urgency in shifting some of 
the attention towards adaptation. This tendency is evident in increasing 
scholarly and political attention to adaptation. Research in a psychological 
research tradition, however, has been lagging behind, as very little scholarly 
work has examined how individuals perceive and, on a more general level,
engage with climate change adaptation. The principal research aim of this thesis 
is thus, to narrow this gap.
In doing so this thesis partly relies on scholarly work on risk perception, 
and social psychological research in particular. Social psychological research on 
risk is embedded in the wider context of social analyses of risk that contrasted 
the formerly predominantly technological approach. One of two major 
paradigms in social analyses of risk is the psychometric approach, which is the 
principal heuristic paradigm of this thesis. 
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Following research in this tradition, this thesis further focuses on so-
called heuristics and the affect heuristic in particular. This latter heuristic
assumes, that feelings inform our risk decisions. Theory on the affect heuristic is 
linked to scholarly work on dual-process models, which generally distinguish 
between an analytical system and an experiential system. The experiential 
system, as the substrate of the affect heuristic, is defined by quick, intuitive, 
effortless and emotional processing. 
The experiential and analytical system work in conjunction. but when 
the two systems reach opposing judgement it is conventionally the experiential 
system that comes out on top. Related to the latter is the concept of 
experiential learning. In the context of climate change engagement studies, the 
concept of experiential learning suggests that individuals can comprehend
climate change through observations of particular weather phenomena, which 
they link to climate change. Both the availability and the affect heuristic have 
been discussed in relevant literature as facilitators of the effect that personal 
experiences of a certain hazard have on individual engagement (Keller et al., 
2006).
Studies in a psychometric research tradition also paid attention to inter-
individual differences. Work in this line has found that to some extent risk 
perceptions are actually driven by adherence to certain cultural preferences. A 
strong focus on this type of cultural and inter-individual differences has been 
central to cultural theory of risk, the second major paradigm in social analyses 
of risk. The central insight from research applying cultural theory is that 
cultural biases, informed by adherence to four group-grid cultural typologies,
best account for patterns of individual risk perceptions, finding that particular 
risks, but also particular risk characteristics, are more salient and mean 
different things to individuals from one group, than they do to individuals from 
another.
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This thesis combines the two major elements of the introduction as it offers an 
empirical exploration of public engagement with climate change, paying 
particular attention to the role of climate change adaptation as a more recently 
established category of climate change action. It does so in a psychometric 
research tradition but with a strong effort to incorporate scholarship on cultural 
theory and risk as affect, to the extent that the methodologically individualistic 
approach taken here allows. By focusing on public engagement this thesis seeks 
to explore much more than just public perceptions. It equally aims to 
investigate how these perceptions are then translated into behavioural 
intentions and support. To do so this thesis, in a first step, relies on a core 
theoretical approach in environmental psychology that has been proposed to 
explain pro-environmental behaviour.
1.5.2Research aim & structure
The overarching aim of this thesis is to explore how the overall 
engagement with climate change changes in light of a more balanced focus on 
both climate change adaptation and mitigation. It does so in multiple ways and 
by asking a series of research questions.
Chapter 2 explores the link between individual risk perceptions regarding 
climate change and individual behaviour intentions and policy support for both 
climate change adaptation and mitigation. On an elementary level it thus 
explores the relationship of adaptation and mitigation with regards to 
individuals’ intentions and support, moving beyond the solely theoretical 
considerations presented in the introduction. More sophisticated analysis then 
looks at psychological correlates of the various behavioural intention and policy 
support, comparing again adaptation and mitigation with regards to the specific 
predictor patterns that emerge. The questionnaire employed includes a variety 
of variables. To illustrate, the survey instrument is concerned with various 
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aspects of individuals’ climate change perceptions. It asks participants to 
indicate whether they believe in climate change and whether they agree that 
they, their families, etc. will be affected by climate change. A series of items 
aims to capture respondents’ emotional engagement with and concern for 
climate change and sea level rise and tests their climate change-related 
knowledge. The questionnaire also includes value- and ideology-related scale 
measurements. A large part of the survey is then concerned with behavioural 
intentions and policy support for both mitigation and adaptation but also 
includes questions that aim to measure efficacy beliefs and responsibility 
attributions. Finally, various socio-demographic variables are surveyed. This 
chapter is mainly of exploratory nature and aims to address two main research 
questions: (1) Can pro-environmental theory be applied to explain adaptation 
and mitigation behaviour intentions and policy support? (2) What are the 
similarities and dissimilarities of adaptation and mitigation in terms of 
psychological predictor patterns?
Chapter 3 investigates whether climate change adaptation as a novel 
aspect of the wider climate change debate induces a shift in risk perceptions and 
consequently affects individual behaviour intentions and policy support,
addressing some of the questions raised in chapter 2. To this end, an 
experimental study tests the effect of a series of frames, that is, particular ways 
of presenting and speaking of climate change on individuals’ engagement with 
climate change. The four frames present climate change as either a local or a 
global issue and propose either mitigation or adaptation as the appropriate 
response strategy. Participants are randomly allocated to one of four groups and 
are presented with a fictitious newspaper article, via which the frames are 
operationalized. In addition to these differences in framing climate change, the 
study pays particular attention to how individuals who adhere to distinct 
ideologies, operationalized as political orientation, might perceive the frames 
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differently and thus react differently. The survey instrument built around these 
experimental conditions measures a series of variables, some of which are 
employed before and after participants have read the contrived article. Pre-
post-measures include scales on climate change scepticism, environmental 
identity, concern for the effects of climate change and sea level rise, efficacy 
beliefs, emotional engagement with climate change and perceived distance of 
climate change. Participants’ cultural orientation is measured and individuals 
are also asked to rate their political orientation, the measure that ultimately 
serves to split the sample into right- and left-leaning individuals. The survey 
includes policy support measures, which in addition to personal support also 
asks individuals to rate the efficacy of these measures. A simpler measure also 
ask respondents whether they would like more information on adaptation or 
mitigation. Socio-demographics and political preferences are also measured.
The study presented in chapter 3 builds on work on identity protective 
cognitions, in a cultural theory of risk research tradition.  It investigates 
whether there is an effect that pertains to the local and more concrete nature of 
adaptation measures that helps increase the salience of climate change among 
liberals and conservatives, increasing overall engagement, with a potentially 
antipodal effect for liberal individuals who object addressing a global issue at 
the local level. Further, an additional effect of adaptation is tested. I 
hypothesize that adaptation resonates better with conservative values, providing 
a more ideology congruent narrative around solutions to climate change and 
thereby dismantling some of the conservative audiences’ dismissive stance 
towards the issue of climate change as a whole. In essence, the principal 
research question this chapter addresses is: How do the spatial (local vs. global) 
and climate change measure (adaptation vs. mitigation) framing of climate 
change affect the engagement of right-leaning and left-leaning individuals?
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Chapter 4 presents a study, which investigates whether personally 
experiencing flooding and the attribution of flooding to climate change, 
alongside other variables, are associated with mitigation and adaptation 
intentions. In addressing the question of the role personal experiences plays with 
regards to both mitigation and adaptation intentions it thus addresses an 
important shortcoming due to sample restrictions in the first two studies. The 
data investigated here represent a section from a larger project which collected 
a nationally representative sample to investigate the effect of personal 
experiences of flooding on climate change engagement in the aftermath of a 
series of flood events during the UK winter 2013/14. 
The study incorporates a measure of personal flooding experience that is 
designed to assess the effect of personal experiences as well as possible using 
cross-sectional data. Whether individuals actually link the flooding to climate 
change is also surveyed in order to control for the essential role attribution 
beliefs play. The regression models further include variables that have also been 
included in chapters 2 and 3, such as environmental identity, psychological 
distance of climate change and climate change belief. Lastly, constructs directly 
related to experiencing flood are incorporated. These include measures like flood 
coping belief, perceived personal flood risk and the emotional consequences of 
the flooding events. 
Multiple regression analysis is carried out for flood adaptation and 
mitigation intentions. For both adaptation and mitigation previous experiences 
of flooding have been linked to stronger intentions. Two competing hypotheses 
explaining this effect exist in literature. The experiential learning hypothesis 
suggests that experiences of what could be interpreted as climate change 
impacts heighten the salience of climate change in the personal memory of 
affected individuals and thus lead to higher risk perceptions. The motivated 
reasoning hypothesis instead reverses the direction of effect building on work 
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around cultural biases. It argues that individuals tend to process information in 
a way that confirms their a priori conclusions. Following this logic respondents 
have higher risk perceptions regarding climate change to start with and would 
thus pay more attention to climate change impacts, and consequently report 
these more frequently. This study seeks to answer the following two principle 
research questions: (1) Does the personal experience of flooding serve as a 
predictor of flood adaptation and mitigation intentions, and if yes, what is the 
sign of these effect? (2) Is this potential effect of personally experiencing 
flooding moderated by whether individuals attribute flooding to climate change 
or not?
84
85
Chapter 2 - Psychological
Variables Associated with 
Behaviour Intentions and Policy 
Support for Adaptation and 
Mitigation
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a study of risk perceptions around climate change 
and sea-level rise and how these link to intentions to perform, and support for, 
adaptation and mitigation measures. The study links the two main issues 
presented in the previous introduction from an environmental psychology 
perspective: the issue of risk perception and the establishment of adaptation as 
an equally important climate change measure alongside mitigation. Linking 
these two aspects is achieved by relying on the rich environmental psychology 
literature of the past decades that has looked at psychological variables that are 
related to or determine pro-environmental behaviour. As has been shown in 
chapter 1.2.1 it will be essential to implement both adaptation and mitigation 
measures. The public’s support, compliance and motivation are at the core of
effectively executing these approaches. Thus, to understand how people perceive 
climate change and the various responses to it; what their attitudes and beliefs 
are; and to comprehend the mechanics of their decision processes, becomes
central to efficiently promoting and implementing adaptation and mitigation
measures. The social sciences and psychology in particular can do a great deal 
to progress our understanding of the complex mechanisms involved. The present 
study builds on environmental psychology studies of determinants of pro-
environmental behaviour and climate-change risk perception literature. 
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Some studies that have investigated climate change relevant behaviour 
have done so by describing factors that impede climate change mitigation and 
adaptation efforts in individuals. Gifford (2011), for example, arranges these 
into seven categories, namely: limited cognition, ideologies, comparisons with 
others, sunk costs, distrust, perceived risks and limited behaviour. In the same 
vein Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, and Whitmarsh (2007) have written about 
barriers perceived by the public to cognitively, affectively and behaviourally 
engage with climate change. They highlight multiple barriers operating at 
individual as well as societal levels, such as: lack of knowledge, uncertainty and 
scepticism, fatalism, lack of action by business and industry, lack of political 
action and social norms and expectations. Even a limited cross section of the 
available literature on climate change engagement like this, clearly illustrates 
the wealth of contributing factors and forms of engagement that have been 
discussed in relevant literature. Merging insights from literature on 
determinants of pro-environmental behaviour with existing scholarly work on 
risk perceptions the following section will elaborate on key factors and 
theoretical constructs that underlie the present research and conceptual 
framework. Broadly, the subsequently discussed variables fall into the three 
categories outlined by Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, and Whitmarsh (2007): 
cognitive, affective and behavioural engagement with climate change.
2.1.1Determinants of adaptation and mitigation intentions 
and behaviours
Fundamental to engagement with climate change is the perception of 
climate change as something that might affect the individual, or valued persons 
and objects in a negative way (Stern et al., 1999). Risk perception, as 
elaborated in the previous chapter, therefore is an essential aspect of peoples’ 
motivation to act on climate change. Pidgeon, Hood, Hones, Turner, and 
Gibson (1992, p. 89) assert that “risk perception involves people’s beliefs, 
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attitudes, judgements and feelings, as well as the wider social or cultural values 
and dispositions that people adopt towards hazards and their benefits”. This 
definition covers a range of components of risk perception, from the rather 
cognitive and systematic assessment of risks to acknowledgements of 
sociocultural aspects, values and affective evaluation of risks. This broadly 
mirrors the theoretical development of risk perception as solely grounded in 
rule-based judgement, to today’s more comprehensive understanding of risk 
perception as a result of complementary analytical and experiential processing 
in a sociocultural context (Epstein, 1994). 
Cognitive engagement with climate change
Knowledge about climate change and its impacts can be understood as 
one of the most essential, albeit not sufficient, constituting components of 
concern and subsequently action. Studies in the past have looked at what 
people know about climate change and, despite the fact that climate change is a 
widely known and well-understood phenomenon, they found considerable 
misinformation among lay-people. Among the most common misconceptions 
were the idea of stratospheric ozone depletion as a main cause of climate change 
and lacking knowledge of CO2 as a main contributor to climate change and its 
relation to the combustion of fossil fuels (Bord, O’Connor, & Fisher, 2000; 
Kempton, 1991; Lorenzoni et al., 2007). More recent studies have shown that 
there is higher awareness and understanding regarding climate change. Ozone 
depletion, for example, is only rarely mentioned as a cause of climate change 
and respondents are now more likely to list energy use as a major contributing 
factor. Some incorrect beliefs however still persist. Such as the important role 
CO2 as a climate change cause and how CO2 is linked to the combustion of 
fossil fuels (Reynolds, Bostrom, Read, & Morgan, 2010). 
As a possible explanation for a situation where more scientific insights 
simultaneously increase ignorance Ungar (2000) discusses the knowledge-
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ignorance paradox. He argues that this happens as a result of progressively 
specialized expert groups with decreasing common knowledge, information 
overload and increasing barriers, including speech barriers, which inhibit the 
appreciation for other knowledge domains. Studies have shown that knowledge 
about climate change is positively linked to concern, personal efficacy, belief in 
anthropogenic climate change and support for mitigation policies (Bord et al., 
2000; Milfont, 2012; Stevenson, Peterson, Bondell, Moore, & Carrier, 2014; 
Tobler, Visschers, & Siegrist, 2012). These findings support the knowledge-
deficit hypothesis, which assumes that awareness and concern, as preconditions 
of appropriate action are low because the public is uninformed. Consequently it 
proposes that the dissemination of appropriate information can amend this. In 
this vein Leary (2012) for example reports that various case studies on 
adaptation underline the need to increase and communicate knowledge. The 
knowledge-deficit hypothesis however has come under increasing criticism. For 
example, a comprehensive study on social psychological and structural 
determinants of climate change policy support found that climate change 
knowledge does not play the central and immediate role the knowledge-deficit 
hypothesis proposes (Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007). Bord et al.’s findings (2000)
further support this by showing that erroneous knowledge of climate change 
serves as a stronger predictor of belief in climate change than correct 
knowledge. Relevant literature suggests that the relationship between 
knowledge and other relevant variables is in fact not as evident as the 
knowledge-deficit hypothesis suggests and that knowledge itself is actually a 
function of certain variables, such as value and cultural orientations, which have 
a strong moderating effect on the way we assimilate and understand 
information (A Corner, Whitmarsh, & Xenias, 2012; Kahan et al., 2012; 
Kellstedt, Zahran, & Vedlitz, 2008; Malka, Krosnick, & Langer, 2009). While 
these studies often find the expected positive relationship in initial analyses, the 
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addition of moderating variables such as party identification and trust in 
science cancels or actually inverts this relationship and makes it stand true only 
for a particular subgroup of respondents. 
One particular subgroup of individuals, which have attracted 
considerable research interest in this research domain, is a cohort of people that 
are to a greater or lesser extent not convinced of the existence of climate change 
or certain aspects of it – a group often referred to as climate change sceptics11. 
Research has found that the more sceptical individuals are regarding various 
aspects of climate change the less likely they are to positively engage with 
climate change, e.g. through supporting mitigation policies through personal 
mitigation intentions (Akter, Bennett, & Ward, 2012; Lorenzoni et al., 2007). 
Rahmstorf (2004) distinguishes three types of sceptics: attribution 
sceptics, who doubt the human causation of climate change; impact sceptics, 
who doubt the negative effects climate change will have and trend sceptics, who 
question if climate change exists at all. The latter represents a rather extreme 
typology but still Leiserowitz and colleagues (2010a, 2010b) report figures of 
approximately a fifth of US-citizens who do not believe that climate change is 
happening. Similarly in the UK, a significant portion of the population 
expresses at least some level of uncertainty with regards to climate change 
(Whitmarsh, 2011). Poortinga et al. (2011) report that uncertainty and 
scepticism about the effects of climate change (impact sceptics) are fairly 
common for their UK sample, while trend- and attribution sceptics are far less 
widespread among the UK public.
Values
As elaborated in chapter 1.4 this diversity in beliefs and attitudes 
regarding climate change can be understood as functions of more deeply 
11 A more detailed discussion of climate change scepticism can be found in chapter 3.1.1
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entrenched values - often also referred to as worldviews or ideologies - that 
constitute an integral part of how people understand and interpret risks. These 
variables inform attitudes towards certain issues and, in consequence, affect our 
motivation to exhibit a specific behaviour and other key variables, such as 
concern. In research on the fundamental determinants of environmentalism, 
variables such as post-materialistic values (Banerjee & Mckeage, 1994), 
altruistic, egoistic and biospheric values (Stern et al., 1993) and more abstract 
and common aspects of values (Schwartz, 1994) have been investigated (for a 
review see Dietz, Fitzgerald, & Shwom, 2005). The importance of values in the 
case of climate change becomes particularly evident in the US public debate on 
this issue. The climate change debate there has long become a question of 
politics with Republicans and Democrats increasingly divided over this subject
(Dunlap & McCright, 2008). In the US political orientation has proven to be a 
stable predictor, with conservatives compared to their liberal counterparts being 
less likely to engage in pro-environmental behaviour (Dunlap, Van Liere, 
Mertig, & Jones, 2000) and more likely to exhibit climate change-scepticism 
(Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008). In this context Leiserowitz (2003, 2005)
paints the picture of the US-American sceptical “naysayer” that is mostly 
Republican and politically conservative. 
Apart from these basic value- and ideology-structures, constructs specific 
to the issue of environmentalism have been developed. Among the most 
prominent is the New Environmental/Ecological Paradigm (NEP) and its 
measure of pro-environmental orientation, the NEP-scale (Dunlap et al., 2000; 
Dunlap & Vanliere, 1978). The NEP is centred on beliefs of limits to human 
growth, antianthropocentrism, the fragility of nature’s balance, the rejection of 
human exemptionalism and the possibility of an ecocrisis. Research however has 
shown that the effect of the broader nature of these environmental values is 
often overridden by particular motivations and structural constraints and 
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frequently correlates only weakly with specific behavioural intentions (Stern, 
2000). As less abstract measures of how much individuals subscribe to the 
general idea of environmentalism Whitmarsh and O'Neill (2010) apply the 
concept of self-identity to their research. In their study Whitmarsh and O'Neill
(2010) investigate the intention to purchase carbon offsets and self-reported pro-
environmental behaviour. Their measure of environmental identity proved to be 
the strongest predictor of a set of pro-environmental behaviours outperforming 
the longer and more complex NEP-scale, which failed to reach significance.
Affective engagement with climate change
Moving on from these supposedly more easily measurable components 
such as values and knowledge a discussion of correlates of climate change 
relevant behaviour has to arrive at the less frequently investigated but 
frequently discussed emotional and affective components. The unforeseeable and 
potentially emotive consequences of climate change have the ability to evoke a 
variety of emotions. Hulme (2008, p. 5) quite vividly describes a “climate of 
fear” that is determining our interaction with the phenomena of climate change. 
Lorenzoni et al. (2007) on the other hand reveal feelings of helplessness, distrust 
and lacking urgency in an analysis of qualitative data on public perceptions of 
climate change in the UK. O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009) investigate 
individuals’ conceptualizations of climate change and find that most 
participants describe feeling fearful, scared, distressed and depressed. In 
contrast, Weber (2006) argues that global warming for now does not dispose of 
the necessary concrete and immediate aspects to elicit strong visceral reactions 
such as fear or anxiety. She argues for design strategies to evoke these types of 
emotional reactions, while O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009) sound a note of 
caution when using emotional messages and specify that nonthreatening 
communication relating to daily emotions and concerns is most effective. Roeser 
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(2012) argues for increased attention towards the role of emotions in effective 
communication on climate change.  She states that emotions do not only 
determine our general understanding and risk perception of climate change, but 
they also inform our moral judgements and can therefore be an ideal channel to 
invoke ethical reflection. Preliminary support for the role of emotions in 
communicating aspects of climate change comes from the findings of Wong-
Parodi, Dowlatabadi, McDaniels, and Ray (2011) who state that persuasive 
expert messages on carbon capture and sequestration are more efficient when 
put into an emotionally self-referent framework.
Based on the work presented in chapter 1.3.2 a considerable amount of 
research has looked at the function of emotions in climate change risk 
perception and risk communication. The role of these emotions, however, in 
determining climate change relevant behaviour and behavioural intentions has 
been less intensely investigated. This is particularly true for studies on 
mitigation- and adaptation-behaviour as most of research focuses on pro-
environmental behaviour. Grob (1995), in early work on environmental 
attitudes and behaviour shows that emotions are among the most important 
predictors of pro-environmental behaviour, while other research specifies that 
this is only the case if the attitude-strength for the relative behaviour is weak 
(S. M. Smith, Haugtvedt, & Petty, 2006). More recent research similarly 
demonstrates that negative anticipated emotions are statistically significant 
predictors of the desire to engage in pro-environmental behaviour (Carrus, 
Passafaro, & Bonnes, 2008). Specifically investigating mitigation behaviour 
feelings of collective guilt have been shown to significantly correlate with
willingness to engage in behaviours (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010).
Even fewer studies have looked at the specific relationship of emotions 
and adaptation. Those that have are mostly concerned with flood adaptation 
behaviour. Harries (2012), for example, proposes that the uptake of flood 
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protective measures might not be as dependent on material, or monetary 
determinants, as it is on feelings of insecurity and anxiety. However, his findings 
only lend marginal support to this proposition. Weber (2006) specifically states 
that visceral (emotive) judgements of risk fuel self-protective behaviours and 
Siegrist and Gutscher (2008) claim that highlighting negative emotional 
consequences is likely to increase motivation for flood-mitigation behaviour. 
This is supported by findings that indicate that negative affect is not only 
integral to predicting adaptation but also mediates the differences in 
behavioural intentions and threat denial between flood-victims and non-victims 
(Zaalberg, Midden, Meijnders, & McCalley, 2009).
Overall this study’s focus is not solely on climate change but also partly 
on sea-level rise. The reason for this is three-fold. (1) As has been shown in 
chapters 1.1.1 and 1.1.2, sea-level change is one of the major components of 
climate change and the associated impacts. It is thus important to allow for this 
component to be proportionally represented in this study of climate change 
perceptions. (2) Further, I wanted to confront participants with a more concrete 
instance of climate change highly relevant to the area of the Severn Estuary, 
where this study was conducted. (3) Finally, it also reflects the hypothesis that 
sea-level rise as a concrete instance of climate change will potentially be more 
strongly linked to engagement with climate change, but in particular the 
similarly more concrete and localized adaptation measures. Tentative support 
for this comes from research that was able to show that living in proximity of 
the coast positively affected climate change belief and support for mitigation 
policies. The authors argue that living by the coast helps make the effects of 
climate change become more concrete and local, that is, tangible climate change 
impacts such as sea level rise are of higher salience to coastal dwellers and thus 
help draw attention to the broader instance of climate change (Milfont, Evans, 
Sibley, Ries, & Cunningham, 2014). Following this reasoning I investigated 
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concern for the effects of, overall emotional response to and ascription of 
responsibility for, climate change, but also sea-level rise. Also the adaptation 
outcomes measures had a focus on preparations for impacts directly linked to 
rising sea levels, most notably flooding. Time restrictions however did not allow 
for a full representation of these two dimensions in all variables and so the 
efficacy belief scales and emotional engagement scale were measured for climate 
change only. Incorporating these measures for sea-level rise as well, would have 
led to a substantial increase in survey length and created a very repetitive and 
potentially disengaging survey instrument. Questions of specificity and 
abstraction, however, were further addressed by measuring efficacy beliefs and 
concern for the effects of climate change and sea-level rise on the individual but 
also the collective level. 
2.1.2 Summary and research question
As the previous paragraphs have illustrated the intersection of risk 
perception literature and environmental psychology theories on pro-
environmental behaviour offers a rich foundation to investigate public 
perceptions of climate change and sea-level rise and how they relate to 
intentions to perform and support for adaptation and mitigation measures. An 
investigation of the various psychological correlates for mitigation and 
adaptation seems expedient as the scholarly discourse on climate change 
highlights the necessity of employing both measures. The main research 
question this exploratory study seeks to answer is: 
• Using a theoretical approach that combines scholarship from risk 
perception and environmental psychology research, what are the 
similarities and dissimilarities of adaptation and mitigation in terms of 
the associated theoretical constructs that can be highlighted?
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2.2 Method
2.2.1Participants 
The ethical board of the School of Psychology, Cardiff University, 
approved the study. The online survey was conducted in England and Wales, 
focusing on the area of the Severn Estuary and the Inner Bristol Channel. Since 
this study also investigated concern for sea-level rise, I tried to ensure that 
participants resided within a sensible distance from the coast. I used ARC GIS, 
a Geographical Information System program, to draw a 12.5 miles12 buffer zone 
around the Inner Bristol Channel outline. I then extracted all the postcodes 
that fell within this area. Subsequently those postcodes were passed on to the 
social research company Maximiles that handled the recruitment and 
remuneration process. 
The final sample consisted of 288 participants and slightly more women 
(59%) than men. The sample was more or less evenly split between Welsh 
(53.8%) and English (44.8%) respondents. The sample was normally distributed 
across age groups, with the biggest group consisting of the 45 to 54 year old, 
making up nearly a quarter of the sample (24.7%). 17.6% indicated they had a 
university degree or that they were studying to obtain one, 31.1% that they had 
passed their A levels, 22.3% that they had vocational qualifications or similar, 
8.1%. that they had earned GCSE and 20.8% that they had obtained no formal 
qualifications. 64.1% stated they had lived at the same address for more than 10 
years and nearly two thirds (72.5%) indicated that they owned, or were buying 
their property with a mortgage/loan. 44,1% specified that they worked full 
time, 13.9% part time and 18.2% reported that they were in retirement. Only 
12 While 12.5 miles can be understood as a considerable distance it was set as low as possible, 
after consultation with Maximiles to achieve a sufficiently large sample size considering the 
reach of Maximiles and the regular response rate. 
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3.5% classified themselves as students. 26.7% of the respondents constituted the 
biggest income class, reporting that their total household income before tax and 
any other deductions ranged between £20.000 and £29.000.
2.2.2Materials
Participants were asked to fill out an online survey, a link to which was 
send to them by the social research company. The median time it took 
participants to complete the survey was 18 minutes. The survey instrument 
contained a variety of items and scales that were intended to measure the three 
forms of engagement with climate change outlined above. The various 
constructs and the way they were operationalized are described in more detail 
below. The complete questionnaire and topline results can be found in Appendix 
2.1.
Cognitive engagement with climate change
Knowledge about climate change
I intended to measure factual knowledge and thus implemented a 
shortened and adapted versions of three climate change knowledge scales by 
Tobler et al. (2012) designed to measure factual knowledge about the (1) causes 
of climate change, (2) the physics of climate change and (3) the expected 
impacts of climate change. To restrict the time necessary to fill out the 
questionnaire I chose to include only four items for each scale based on the 
magnitude of their scalability coefficients. An additional item on ocean 
acidification was added to the impacts-scale (Q23.1-5) for exploratory purposes 
and was retained as part of the scale. The physics-scale (Q22.5-8) and causes-
scale (Q22.1-4) consist of 4 items each. Respondents are asked whether they 
believe statements to be true or false, but are also given the opportunity to 
indicate that they don’t know the answer. The three scales include items such 
as “The ozone hole is the main cause of the greenhouse effect.” (Causes, false); 
“Carbon dioxide (CO2) is harmful to plants.” (Physics, false) and “For the next 
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few decades, the majority of climate scientists expect an increase in extreme 
events, such as droughts, floods and storms.” (Impacts, true).
Scepticism
The scepticism scale (Q1.1-6, a = .91) is a condensed version of the scale 
used by Corner et al. (2012) and was constructed by isolating the six highest 
loading items of the original measure. It includes statements such as: “I am 
convinced that climate change is really happening” (reverse coded) and “The 
evidence for climate change is unreliable”, for which participants than had to 
indicate their agreement on a 5-point scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree).
Values
Human Values Scale
Consistent with Stern’s (2000) choice of a value measure by Schwartz 
and colleagues (1987; 1994) (see chapter 1.4), values were measured here with 
the Human Values Scale (Schwartz, 2003), which is a modification of  the 
Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) (Schwartz et al., 2001). This measure was 
chosen in preference to the scale originally used by Stern (2000) as it is 
considerably shorter while still allowing for a comparable measurement of 
human values as employed by Stern (2000). Further advantages of this scale 
include the fact that it was developed with the specific aim of transnational 
validity and that it addresses some of the problematic aspects of earlier scales 
by Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz et al., 2001), such as their abstract 
nature.. The Human Values Scale includes 21 items presenting the participants 
with short portraits of various people. For example: “Being very successful is 
important to her/him.” “She/He likes to impress other people.” The respondents 
are then asked to indicate on a 6-point scale (very much like me, like me, 
somewhat like me, a little like me, not like me, not like me at all) how much 
they are like the described person. Conducting a factor analysis I was not able 
to reproduce the original scale structure that suggests 10 value types. Instead 
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an initial exploratory factor analysis (see Appendix 2.2.1) indicated a four-factor 
solution, essentially mirroring the two orthogonal dimension proposed to explain 
the integrated structure of all values: self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence 
and openness to change vs. conservatism. Universalism (Q8.8, 8.3, 8.19) and 
benevolence (Q8.12, 8.18) items loaded on the first factor. The scale accordingly 
was labelled self-transcendence, yielding a Cronbach alpha of .83. One security
(Q8.14), one tradition (Q8.20) and two self-direction (Q8.1, 8.11) items also 
loaded on this factor but were excluded from further calculations as they were 
conceptually incongruous and also yielded low communalities and factor 
loadings. Based on the obtained factor solution I further calculated a self-
enhancement-scale (a = .82) composed of two power (Q8.13, 8.4) and two 
achievement (Q8.17, 8.2) items, a four-item openness to change-scale (a = .81) 
consisting of hedonism (Q8.21, 8.10 items) and stimulation (Q8.15, 8.6) items 
and a 3-item conservatism-scale (a = .67,) calculated from conformity (Q8.7, 
8.16) and tradition (Q8.9) items.
Environmental Identity
In addition to this general measure of values I also captured 
Environmental identity (Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010). The environmental 
identity scale was chosen over the NEP-scale for the reasons outlined above. 
The included measures ask participants how much they agree with statements 
such as: “I think of myself as someone who is very concerned with 
environmental issues” on a 5-point scale (strongly agree, tend to agree, neither 
agree nor disagree, tend to disagree, strongly disagree). The final scale (a = .93) 
consists of three items (Q9.1-3) previously used by Whitmarsh and O'Neill
(Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010) but does not include one item (Q9.4) that yielded 
a markedly weak factor loading in an exploratory factor analysis (see Appendix 
2.2.2). 
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Affective engagement with climate change
General Emotional Response and Emotional engagement
To assess participants’ emotional response to climate change and sea-
level rise, they were presented with two statements (Q3.3, 3.4): “On a purely 
emotional level, how do you personally feel about climate change/sea-level rise?” 
The questions are adopted from Poortinga et al. (2011) and answer options on a 
5-point scale range from very positive, fairly positive to neither positive nor 
negative, fairly negative and very negative. Further I presented participants with
a list of emotions (Q14.1-18). Participants had to indicate to what extent they 
feel the respective emotion when thinking about climate change using a 4-point 
scale (great extent, somewhat, very little, not at all). This array of emotions was 
mostly based on work by Boehm and Pfister (2005; 2003) on emotional 
reactions to environmental risks and had been supplemented with five positive 
emotions in order to generate a less negative measure. The final emotional 
engagement measure (a = .95) included 14 emotions excluding four emotions 
(Q4.1, 4.3, 4.4, 4.7) that clearly loaded on a separate factor (see Appendix 
2.2.3).
Climate change and sea level rise concern. I also asked individuals 
multiple concern questions which are adapted from work by Spence, Poortinga, 
and Pidgeon (2012). These items ask participants to rate their concern about 
climate change/sea-level rise overall and for effects of these phenomena on 
themselves, society in general and the world (Q5.1-3, Q6.1-3) The answer 
options on a 4-point scale range from very concerned, fairly concerned, not very 
concerned to not at all concerned.
Behavioural engagement with climate change
Behavioural engagement with climate change was operationalized as the 
outcome measures described below but equally through efficacy beliefs and 
ascription of responsibility as predictors. These latter two variables were 
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surveyed to allow for both of the constructs included in the ambiguous 
construct ‘ascription of responsibility’ in VBN to be investigated
Personal and collective efficacy
The present efficacy measures (Q14.1-6, Q15.1-6) stem from an 
international research effort on risk perception, understandings and responses to 
climate change (Reser et al., 2011). They have been integrated as the original 
version measuring individual efficacy beliefs as well as in an adapted version 
looking at collective efficacy beliefs. Respondents are asked to rate their 
agreement with statements such as: “I can personally help to reduce climate 
change by changing my behaviour”, “Our society can make a difference with 
regard to climate change” and “It is our responsibility to help to do something 
about climate change” on a 5-point scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree)13.
Following the exploratory factor solutions for these two sets of items (see 
Appendix 2.2.4-5) the final personal efficacy measure (a = .88) included four 
items (Q14.1, 14.4-6) and three items (Q15.1, 15.4, 15.6) constituted the 
collective efficacy measure (a = .92).
Ascription of responsibility
Just like the efficacy measures, the ascription of responsibility measure 
was adapted from work by Reser and colleagues (2011). Participants were 
instructed to indicate one group out of a list of seven social actors that they 
deem responsible for taking action against climate change and sea-level rise 
respectively. They were also presented with an open-ended answer category. A 
substantial number of respondents consistently made use of this free answer 
category indicating that everyone was responsible for taking action against 
climate change as well as sea-level rise. As a consequence an additional post hoc 
13 One item in this scale asked participants about responsibility to act and thus analogous to 
Stern seems to confound efficacy beliefs and ascription of responsibility. Factor analysis however 
indicated that these items constituted a stable factor with the other efficacy items.
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answer category was created. The reported answer options thus include: 
industry/companies, local authorities, environmental groups, individuals and 
their families, the European Union, national governments and agencies, the 
international community, everyone and Don’t know/Other.
Outcome measures
Measures are based on scales used by Brügger, Morton and Dessai
(2015)studying public support for mitigation and adaptation. The scale for 
adaptation intentions was modified to include items concerned with adaptation 
to rising sea levels and flood risk. As has been mentioned above this stronger 
focus on sea-level rise and flooding reflects the understanding that these impacts 
are an issue of high relevance to the area of the Severn Estuary and thus 
potentially represent the principal issues through which respondents relate to 
and engage with climate change. 
The outcome measures were intended to constitute four scales: adaptation 
intentions, mitigation intentions, support for adaptation policies and support for 
mitigation policies. The questions on support for adaptation and mitigation 
policies ask individuals to indicate how they would vote in a national 
referendum for a range of proposals ranging from tax- and price-increases for 
household electricity (mitigation) and water consumption (adaptation), to 
subsidies for the household production of green energy (mitigation), and the 
creation of habitat corridors (adaptation). In the instructions the participants 
are reminded that each of these proposals might be associated with considerable 
costs and/or inconveniences. Answer options are provided on a 5-point scale 
(definitely yes, probably yes, unsure, probably no, definitely no). 
The adaptation intentions scale includes items that ask participants how 
likely they are to take certain actions in the future to adapt to climate change. 
Proposed actions include measures such as buying flood insurance, reading 
about how to avoid heat stress and putting irreplaceable or valuable items on 
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high mounted shelves. The mitigation intentions scale analogously asks 
individuals how likely they are to perform certain activities in the future to 
combat climate change. Items cover mitigation measures such as installing more 
insulation at home, eating less meat and choosing a car that gets a good 
petrol/diesel mileage. For both of the intention scales respondents are asked to 
answer on a 5-point scale (very likely, likely, neither, unlikely, very unlikely), 
Additionally they are asked to indicate separately if they have already taken, or 
are currently taking such actions, while still referring to the main answer 
options to specify how likely they are to continue to do so.
Contrary to the intended four scales division exploratory factor analyses
(see Appendix 2.2.6 to 2.2.10) of the outcome measures suggested a split into 
five scales. This mostly concerned the two policy support scales, which split into 
three scales. Factor analysis indicated that mitigation and adaptation policies 
such as price and tax increases form a separate factor, while the remaining 
policies formed part of the intended scales. This meant that analyses proceeded 
with the following five outcome measures: the adaptation intentions scale (a = 
.91) consisting of ten items (Q21.1-5, Q21.7-11), the mitigation intentions scale
(a = .79) constituted by six items (Q19.3-5, Q19.8-10), seven items (Q20.2-3, 
Q20.7-9, Q20.12-13) that make up the support for adaptation policies scale (a = 
.85), the support for mitigation policies scale (a = .79) consisting of five items 
(Q18.9-11, Q19.12-13) and the support for financial regulation scale (a = .86)
that integrated both mitigation and adaptation policies (Q18.1, Q18.3-4, Q18.8, 
Q20.5, Q20.10).
Socio-demographic and contextual variables included in this survey were:
age, gender, whether respondents have children or grandchildren, working
status, income, education, post code, number of European and transcontinental 
flights during the last year, duration of residence in the area, type of occupancy
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of current accommodation, estimated distance from the coastline14 and three 
items concerning previous flooding experience15.
2.2.3Procedure
The opening page of the online questionnaire provided general 
information regarding the survey, the responsible researchers and information 
that was necessary for informed consent. The questionnaire was only made 
accessible to participants who indicated that they gave consent to participate in 
the study by clicking the appropriate consent button. Scales were presented in a 
randomized fashion where applicable. After completing the questionnaire 
participants were fully debriefed and provided with contact details should they 
have any further questions or comments. Data collection started the second of 
7th of June, 2013 and ended the 19th of June, 2013.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Descriptive Results
Outcome measures
Percentages for policy support and behaviour intentions are displayed in 
Figures 2-6.  As noted earlier the policy support measures did not yield the 
expected factor structure with adaptation policies and mitigation policies 
breaking up into adaptation and mitigation policies and financial regulation. 
This separation is very well reflected in the descriptive statistics for these 
14 The purpose of this measure was twofold. First, this measure was intended to check whether 
the goal to sample respondents that lived close by the shore had been sufficiently met. Also it 
was included in the subsequently reported regression models to investigate whether the 
perceived distance to the coastline had any relation to the outcome measures. I speculate that in 
particular for the adaptation measures lower perceived distance has a positive effect.
15 Research has shown that previous experiences of flooding have an effect on climate change-
relevant behavioural outcomes (Broomell et al., 2015; Spence et al., 2011). While the focus in 
this survey was not specifically on the effect of extreme weather events, the variables were 
included in the initial regression models to control for potential differences between respondents 
with regards to previous experiences of flood. Study 3 will specifically address the issue of 
previous flood experience and how it influences engagement with adaptation and mitigation.
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measures. Financial regulation measures were consistently found to be the least 
favoured by respondents.
Starting with adaptation intentions (M = 2.68, SD = .91) the two most 
popular measures turned out to be reading about how to avoid heat stress
(40.6% very likely/likely) and putting irreplaceable or valuable items on high 
mounted shelves (37.8% very likely/likely). Less popular were what could be 
described as more extensive adaptation measures, such as buying flood 
insurance (15.7% very likely/likely) and using horizontal plaster board or lime-
based plaster instead of gypsum (15.7% very likely/likely).
Figure2.Frequencystatisticsforadaptationintentions.Note.Ihavealreadydonethisanswer
categoryisnotincludedandsothedisplayedfiguresdonotaddupto100%.
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Frequency statistics for mitigation intentions (M = 3.16, SD = .91) saw 
walking and cycling more often (49.5% very likely/likely) and reducing the 
number of new things one buys (39.1% very likely/likely) at the top two places, 
while car sharing (30.7% very likely/likely) and eating less meat (26.1% very 
likely/likely) ranked lowest.
Figure3.Frequencystatisticsformitigationintentions.Note.Ihavealreadydonethisanswer
categoryisnotincludedandsothedisplayedfiguresdonotaddupto100%.
For adaptation policies (M = 3.88, SD = .91) the improvement and 
better maintenance of existing flood defences (84.0% yes/probably yes) and the 
construction of new ones (77.3% yes/probably yes) were most favoured, whereas 
more funding for research and monitoring to better understand sea-level rise on 
the Severn Estuary (63.9% yes/probably yes) and the production and 
distribution of guidance on how to avoid heat stress (51.7% yes/probably yes) 
were less favoured.
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Figure4.Frequencystatisticsforadaptationpolicies.
Mitigation policies (M = 4.06, SD = .68) were ranked as follows: teaching 
children about the causes, consequences and potential solutions to climate 
change (82.3% yes/probably yes) and subsidies for house insulation (82.3% 
yes/probably yes) ranked as the most supported and more investments in safe 
cycling- and walking-routes (74.9% yes/probably yes) and subsidies for electric 
vehicles (66.2% yes/probably yes) as the least supported out of the five 
proposed policies.
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Figure5.Frequencystatisticsformitigationpolicies.
Financial regulation (M = 2.34, SD = .85) measures were overwhelmingly 
unpopular with the two most popular, congestion charging for cars in all city 
areas (31.7% yes/probably yes) and a new tax to alleviate unavoidable climate 
impacts in the UK (24.4% yes/probably yes), failing to reach the level of 
support for the least popular mitigation and adaptation policies. Most 
unpopular were policies that concerned the provision of everyday services such 
increased prices for water consumption (10.1% yes/probably yes) and increased 
household electricity taxes (6.6% yes/probably yes).
Figure6.Frequencystatisticsforfinancialregulation.
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Predictors
Scepticism
A certain amount of scepticism regarding the phenomenon of climate 
change was evident in this sample (M = 2.45, SD = 1.00). While only 16.9% 
agreed with the statement that they believed that climate change was not a real 
problem, a quarter of respondents (25.2%) indicated that they were uncertain 
about whether climate change is really happening. The scepticism statement on 
the unreliability of evidence for climate change had the highest percentage 
(31.5%) out of all the items affirmative of scepticism. These sceptic tendencies 
were counterbalanced by a majority of 69.1% who agreed that climate change 
was happening.
Climate change knowledge
The survey found that some substantial misconceptions of climate change 
still persist. For example, nearly half of participants (47.0%) thought that the 
ozone hole was the primary cause of climate change. Further results indicated 
that knowledge of the physics of climate change was lower (56.4% Don’t 
know/Incorrect) than knowledge of the causes (49.3% Don’t know/Incorrect) 
and impacts of climate change (43.3% Don’t know/Incorrect). 
Environmental identity 
Respondents on average showed a positive environmental identity with 
an overall mean score for the environmental identity scale of 3.70 (SD = .95). 
Values
Self-transcendence was rather high with a mean score of 4.51 (SD = .94) 
on a scale from one to six, where higher values indicated a stronger 
identification with the proposed value. Self-Enhancement on the other hand was 
least pronounced with a mean score (M = 2.93, SD = 1.06) just below the scale 
midpoint. Openness to change (M = 3.25, SD = 1.07) yielded a mean slightly 
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above the scale midpoint, while Conservatism (M = 4.00, SD = 1.02) was again 
more pronounced in this sample.
Emotional response to climate change and sea-level rise
The single item measures on the overall emotional response to the two 
phenomena yielded identical means (MCC = 2.67, SDCC = .92; MSLR = 2.67, 
SDSLR = .91) for climate change and sea-level rise, indicating that overall 
participants had a rather indifferent to marginally positive emotional response 
towards both.
Emotional engagement
Emotional engagement (M = 2.27, SD = .76) on average was slightly 
above the mid point of the four-point answer scale. Interest (18.5% to a great 
extent) was ranked first in terms of how many participants indicated that they 
felt it to a great extent, followed by sadness (18.2% to a great extent), worry 
(13.2% to a great extent) and fear (10.9% to a great extent). The least 
frequently listed in this respect were guilt (3.8% to a great extent), shame (5.2% 
to a great extent) and outrage (7.0% to a great extent).
Concern
85.4% of participants agree with the statement that climate change will 
affect plants and animal species, followed by the world (82.6% strongly 
agree/tend to agree) and developing countries (80.4% strongly agree/tend to 
agree). On the more proximal side only 59.6% of respondents agree with a 
statement that they themselves, or their family (65.4%) and local community 
(65.5%) will be affected. This pattern of low proximal and high distal ratings is 
also reflected in the various concern measures, which exhibit a consistent 
pattern of high distal concern and low proximal concern. Both for the effects of 
sea-level rise and climate change, levels of concern were highest for the world 
(73.0%/73.3% concerned for the effects of CC/SLR on the world) followed by 
society (64.7%/64.5% concerned for the effects of CC/SLR on society) and the 
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self (50.0%/47.7% concerned for the effects of CC/SLR on the self). The two 
broad concern measures for climate change and sea-level rise (65.9% and 64.4% 
concerned respectively) seemed to be anchored approximately at the same level
as concern for the effects on society
Ascription of responsibility.
Responsibility 16 was predominantly associated with institutions. 
Approximately a third of all respondents for both climate change (31.3%) and 
sea-level rise (36.7) judged the responsibility to lie with national governments. 
A noticeable difference is that 18.9% ascribe responsibility to act on climate 
change to industries and companies as opposed to only 6.7% for sea-level rise 
but equally responsibility to act is perceived to lie more with the individual for 
climate change (10.3%) than for sea-level rise (2.1%). Around a fifth perceived 
the responsibility to act on climate change (17.4%) and sea-level rise (21.2%) to 
lie with the international community.
Efficacy beliefs
Efficacy beliefs were a little lower at the personal level (M = 3.24, SD = 
.90) than at the collective level (M = 3.82, SD = .89). A little more than half of 
the participants agreed that it was their responsibility to do something about 
climate change (57.0%) and that they could help by changing their behaviour 
(52.8%). Participants were less confident that they could make a difference 
though (36.5%) and two thirds of them did not feel a sense of urgency to change 
their behaviour (31.6%). For collective efficacy levels of agreement were 
consistently around the two thirds mark. 70.9% indicated that they think that 
it is our responsibility to do something about climate change, 70.4% agree that 
society can make a difference with regard to climate change and 69.0% believe 
16 Substantially unequal group sizes and the lack of possibilities to sensibly combine some of the 
answer categories meant that this variable could not be included in multiple regression analyses
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that people in our society can personally help reduce climate change by 
changing their behaviour.
Adaptation and Mitigation 
To investigate the relationship of adaptation and mitigation, first, a 
simple correlation analysis of all outcome measures was performed. As can be 
seen in Table 1 correlations between the outcome measures were mostly positive 
and significant. Essentially only support for financial regulation and support for 
adaptation policies did not correlate at all.
Table1. 9
CorrelationMatrixforoutcomemeasures.
Adaptation
intentions
Mitigation
intentions
Adaptation
policies
Financial
regulation
Mitigation
policies
Adaptation
intentions
1 ,429** ,233** ,276** ,265**
Mitigation
intentions
,429** 1 ,228** ,345** ,357**
Adaptation
policies
,233** ,228** 1 0,034 ,558**
Financial
regulation
,276** ,345** 0,034 1 ,171**
Mitigation
policies
,265** ,357** ,558** ,171** 1
Note. (** p < .01; * p< .05)
2.3.2 Multiple regression analysis
To investigate the relationship between the predictor variables and the 
outcome measures the data were analysed using multiple regression and using 
the Enter procedure. This section will present the results from the regression 
models for each one of the five outcome measures. These were chosen based on 
the theories and previous research outlined above. Socio-demographic variables 
were also entered to control for the influence of these. Predictor variables that 
did not yield significant regression weights in a first exploratory regression were 
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excluded from further calculations. For variables that I expected to measure 
similar constructs and/or correlate strongly – i.e. the various concern measures, 
knowledge measures and Self-transcendence & environmental identity – the one 
predictor that scored the highest regression weight was kept to run a second 
exploratory regression, even if it yielded a non-significant result initially. This 
procedure was chosen to account for the fact that related variables potentially 
split up explained variance among them resulting in non-significant contribution 
to the model, while the single strongest predictor by itself does yield a 
significant effect. Excluding related variables further decreases the likelihood of 
multicollinearity issues. If the single predictor without related variables included 
in this second stage failed to reach significance it was excluded from further 
calculations at this point. The final regression models, as presented here, were 
then run applying boot strapping with bias-corrected accelerated confidence 
intervals. For ease of comparison, standardized beta weights are reported 
together with significance values from the bootstrapping procedure. A 
correlation matrix for the significant predictors and the outcome variables in 
the five following regression models is attached in Appendix 2.3
Adaptation Intentions
As shown in Table 2 the multiple regression model for adaptation 
intentions explained 31.3% of variance. For this model the strongest predictor 
was scepticism (b = .30, p < .01) trailed by concern for the effects of sea-level 
rise on oneself (b = .25, p < .01), emotion (b = .25, p < .01), environmental
identity (b = .22, p = .004) and personal efficacy (b = .21, p = .024). The result 
for scepticism is opposed to what I expected, in that the more sceptical a person 
is, the higher his/her intentions are to perform adaptation measures.
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Table2
Linearmodelofpredictorsofadaptationintention
Adaptationintention B SEB b adj.R2 p£
Model1 .313 .001
Constant .630 (.976, .285) .175 .001
Scepticism .296 ( .148, .443) .075 .297 .001
Concernfortheeffectsof
SLRon oneself .258 ( .123, .392) .068 .252 .001
Emotionalengagement .239 ( .090, .388) .076 .248 .002
Environmentalidentity .210 ( .083, .338) .065 .215 .001
Personalefficacy .211 ( .059, .364) .077 .207 .007
Note. 95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals reported in parentheses.
Confidenceintervalsandstandarderrorsbasedon1000bootstrapsamples
Mitigation Intentions
The results of the final regression model for mitigation intentions are 
displayed in Table 3. The model accounted for 36.5% of total variance. Personal 
efficacy (b = .27, p = .001) yields the highest standardized regression weight, 
followed by emotional engagement (b = .21, p = .006), climate change concern 
(b = .20, p = .020), income (b = -.15, p = .008) and conservatism (b = -.13, p = 
.008.).
Table3
Linearmodelofpredictorsofmitigationintention
Mitigation intention B SEB b adj.R2 p£
Model1 .365 .001
Constant .325(.788, .159) .243 .193
Personalefficacy .252( .119, .374) .065 .265 .001
Emotionalengagement .188( .047, .329) .070 .206 .006
Climatechangeconcern .200( .039, .362) .084 .195 .020
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Income .072( 125, .021) .026 .145 .008
Conservatism .137( .232, .039) .050 .131 .008
Note. 95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals reported in parentheses.
Confidenceintervalsandstandarderrorsbasedon1000bootstrapsamples
Support for Adaptation Policies
Table 4 displays the results of the multiple regression for support for 
adaptation policies. The significant predictors ordered by size of their 
standardized regression weights are: age (b = .32, p = .038), self-transcendence
(b = .30, p = .001), concern for the effects of sea-level rise on oneself (b = .24, 
p = .001), estimated distance from coastline (b = .17, p = .005) and scepticism
(b = .13, p = .029). The regression model accounted for 30.7% of total variance.
Table4
Linearmodelofpredictorsofadaptationpolicysupport
Adaptationpolicies B SEB b adj.R2 p£
Model1 .307 .001
Constant 1.96(2.60, 1.25) .289 .001
Age .204( .125, .278) .035 .322 .001
Selftranscendence .311( .199, .444) .059 .300 .001
Concernfortheeffectsof
SLRononeself .231( .115, .356) .064 .235 .001
Estimateddistancefromthe
coastline .152( 047, .245) .050 .169 .005
KnowledgeofCCcauses .422 ( .049, .772) .062 .131 .029
Note. 95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals reported in parentheses.
Confidenceintervalsandstandarderrorsbasedon1000bootstrapsamples
Support for financial regulation
The regression model for financial regulation yielded the lowest 
percentage of explained variance from all the models with an adjusted R2 value 
of .235 (23.5% of explained variance). As can be seen in Table 5 only three 
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predictors reached significance: emotion (b = .32, p = .001) followed by general 
climate change concern (b = .26, p = .002) and self-transcendence (b = -.16, p
= .010). It is worth highlighting that the regression weight for self-
transcendence is negative and thus opposed to what I expected.
Table5
Linearmodelofpredictorsoffinancialregulation support
Financialregulation B SEB b adj.R2 p£
Model1 .235 .001
Constant .801( 1.30,  .331) .254 .002
Emotionalengagement .313( .127, .487) .088 .322 .001
Generalclimatechange
concern .287( .102, .496) .092 .264 .001
Selftranscendence .163( .271,  .042) .064 .158 .009
Note. 95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals reported in parentheses.
Confidenceintervalsandstandarderrorsbasedon1000bootstrapsamples
Support for mitigation policies
Results for this final regression model are displayed in Table 6. The 
significant predictors of support for mitigation policies were: scepticism (b = -
.38, p = .001), self-transcendence (b = .23, p = .001) and knowledge about the 
causes of climate change (b = .16, p = .010). This model explained 34.1% of 
variance.
Table6
Linearmodelofpredictorsofmitigationpolicysupport
Mitigationpolicies B SEB b adj.R2 p£
Model1 .341 .001
Constant .239( .465, .019) .107 .030
Scepticism .356( .466, .247) .058 .380 .001
Selftranscendence .224( .117, .334) .055 .228 .001
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KnowledgeofCCcauses .479( .148, .837) .183 .158 .010
Note. 95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals reported in parentheses.
Confidenceintervalsandstandarderrorsbasedon1000bootstrapsamples
2.4 Discussion
This study investigated various variables and their association with 
intention to perform and support for adaptation and mitigation. As such it 
presents a novel look beyond the confines of pro-environmental behaviour or 
mitigation alone, at how these two climate change measures might relate or 
differ in terms of the variables they are associated with. Statistical analyses 
consisted of five regression models for each of the outcome measures: adaptation 
intentions, mitigation intentions, support for adaptation policies, support for 
financial regulation and support for mitigation policies.
The fact that the initial exploratory factor analysis of the outcome 
measures yielded a factor solution with an additional outcome measure, rather 
than the intended four outcome measures, represents an interesting result in 
itself already. The force that drove towards this additional outcome measure is 
a strong correlation between certain adaptation and mitigation policies that 
most probably has a basis in their common theme of financial regulation. In the 
eye of the public this characteristic apparently trumps any differences between 
adaptation and mitigation. Not only does this eliminate any effect that could 
arise from the difference between adaptation and mitigation but the same also 
seems to apply to inter-individual differences. The very low support across 
groups and the lowest explained variance suggest that this kind of measures
more than others unites individuals in their disdain across otherwise divisive 
categories.
Starting with adaptation intentions, multiple regression yielded five 
significant predictors. Concern for the effect of sea level rise on oneself was a 
significant positive predictor of adaptation intentions. This indicates that 
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intentions to perform adaptation are born out of concern for one’s own 
immediate safety more so than out of concern for the wider society or the world 
as a whole. How strongly participants felt as environmentalists and how strong 
their emotional engagement with climate change is constituted two other 
variables that were positively associated with adaptation intentions. It is 
notable that environmental identity did not yield a significant effect for any of 
the other outcome measures apart from adaptation intentions. Research that 
has investigated this variable so far would suggest that is a good predictor of 
pro-environmental action and as such should predict mitigation intentions best. 
Analogous to the effect on mitigation intentions, personal efficacy also had a 
significant effect on adaptation intentions. 
A truly unexpected result was the fact that scepticism turned out to be 
the strongest, and more importantly, positive predictor of adaptation intentions. 
Contrary to intuition this result would suggest that the more individuals 
reported to be sceptical about climate change, the more they intended to 
prepare for it. A stepwise multiple regression (see Appendix 2.4) helped shed 
light on this unusual finding. Entering scepticism into the regression model first 
and subsequently entering the other significant predictors separately revealed a 
substantial suppressor effect. As is also visible in the correlation matrix in 
Appendix 2.3 scepticism initially significantly and negatively predicts 
adaptation intentions (b = -.23, p < .01) but this relationship turns positive and 
significant as the remaining predictors are added. This suppressor effect is 
mainly contributed to by emotional engagement and personal efficacy, 
indicating that the variance in adaptation intentions that scepticism should 
negatively predict is better explained by these two variables. Emotional 
engagement and personal efficacy are also significant predictors of mitigation 
intentions and significantly correlate with environmental identity. Based on 
these findings they thus represent what one would expect to separate engaged 
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from less engaged persons, at least in terms of mitigation. Scepticism is also 
strongly but negatively correlated with this triplet of variables but seems to 
possess another strong component that is independent of the primary climate 
change engagement aspect in predicting adaptation intentions. 
This discussion can be further elucidated by referring to the cultural 
cognition framework and theory of motivated reasoning (Kahan, 2013). Building 
heavily on Douglas and Wildavsky´s work (1983) on ideologies this theory 
posits that individuals process information in order to maintain and, ideally, 
promote their standing in the social group they adhere to. Applying this 
reasoning, a climate change sceptical view could be interpreted as a consequence 
of a conflict between aspects of the contested issue with one’s goals, social 
commitments and ideology. One such aspect of climate change could be 
mitigation measures via which, as McCright and Dunlap (2011) specify, climate 
change continuously challenges conservative domains of interest such as the 
industrial capitalist economic system or the fossil fuel industry. Scepticism –
more than just a passive perception of an issue – thus can be conceptualized as 
an active effort to apprehend climate change in a way that helps resolve the 
conflict between identity, convictions and interests of a person on one side (e.g. 
economic growth at any cost), and identity-incongruent aspects of the wider 
climate change discourse on the other (e.g. measures to cut carbon emissions 
that also limit the traditional economic growth model). Adaptation in this 
survey was presented as part of the wider discussion around the climate change 
debate. Individuals’ reactions to adaptation would thus be tainted by their 
overall attitude towards the wider issue of climate change. It is therefore not 
surprising to find that the initial correlation of scepticism and adaptation is 
negative. However, once the variance associated with the overall negative 
attitude towards any climate change related issue such as adaptation is 
explained by lower environmental engagement – as measured through lower 
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emotional engagement, personal efficacy and similar – the positive association 
between scepticism and the remaining variance suggests that there is something 
particular to adaptation actions that seems to be more appealing to sceptical
than non-sceptical audiences. A potential explanation for this finding is the 
more locally relevant and concrete nature of adaptation measures. This could be 
of particular relevance to public engagement campaigns directed at audiences
that oppose mitigation as a set of measures that conflicts with their ideology.
Mitigation intentions were best explained by personal efficacy. This 
finding indicates that whether an individual intends to perform an action is 
most strongly related to whether he or she feels that his or her actions will 
actually have an effect. The fact that both intention regression models included
personal efficacy as a significant predictor underlines the importance of this 
variable. This finding is in line with previous literature (Tabernero & 
Hernandez, 2011). Again, analogous to adaptation intentions, the extent to 
which participants reported feeling certain emotions with regards to climate 
change also significantly predicts mitigation intentions. Contrasting the specific 
and egocentric focus of the concern measure that best predicted adaptation 
intentions, mitigation intentions were associated with the broadest general 
climate change concern measure. A noticeable finding, or lack thereof, is the 
absence of environmental identity from the list of significant predictors. In 
terms of value/identity, results indicate that the broader value dimension 
Conservatism best explains mitigation intentions. One could thus hypothesize 
that mitigation, more than just appealing to people with a strong environmental 
identity, has found its place in the wider societal debate as a behaviour that 
differentiates well between groups that subscribe to differing value sets. This 
could hint at increasing polarization between ideological camps similarly to 
what studies find in the US (Dunlap & McCright, 2008). Adaptation intentions 
instead were more strongly associated with environmental identity, which could 
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suggest that adaptation is not yet determined by broader value constructs, 
potentially due to its relatively novel role in the climate change discourse. 
Interestingly the more income respondents reported the lower their intentions 
were to engage in mitigation. This finding is in line with previous research that 
found higher income to be associated with lower climate change concern and 
risk perceptions (O’Connor, Bord, & Fisher, 1999; Semenza et al., 2008). 
The regression model for support for adaptation policies yielded five 
significant predictors. An unexpected result was that as perceived distance from 
the coast increased so did support for adaptation policies. One would expect the 
individuals who live in proximity of the coast to be more supportive of 
adaptation policies such as flood defences due to the immediate relevance to 
them. Some insight regarding this finding can come from research on public risk 
perceptions of nuclear power plants which has consistently found that proximity 
to established facilities correlates with decreased perceived risk (e.g. Venables, 
Pidgeon, Parkhill, Henwood, & Simmons, 2012). Venables et al. (2012)
summarize that the association between lower levels of perceived risk and 
proximity might be due to increased familiarity and cognitive coping efforts. 
If reported distances are to be understood as moderately accurate, one 
could suggest that individuals’ perceptions are affected by a form of self-
protective optimism bias, which results in decreased support for measures that
would seem unnecessary. Similarly people who live by the coast may have 
learned to live with the perils of the sea, developing a sense of mastery that 
minimizes their concern and reassures them in their belief that they can rely on 
themselves to handle adaptation issues. Of course this sense of mastery might as 
well be a cognitive coping effort to keep overwhelming feelings of helplessness 
and threat at bay. Another explanation for this finding is the idea that 
proximity to the coast can be one, but certainly is not the only factor relevant 
to some of the risk the proposed adaptation measures address. Fluvial flooding 
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for example might be more prevalent inland. Further, in some areas certain 
coastal characteristics might actually protect against some of the risks, 
conclusively explaining the inversion of the expected correlation. For future 
studies, a more detailed investigation of the various contextual factors and 
individual perceptions regarding respondents’ exposure to risks with regards to 
their place of residence could help clarify this association. 
Age was the strongest positive predictor of support for adaptation 
policies. Age is also significantly negatively correlated with perceived distance 
from the coast, indicating that older people live closer to the sea, thus making 
quite a few proposed policies more relevant and desirable to them (Stockdale, 
2011; Zsamboky et al., 2011) . However, as the finding on perceived distance 
illustrated, proximity does not translate into more support for adaptation 
measures. Potentially it is only with increasing age that individuals rely more 
on others to solve frequently labour intensive issues regarding adaptation. 
Equally it could be the expression of a motivation to support structural 
measures that will benefit their descendants in the future, more than they will 
benefit them personally.
An altruistic interpretation like this, is certainly supported by the finding 
that self-transcendence is positively related to adaptation policy support. This 
comes as no surprise with items such as ‘Increased financial support for better 
flood prediction, emergency planning and warning in the case of a flood event’ 
and ‘Creation of habitat corridors for animals (e.g. bridges over motorways)’ 
suggesting actions geared at safeguarding the well-being of everyone, including 
nature, and thus very much in line with universalist and benevolent values. 
Analogous to adaptation intentions concern for the effects of sea-level rise 
on oneself is significantly associated with support for adaptation policy support. 
Out of all concern measures both adaptation measures are thus most strongly 
associated with concern for the effects of sea-level rise on oneself. The specificity 
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of concern for the effects of sea-level rise then is most probably related to the 
outcome measures’ focus on flood prevention, which is probably more readily 
associated with sea-level rise. More interesting is the strong egocentric 
component in people’s support for and intention to perform adaptation 
measures. I would argue that this specificity of concern for the self is a 
consequence of two aspects: first, as variables such as self-transcendence and 
environmental identity are already in the model, related concern measures 
(concern for society/world) will find little variance left to be explained, paving 
the way for a significant contribution of concern for the self. Second, as alluded 
to earlier adaptation itself carries a strong individualist component as an 
approach that, much more than mitigation, is anchored in the here and now 
and is often associated with immediate benefits for the safety of the individual. 
The regression model for support for financial regulation yielded the 
lowest amount of explained variance. It is thus safe to assume that support for 
financial regulation fits the least best into the conglomerate of variables studied 
here. General climate change concern was associated with support for financial 
regulation, as one would expect to find based on existing literature. A 
noticeable finding however was the negative regression weight found for self-
transcendence. Literature would suggest that people high in Self-transcendence
are usually more favourable towards mitigation, or environmental protection 
measures more generally (Adam Corner, Markowitz, & Pidgeon, 2014). Again a 
stepwise regression for the three significant predictors entering Self-
transcendence first into the model showed that Self-transcendence does in fact 
yield a non-significant positive beta weight first (b = .10, p = .11), pointing 
again to a suppressor effect that turns the contribution of Self-transcendence 
from a marginally positive into a significant negative one, indicating that 
support for financial regulation is actually lower among individuals high in self-
transcendence. One could speculate that this might be a consequence of the 
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particular nature of these measures that opposes self-transcendence values, once 
the generally positive attitude towards climate change issues is accounted for by 
the other variables in the model. Such values on the other end of Schwartz’s 
value continuum would be power and achievement (Schwartz, 1994). How these 
values relate to financial regulation measures is not clear and warrants further 
research. Emotional engagement was the strongest predictor of support for 
financial regulation. This association and the fact that it also significantly 
predicts mitigation and adaptation intentions markedly distinguishes emotional 
engagement from less influential variables such as the knowledge of the causes 
of climate change variable. Emotional engagement appears as a consistent 
predictor of outcome variables that are testament to a more committed 
engagement with climate change.
The regression model for support for mitigation policies yielded 34.1% of 
explained variance with only three significant predictors, namely: scepticism, 
Self-transcendence and knowledge about the causes of climate change. The fact 
that it was only three predictors that explained a third of the variance further 
underlines the performance of this regression model. Knowledge of climate 
change causes was also positively associated with support for adaptation 
policies. It is tempting to assume that individuals who are more knowledgeable 
about climate change also see the necessity to adapt more clearly and thus 
support this kind of measures more strongly. The same applies for mitigation 
intentions and the significant contribution knowledge of climate change causes 
exhibits for the corresponding regression model. The fact that knowledge of the 
causes of climate change only reaches significance for these two predictors 
makes this type of interpretation questionable. If knowledge of the causes of 
climate change was really indicative of greater conviction regarding the 
necessity of addressing climate change then one would logically expect an 
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equally strong, if not stronger, association with the other outcome measures 
investigated here. 
An alternative explanation could be that the climate change knowledge 
scale measures that were used here are popularly associated with low 
commitment climate change engagement as measured by the two policy support 
scales. This reasoning is directly related to the good performance in terms of 
explained variance of the regression model for support for mitigation policies. 
The limited number of predictors necessary to explain more than a third of the 
variance of support for mitigation policies suggests that this latter policy 
support measure is rather simplistic in terms of the psychological constructs it 
is associated with. I hypothesize that this form of support can be understood as 
prototypical of low-commitment climate change engagement. A prevalent form 
of support for action on climate change conditional on very low or no cost of the 
proposed measures. Results in support of this argument have found that pro-
environmental actions are more likely to be associated with environmental 
values, than are actions that require some sort of sacrifice, which prove to be 
more reliant on contextual and situational variables (Gatersleben, Steg, & Vlek, 
2002; Whitmarsh, 2009).
This research carried shortcomings. The collected sample constitutes a 
convenience sample and it thus unsure whether these results will be equally 
applicable to the general population. Further aspects that limit the applicability 
of the results presented here to the general population exist. The adaptation 
measures’ focus on flooding must be acknowledged and it is unclear if the 
results generated here for adaptation are applicable to adaptation measures that 
have a stronger focus on other impacts such as heat stress. The importance of 
concern for the effect of sea level rise on the self are most probably borne out of 
this particular focus of the adaptation measures. I would expect, however, that 
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the strong egocentric component this particular finding demonstrates applies to 
most of the adaptation measures, regardless of the impact they focus on.
Another potential critique of this study concerns the emotional 
engagement measure. It is questionable whether the scale used here to measure 
emotions, measures emotions as they occur in the moment. It is in fact 
questionable whether a survey measure can actually capture the instantaneous 
character of emotions. For surveys at this scale however physiological measures 
of emotion and arousal, such as heart rate and skin conductance levels are 
extremely laborious to administer and essentially infeasible. Still, and pointing 
again to the essentially exploratory function of this study, valuable insight was 
gained concerning the importance of emotion and future research, where 
possible, should seek to employ alternative measures of affect. 
2.5 Conclusion
This research investigated psychological variables related to intentions to 
perform, and support for, adaptation and mitigation measures. The spread in 
explained variance for the various outcomes measures is certainly to a large 
extent due to what could be critically reviewed as an effort to create a universal 
model for very varied constructs. This naturally comes with a less than perfect 
fit for at least some of the outcome measures. The aim of this research however 
was a broad exploratory investigation of similarities and dissimilarities in 
predictor patterns of intention to perform and support for adaptation and 
mitigation measures. Intriguingly in terms of public acceptance and explained 
variance the two most distinctive outcome measures did not reproduce a 
mitigation-adaptation dichotomy. Models for adaptation and mitigation instead 
performed comparably well in terms of explained variance. In the same vein 
simple correlations between adaptation and mitigation outcomes measures were 
all positive and significant, suggesting that in the public’s opinion there is not 
trade-off between adaptation and mitigation. 
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Parallels also showed in terms of predictor patterns, as personal efficacy 
and emotional engagement were significantly associated with both intention 
measures. Initiatives to engage the public for both adaptation and mitigation 
would thus be well advised to consider that individuals who intend to mitigate 
and adapt, think that they can do so and are also emotionally engaged by 
climate change.
Some characteristic differences between adaptation and mitigation do 
exist however. The picture that presented itself would suggest that adaptation 
has not been fully engrossed yet by what appears to be the dominant narrative 
on climate change. This has important implications for communicating the risks 
of climate change. As Evans, Milfont, and Lawrence (2014) note, adaptation 
could serve as a tool to engage individuals who have been previously unengaged 
by, or even dismissive of climate change. The finding that adaptation intentions 
and climate change scepticism are positively associated needs to be replicated 
but it hints at an aspect of adaptation measures that does in fact offer a less 
biased access point for people’s engagement with climate change, in particular 
for previously disengaged audiences such as climate change sceptics. 
A distinguishing feature of the predictor patterns found for both 
adaptation outcome measures is the consistent role concern for the effects of 
sea-level rise on oneself assumes. Adaptation in comparison to mitigation thus 
seems to be more strongly linked to egocentric concerns. This connects again to 
the different appeal that might characterize adaptation as an alternative to the 
predominantly altruistic nature of mitigation.
A last finding to highlight is that emotional engagement was among the 
three strongest predictors for three of the outcome measures. Adaptation 
intentions, mitigation intentions but also support for financial regulation. In 
terms of costs, behavioural as much as economical, this triplet of outcome 
measures certainly asks a relatively high commitment of respondents. Emotional 
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engagement can thus be understood as a stable predictor of committed 
engagement with climate change. Going into more detail emotional engagement 
was the strongest predictor of support for financial regulation, an outcome 
measure that was least well explained by the variables examined here and 
arguably most obviously linked to costs for the individual. For the other policy 
support scales emotional engagement was strikingly absent, which raises the 
question what these scales measure. One could speculate that, rather than 
committed engagement with climate change, these scales survey a lip service to 
what are perceived to be social standards and norms rooted in ideologies and 
belonging to a particular peer group. Consequently the significant predictors of 
these measures would have to be considered equally superficial as the outcome 
measures, suggesting that they would perform poorly in explaining actual 
behaviour and support for measures that involve costs for the individual. This 
underlines the importance of considering affective components such as emotional 
engagement as they could serve an important role as stable predictors of 
committed engagement with climate change across adaptation, mitigation and 
financial regulation measures.
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Chapter 3 - Adaptation as a New 
Gateway to Engagement with 
Climate Change
3.1 Introduction
The first study presented in this thesis looked at how various 
psychological constructs relate to intention to perform and support for 
adaptation and mitigation measures. One of the findings indicated that a 
typically dismissive stance towards climate change, climate change scepticism, 
was positively associated with intentions to perform climate change adaptation 
measures. This surprising result can be interpreted as suggesting that there is 
something about adaptation measures that might appeal to a sceptic audience. 
While there are certain audiences that are particularly unengaged, or 
outright dismissive, such as climate change sceptics, various authors (Myers, 
Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Akerlof, & Leiserowitz, 2013; Weber, 2006, 2010)
propose that certain qualities of climate change generally make it difficult for 
people to relate to it. Central to their argument is that climate change, with its 
inherent inertia, gradual changes and its overall low signal-value, makes it 
difficult for people to gain personal experience and climate change thus has to 
be understood mostly through abstract analytical thought. This clearly 
resonates with the distinction between analytic processing and experiential
learning (Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000).
Climate scientists’ perceptions of climate change for example, can be 
understood as being largely based on analytic processing. Scientists, however,
dispose of the necessary knowledge, tools, and attention resources to deal with 
climate change evidence that is of statistical nature mostly. For lay people on 
the other hand, analytic processing of climate change means dealing with 
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information that they are not familiar with and that, in most cases, exceeds 
their abilities, knowledge and experience to properly process. This has been 
particularly visible in studies showing that even highly educated individuals still 
perform very poorly at understanding and applying the most basic climate 
change knowledge (Sterman & Sweeney, 2002, 2007; Sterman, 2008). Since
climate change mostly lacks the qualities for experiential learning, individuals 
are faced with information they struggle to process, on a phenomenon that does 
not lend itself to the type of processing they can easily engage in. To make 
things worse any information they are provided with, then stands in constant 
competition with other contents, as the cognitive effort required for analytic 
processing represents “a scarce commodity, which people expend sparingly” 
(Myers et al., 2013, p. 343). 
It would, however, be overly simplifying to reduce this discussion to a 
question of certain aspects of climate change, that seem to favour this type of 
apprehension and processing. Moser (2014) coins the term distancing to discuss
the consistent and somewhat incongruous results showing that, contrary to 
widespread climate change awareness and reports of personal experience of 
climate change impacts, studies simultaneously find that people continue to 
describe climate change as something that is distant from them. This notion of 
distancing as an active process accredits the individual a less passive role in 
perceptions which have been summarized as the psychological distance of 
climate change (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Pidgeon, 2012; Spence et al., 2012). 
In this light, analogous to the discussion of scepticism in chapter 1.4, one would 
have to ask if there is a self-serving purpose to this kind of perception.
3.1.1 Climate change perceptions as a function of coping 
strategies
I propose that a well-established theory can help guide a discussion of the 
origin and function of certain types of engagement with climate change. As has 
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been noted elsewhere, the phenomenon of scepticism, for example, lends itself 
very aptly to the mechanisms outlined in Lazarus’ (1991) cognitive theory of 
stress/appraisal theory (Crompton & Kasser, 2009; Lorenzoni et al., 2007). This 
theory conceives of stress as a transaction in which a potential threat and 
personal resources are confronted via a series of cognitive operations, so-called 
appraisal processes. The process that could lead to scepticism in appraisal 
theory must start with an initial assertion, a so-called primary appraisal, of 
climate change as a threat. Intriguingly this parallels an essential assumption in
Value Belief Norm theory (Stern, 2000). Stern and colleagues (Stern et al., 
1999; Stern, 2000) similarly argue that the precondition of any pro-
environmental action is a state of worry. That is, a person must be aware of 
negative consequences for a valued object. In both theories a person would thus 
consider the potentially negative effects climate change might have on oneself, 
family, friends and/or other valued objects such as one’s house, nature, or a 
particular animal species for example. It is clear that the outcome of this 
primary appraisal process thus depends heavily on what a person defines as a 
‘valued object’ which in both theoretical approaches is based on a person’s 
individual set of values and beliefs that he or she subscribes to (Folkman, 1984; 
Stern, 2000).
Following the primary appraisal of a stimulus as a threat, secondary 
appraisals are induced. This type of cognitive operations investigates possible 
ways to engage the threatening entity, so-called coping mechanisms. The 
individual can then mitigate a threatening stimulus applying problem-focused 
and/or cognitive coping strategies. Problem-focused coping strategies describe 
actions that are directed at a threatening stimulus to ameliorate the outcome 
for the individual. A person could for example determine that climate change is 
something he/she can tackle as an individual, applying problem-focused coping 
strategies, such as mitigation and adaptation efforts. Another person conversely 
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could find the problem-focused coping strategies at his/her disposal to be 
insufficient or inapplicable and therefore resort to cognitive coping strategies. 
This type of mechanism, rather than engaging the threat directly, aims to 
change the way the threat is perceived, or how it is understood, as to minimize 
the negative emotional outcome. It is important to note that Lazarus and 
colleagues (Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991) have pointed out that it is in fact 
hard to separate cognitive coping and appraisal processes since they are in 
essence constituted by the same cognitive operations. This is reflected by early 
references to reappraisal, a third form of coping that Lazarus and Folkman
(1984) initially introduced as a more comprehensive re-evaluation of the threat, 
rather than just adjusting the emotional reaction to a threat, a strategy that 
was originally called emotional coping. 
The following paragraphs focus on cognitive coping, defining it as the 
sum of cognitive operations, conscious and subconscious, that help conceive a 
stimulus in a manner that creates a more favourable outcome for the person. 
The rationale applied here is that any engagement with climate change thus 
becomes a product of (1) objective features – that might as well favour one or 
the other outcome – and (2) the various cognitive coping operations through 
which these are manipulated. I propose that one of the most easily identifiable –
in absence of factual information favouring such a view – and most widespread 
results of such a process is in fact climate change scepticism. Appraisal theory 
would suggest that the growing threat of climate change will trigger more and 
more efforts to keep this threat at bay, which helps explain the paradoxical 
finding that the increasing reality of anthropogenic climate change seems to 
simultaneously increase disbelief. With regards to climate change a variety of 
cognitive coping options could be described by referring to Rahmstorf’s
(Rahmstorf, 2004) taxonomy of sceptics. Attribution sceptics for example resort 
to the conviction they have no involvement in the creation of climate change 
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and thus cannot do anything about it even if they wanted to17. Impact sceptics 
on the other hand turn their blind eye on climate impacts thereby legitimizing 
inaction and trend sceptics are probably what one could describe as closest to 
the idea of complete denial, disavowing that there is a problem at all. While 
climate change scepticism might constitute an overly obvious result of 
unambiguous facts being distorted, it is important to point out that, as the 
above-mentioned concept of distancing alludes to, less distinctive outcomes 
could exist. The same processes could also stand behind more distant 
perceptions of climate change than it would actually merit. Temporal, social 
and spatial distance and also uncertainty, all reduce urgency, immediacy, the 
need to act and thereby allow the individual to shift his/her attention to 
potentially more pleasant things in life, without having to feel anxious about it. 
These hypothesized forms of cognitive coping differ in relation to what 
aspect of climate change they affect. From a cognitive theory of stress 
perspective however, they all serve the same purpose of relieving the individual 
from psychological distress by providing less threat-inducing appraisals. Very 
few studies have looked at environmental issues, let alone climate change, in 
line with a cognitive theory of stress (Higginbotham, Connor, & Baker, 2014; 
Homburg & Stolberg, 2006). Their common theme is that they explain 
mitigation and adaptation behaviours as a consequence of primary threat 
appraisals of environmental issues, or climate change respectively. In applying 
this theory these studies (Higginbotham et al., 2014; Homburg & Stolberg, 2006; 
Iwata, 2002) have exclusively looked at actual behaviour as a form of problem-
focused coping without considering cognitive coping as a potential outcome. 
17 This relates to the above-mentioned overlap between what is often referred to as efficacy 
beliefs but could be understood as the result of a cognitive coping effort. Low efficacy beliefs 
equally could be exploited to suggest to the self that one’s inaction is in fact a simple 
consequence of lacking ability and/or opportunity, sparing oneself from the inconvenient and 
threatening admission that actions need to be taken.
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Applying the concept of cognitive coping to the formation of climate 
change scepticism and the wider perceptions, beliefs and attitudes around it, 
hinges on two central assumptions: first, climate change is perceived as a threat. 
Second, this threat is furthermore perceived as exceeding the individual’s 
problem focused coping strategies, inducing cognitive coping strategies. I argue 
that the crux of the applicability of a cognitive theory of stress approach to 
climate change scepticism in fact lies mostly with the first assumption, that 
climate change is judged to be threatening. Arguably, climate change does in 
fact represent a considerable threat to societies and the individual. Threats, 
that in their magnitude and comprehensiveness are very likely to exceed an
individual’s problem focused coping strategies and as such should trigger 
cognitive coping. It is however doubtful if the idea of climate change as an 
immediate threat holds true for most of human interaction with it, as the above 
discussion on the psychological distance of climate change and its low signal 
value underlines.
3.1.2 The other threat of climate change
The assertion that climate change does not represent a tangible threat 
for a majority of the population raises the question of what actually triggers 
coping effort then. It seems plausible that climate change does in fact offer 
another kind of threat. The opportunity to experience a “strong negative affect 
associated with the concrete, immediate costs and sacrifices” of climate change 
actions contrasted by an “absence of feelings of worry about possible abstract 
and distant consequences of global warming” (Weber, 2006, p. 110). This type of 
threat has been discussed in work around cultural cognitions (Kahan, Braman, 
Gastil, Slovic, & Mertz, 2007), proposing that conservative white males 
assimilate or ignore information so as to not conflict with their favoured form of 
societal organization. Building on this work and investigating the reluctant 
engagement of conservative audiences with climate change, McCright and 
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Dunlap (2011) specify that the climate change discourse, by means of ascribing 
responsibilities to humans and more importantly through proposed 
countermeasures, challenges conservative domains of interest such as the fossil 
fuel industry. In essence this work suggests that the threat of climate change is
constituted by a misalignment between the identity, convictions and interests of 
a person on one side, and measures proposed to address climate change (i.e. 
mitigation measures) on the other. Applying the terminology of appraisal 
theory, affected publics then could respond to this with cognitive coping.
If these dismissive and distant perceptions are at least to some extent 
due to the proposed solution to the issue, then policy makers and 
communicators face a demanding task in trying to motivate these unengaged 
publics to participate in a constructive way. A challenge that is to some extent 
addressed by Corner (2013) who proposes five narratives to better engage 
conservative audiences, who are known to be less engaged by climate change. 
(1) He recommends highlighting the localism aspect of climate change and a 
sense of responsibility to fellow citizens and future generations. The assertion 
that action on climate change does not need international involvement but 
instead starts at home further underpins the core message of local obligations 
and actions. (2) Messages should also focus on energy security. This narrative 
proposes a shift towards renewable energies to secure abundant, safe and 
economically viable energy sources. It is described as a prerequisite for securing 
long-term jobs and opportunities for British citizens and as a way of increasing 
resilience to future energy shortages. (3) The third narrative frames climate 
change as an opportunity for a green economy and new environmentalism. The 
messages that this should convey are those of a second industrial revolution in 
harmony with nature and the establishment of a green economy, investing and 
innovating for a better society. Entrepreneurs and business leaders are also 
called upon to take on the challenge of climate change off liberals to ensure the 
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transition to a low-carbon future as they envision it. (5) Central to the last set 
of messages is the idea of good life, as it highlights the importance of mitigating 
threats posed by climate change to the health and overall quality of life of 
communities. These messages highlight the threats that climate change poses to 
the health and overall quality of life of communities; in particular threats to the 
young and elderly through climate impacts, such as increased flooding, are 
accentuated. In a similar vein Bain, Hornsey, Bongiorno, and Jeffries (2012)
suggest that climate change communication aimed at promoting pro-
environmental behaviour in climate change deniers should accentuate how 
mitigation efforts advance progress in science and economy, while at the same 
time making us more caring and considerate people. In essence these approaches 
try to highlight aspects of climate change, and more importantly the measures 
proposed in response to it, in a way that potentially resonates with conservative 
core values.
There is, however, only so much carefully designed messages can do to 
portray certain mitigation measures, which are essentially opposed to 
conservative values, in a fashion that will resonate with them. Furthermore it is 
important to note that, as Moser (2014, p. 340) argues, any message will be 
embedded in a “discursive context that is coloured by the historical legacies of 
communicating climate change science and mitigation”. The historical legacies of 
the climate change debate are clearly dominated by mitigation. This one-
sidedness has made climate change “become suffused with antagonistic 
meanings, generating conflict that persists even in the face of ample and widely 
distributed scientific evidence” (Braman, Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, Tarantola, & 
Silva, 2012, p. 21). One could thus argue that it is the historical focus on 
mitigation measures, which has led to the current polarization between publics 
of different political and/or ideological orientations (Dunlap & McCright, 2008). 
A situation, where in some contexts the mere mentioning of climate change 
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seems to clearly indicate to individuals where to take up position within the 
deeply polarized playing field of the climate change debate. 
So if mitigation measures to address climate change form a large part of 
the problem, then it follows that an alternative set of measures, such as 
adaptation measures, might provide a more favourable starting ground in trying 
to reduce sceptical responses. This hypothesis finds initial support in research, 
which has shown that climate change adaptation can actually serve as a 
catalyst for increased mitigation efforts. Adams et al. (2011) showed that 
respondents who had participated in public forums on adaptation planning 
showed more interest in climate mitigation than non-participants. The authors 
speculate that this effect could be mediated by concern for local impacts, which 
was found to be higher among the former group. While this research did not 
investigate how sceptical publics specifically reacted to that framing, it does 
suggest that the above-mentioned localism narrative seems to be activated to 
some extent by considering climate change adaptation. 
A similar qualitative study (Furth & Gantwerk, 2013) found that citizen 
dialogues discussing sea-level rise in terms of impacts and preparations led to a 
strong agreement among participants regarding the necessity of adaptation 
policies among liberal and conservative participants. Further, the discussions 
also quickly moved from adaptation to mitigation measures, a tendency that 
was also reflected in the highest overall popularity of one out of four proposed
scenarios that promoted preparing for sea level rise (adaptation) but also 
addressing its root causes (mitigation). While levels of scepticism did not 
change before and after the discourse there was consistent support for 
mitigation measures even among those participants that thought that climate 
change had not been proven yet. This latter finding is a strong indication for a 
mechanism that is triggered by an adaptation framing that, much more than 
just ameliorating the negative attitude towards climate change, actually
138
increases mitigation efforts, even among sceptical audiences. An effect that was 
tested in an experimental study by Evans, Milfont, and Lawrence (2014). The 
authors confirmed that persons who had previously considered local adaptation 
reported higher willingness to perform mitigation actions; an effect that was 
found for sceptics, as well as non-sceptical respondents. Further, a study that 
similarly looked at the effect of reading a newspaper article that focuses on 
adaptation, also found some tentative support for an engaging effect of 
adaptation but, more importantly, pointed to the importance of considering 
political orientation as moderating variable (Carrico, Truelove, Vandenbergh, & 
Dana, 2015).
Evidence for this type of mechanism also comes from research into public 
perceptions of geo-engineering. In an experimental study (Braman et al., 2012)
participants who had read a news article demanding  more investments in 
geoengineering, as opposed to one that talked about further lowering the 
current atmospheric CO2 ceiling, exhibited less polarization between hierarchical 
individualists and egalitarian communitarians. Additionally this study found an 
overall increase in perceived climate change risk for the geoengineering 
condition when compared to the control condition. A preliminary investigation 
into public perceptions and attitudes towards geoengineering embedded within 
2009 Royal Society report on this emerging climate change response strategy
(Shepherd, 2009) found that perceptions of participants in focus groups 
concerning geoengineering were rather negative but interestingly several 
suggested that they were motivated to put more effort into mitigation if 
geoengineering was actually considered as a response strategy.
These results represent a very promising basis on which to hypothesize 
that adaptation can serve as a catalyst for overall engagement with climate 
change and in particular for previously unengaged publics. I propose that there 
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are two major aspects of adaptation that will increase engagement with climate 
change:
(1) On a very general level, adaptation can increase the immediacy of 
climate change by coupling it to actions in the here and now. Applying one of 
the main findings of CLT – the fact that mental construals reciprocally affect 
each other – would suggest that, as climate change gets associated with the 
more concrete and local adaptation measures, the overall psychological distance 
of climate change decreases. Adaptation measures geared towards buttressing 
people’s houses, their property, their health – concrete instances of their daily 
lives – against climate change impacts could potentially help convey the 
urgency and immediacy of climate change more effectively than the idea of 
mitigating essentially invisible greenhouse gases. Building on results that have 
found that lower levels of psychological distance are associated with higher 
levels of concern (Spence et al., 2012) one could expect that this local quality of 
adaptation would have a positive effect on engagement with climate change.
This is an effect that could be particularly accentuated for, but not exclusive to, 
previously unengaged publics such as conservatives. There is, however, potential 
for a negative effect of adaptation frames among liberal publics, in that the 
concept of climate change as a global issue and the universalist communitarian 
values held by this audience might contrast sharply with adaptation measures 
that focus at the local level and the benefit of a few. This sort of mismatch 
could potentially induce lower engagement among these individuals, comparable 
to how Kahan and colleagues (2012) found that the depolarizing effect of the 
geoengineering condition was a function of both hierarchical individualists 
becoming less dismissive but egalitarian communitarians becoming more so. 
(2) On a more specific level cues for the applicability of climate change 
adaptation to a conservative discourse are in fact implied in the semantics of 
the issues at hand – Climate change and conservatism. According to Jost, 
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Glaser, Ktuglanski, and Sulloway (2003) one of two core dimensions that 
liberals and conservatives differ on is whether they advocate or resist change.
The idea of adaptation as an effort to conserve the status quo can function as a 
powerful antidote to conservatives’ reluctance to engage with the subject. In 
particular if climate change is framed as an issue that will change societal 
relations, the stability of which is of great importance to conservatives. 
Furthermore, the concept of adaptation as protecting what is dear to people 
against climate impacts speaks to local concerns for immediate valued entities 
such as one’s house, neighbourhood or local environment, as outlined in the 
localism-narrative by Corner (2013). This view is corroborated by results that 
have found adaptation intentions to be mostly driven by proximate concerns for 
local impacts (Haden et al., 2012). Another aspect of adaptation that lends itself 
more easily to a conservative mind-set is its technocratic nature. The authors of 
the above mentioned experimental study argue that geo-engineering as a symbol 
for overcoming limits to economic growth set by the environment by virtues of 
new technologies affirms hierarchical individualists’ values, which makes them 
less likely to dismiss information concerning climate change (Braman et al., 
2012). Adaptation analogously can carry notions of a green economy-narrative, 
as mentioned above, focusing on issues such as innovation and economic 
opportunities. At the same time adaptation builds resilience and independence, 
helping to maintain a certain standard of living; aspects that resonate both with 
the good life- as well as the energy security-narrative.
3.1.3 Summary and research question
This experimental study aims to disaggregate these two aspects fused 
into adaptation. It does so by manipulating the local relevance of climate 
change by putting it into a local or global reference frame, in addition to 
presenting climate change as a matter of adaptation or mitigation. To test these 
hypotheses, four different fictitious newspaper articles were created. These 
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articles highlight climate change impacts either at the local or global scale and 
refer to either adaptation or mitigation as the response strategy of choice. 
This 2x2 design is what separates this research effort from similar work 
by Evans, Milfont, and Lawrence (2014). Manipulating the climate change 
measure framing (adaptation vs. mitigation), as well as the spatial framing 
(global vs. local) should allow for a more detailed investigation of the effects 
that arise from local relevance and those induced by other aspects of 
adaptation. Since these aspects are expected to resonate differently with 
audiences of different political orientations, particular attention will be directed 
to potential interaction effects arising from the interplay of political orientation 
(left-leaning vs. right-leaning) and the two framing manipulations. Analysis will
investigate whether these conditions affect engagement with climate change as 
surveyed through a variety of pre-post measurements18. The study covered a 
considerable breadth of dependent variables; from the perceptual-cognitive level 
with items on climate change scepticism, to affective responses, such as 
emotional engagement with climate change. The breadth of constructs 
investigated should provide an opportunity to determine at what level the 
experimental manipulations might have an effect – from the rather cognitive 
perceptual to the more affective components. Additionally variables of a more 
applied nature, such as support for adaptation and mitigation policies, were also 
investigated. Analogous to the adaptation measures presented in the previous 
chapter the measures used here include variables that deal with the central 
theme of climate change but also the more specific issue of sea-level rise. 
18 Increased engagement is used to summarize one or more of the following effects: decreased 
scepticism b) increase in efficacy beliefs c) less socially distant perceptions for both CC- and 
SLR-effects, d) increase in concern for CC and SLR, e) increase in emotional engagement with 
CC and f) higher support and efficacy ratings for financial regulation, mitigation and 
adaptation.
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Summarizing the above, I anticipate that there is an effect that pertains 
to the immediate nature of adaptation measures that I aim to test separately 
from other aspects that characterize adaptation, by providing a direct 
manipulation through a local or global frame for climate change. Alternative 
predictions regarding the effect of this spatial framing can be made. A first 
hypothesis predicts that a local frame increases overall engagement, regardless 
of political orientation. One could, however, equally expect to find that this 
effect is particularly accentuated for right-leaning individuals and rather small 
or undetectable for left-leaning participants. The reason for this alternative 
expectation is the assumption that left-leaning individuals are already engaged 
with climate change, evidencing somewhat of a ceiling effect regardless of the 
information they are provided with. The specific combination of a global 
reference frame and an adaptation frame could see this generally positive 
engagement of left-leaning individuals reversed though. This prediction is based 
on the assumption that the discrepancy of responding to an issue that has been 
described as global, with a measure that possesses a strong local component 
should be particularly striking to these individuals as it stands in conflict with 
their convictions.
I expect to find an effect of adaptation specifically, as it resonates well 
with conservative values, providing a more politically congruent climate change 
narrative and thereby dismantling some of the conservative audiences’ 
dismissive stance towards the issue of climate change as a whole. The effect of 
the climate change measure framing should thus be exclusive to right-leaning
individuals. Regarding the isolated effect of political orientation I expect to find 
that left-leaning individuals generally show higher engagement with climate 
change.
Summarizing the above, this study’s main goal is to address the following 
research question:
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• How do the spatial (local vs. global) and climate change measure 
(adaptation vs. mitigation) framings of climate change affect the 
engagement of right-leaning and left-leaning individuals?
This research question can be translated into the following more specific 
hypotheses:
H1 Political orientation is expected to influence overall engagement with 
climate change, which should be lower in right-leaning individuals.
H2 The effect of the climate change measure frame depends on the political 
orientation of the individual. The adaptation condition is more engaging 
to right-leaning individuals and the mitigation condition is more engaging 
for left-leaning participants.
H3 Local frames increase overall-engagement.
H4 Local frames are more engaging to right-leaning individuals than they are 
to left-leaning participants.
H5 Global adaptation frames are disengaging to left-leaning participants.
3.2 Method
3.2.1 Participants
Ethics approval was sought with the Cardiff University School of 
Psychology Ethics Board and granted. A call for participants was then 
published on the electronic notice board of the university’s web platform
accessible to both students and staff. The call provided some basic information 
on the questionnaire and advertised the chance to enter a prize draw for an 
Amazon online shopping voucher upon completion of the survey. A link to the 
survey was attached at the end of the message. A total of 283 predominantly 
female (71.7%) and English (71.1%) subjects participated in this study. The 
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relatively low mean age of 24.25 (SD = 8.60) reflects the finding that the 
majority of participants were students (80.6%).
3.2.2 Materials
This experimental study was built around faux newspaper articles that 
were aimed at framing climate change in various ways. These four articles
(Local adaptation, Local mitigation, Global adaptation, Global mitigation) 
differed in whether they accentuated climate impacts at the local or global scale 
and whether they proposed adaptation or mitigation as response strategies. The 
articles were further adapted to reflect a Welsh or English local background (see 
appendices 3.2.1-6).
Various scales consisting of Likert-type scale items were employed as pre-
and post-measures19. Climate change scepticism (a = .8620) was measured using 
a five-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree) and included five items
(Q1.1-5) such as “I am convinced that climate change is happening and “The 
evidence for climate change is unreliable”. Environmental identity (a = .83, five-
point scale, strongly disagree to strongly agree) consisted of three items (Q2.1-3)
including “I consider myself to be environmentally-conscious” and “I think of 
myself as someone who is concerned about the environment”. Three single items
(Q4.1-3, Q6.1-3) each were employed to measure concern for the effects of
climate change (CCC) and sea-level rise (SLRC) on the self, society and the
world. These items were combined into two separate climate change and sea-
level rise concern-scales (aCCC = .79, aSLRC = .77, four-point scale, not at all 
concerned to very concerned). Climate change efficacy beliefs (a = .79, five-
point scale, strongly disagree to strongly agree) were surveyed using 6 items 
(Q7.1-6) such as “There is no point in me doing anything about climate change 
19 Please see appendix 3.1 for the exact wording of items, answer options and topline results.
20 For pre- post-measures reliability scores are averaged across both measurements.
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because no-one else is” and “The actions of a single person don't make any 
difference in tackling climate change”. The emotional engagement with climate
change scale (a = .81, four-point scale, not at all to to a great extent) presented 
five emotions (anger, disappointment, guilt, fear, sadness; Q8.1-5) and asked 
respondents to indicate how intensely they felt each emotion when thinking 
about climate change. Furthermore, two slider items (Q3, Q5) measuring 
perceived social distance of climate change and sea-level rise asked participants 
to indicate whether they thought that it was rather themselves and their 
families that were going to be affected by climate change and sea-level rise 
respectively, or other people. These measure asked respondents to place a 
sliding indicator over a scale from 0 (oneself and family) to 100 (other people), 
where 50 indicates that both groups are going to be affected equally. The same
type of measure (Q23) was used to ask individuals to indicate their political 
orientation on a political continuum from ‘left wing’ (0) to ‘right wing’ (100).
This political orientation measure was used to split the sample into right and 
left-leaning participants.
The experimental manipulation was followed up by a question asking for 
immediate top of mind associations (Q10) and by two open-ended manipulation 
check questions (Q11, Q12), asking respondents what type of action the article 
had proposed in response to climate impacts and what area the article had been 
concerned with. Approximately two thirds identified the correct action (69%) 
and 87% correctly identified the area the article was concerned with. Towards 
the end of the questionnaire another item (Q27) asked subjects to rate the 
overall convincingness of the article (five-point scale, very convincing to very 
unconvincing). The convincingness of the articles was rated 2.51 (SD = .84,).
Convincingness ratings did not significantly differ between experimental 
conditions.
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Policy support measures asked individuals to indicate on a five-point
scale (definitely not to definitely yes) how they would vote in a national 
referendum for a series of proposed mitigation and adaptation measures. 
Additionally participants were asked to rate the efficacy for each measure on a 
four-point scale (not at all effective to very effective). A supposed adaptation 
policy support item (Q13.4) was excluded from further calculations after a first 
exploratory factor analysis (see Appendix 3.3.1) found that negatively loaded on 
the same factor as two support for financial regulation measures. After this item 
had been removed, exploratory factor analysis (see Appendix 3.3.2) found a 
clear three factor solution, which translated into three policy support scales: 
support for financial regulation (a = .78), support for mitigation (a = .59) and 
support for adaptation (a = .64). Analogous to findings presented in chapter 
2.2.2 the support for financial regulation scale included five adaptation and
mitigation items (Q13.2, Q13.8, Q14.1, Q14.4-5) that proposed to advance these 
efforts through financial regulation, such as increased taxes for diesel and petrol 
and higher prices for water. The support for mitigation scale consisted of four 
items (Q14.2-3, Q14.6-7) such as “More investments in safe cycling- and 
walking-routes” and “Subsidies for house insulation” and the support for 
adaptation scale included 6 items (Q13.1, Q13.3, Q13.5-7, Q13.9) such as 
“Stricter planning control in flood risk areas, to limit construction on flood 
plains” and “Build new flood- and coastal-defences”. It has to be pointed out 
that reliability scores for the support for mitigation- and support for 
adaptation-scale were not satisfactory21 and so subsequently reported results 
concerning these two constructs have to be interpreted with the necessary 
caution. In lieu of the intention measures applied in the study presented in 
21 Reliability analysis did not indicate that deleting any of the included items would increase the 
reliability score (see Appendix 3.4.1 and Appendix 3.4.2)
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chapter 2.2.2, a set of two single item measures (Q33-34) (yes/no) asked
respondents to indicate whether they wanted to obtain additional information 
on adaptation and/or mitigation. This followed the reasoning that, in particular 
with regards to adaptation, a lot of the proposed action would not come into 
consideration for students, who constituted a large share of the sample.
The current study also included a scale (Q26.1-6) measuring cultural 
orientation based on previous work by Capstick, Pidgeon, and Whitehead 
(2013) that aimed to measure adherence to one of the group grid typologies, as 
outlined in chapter 1.3.3. This scale was initially intended to measure ideology, 
in order to control for interaction effects with the experimental manipulations. 
Exploratory factor analysis however did not find a sensible two-factor solution 
(see Appendix 3.3.3) as reported by the original authors. Given these 
inconclusive results the scale was not included in any further calculations.
The remaining measures included: an item on UK party preferences
(Q25), two items investigating previous experiences with floods (Q32.1-2) and 
questions asking participants to report their gender (Q28), age (Q29), 
occupational status (Q30) and one question asking participants whether they 
have recently donated to an environmental organisation (Q31)22.
3.2.3 Design
This study employed a three way factorial design (local/global x 
adaptation/mitigation x right-leaning/left-leaning). Participants were
categorized into right and left-leaning by applying a median-split to the political 
orientation measure. It is important to point out that due to the rather liberal 
orientation of the total sample (M = 38.60, SD = 20.44) half of the participants 
that were categorized as right-leaning were by definition of the scale left-leaning
22 Q31, as well as Q32.1-2 and Q10 were included primarily for exploratory purposes and will 
not be analysed here.
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or undecided. To analyse the data, spatial framing (local vs. global), climate 
change measure framing (adaptation vs. mitigation) and political orientation 
(left-leaning vs. right-leaning) were entered as between group variables into 
MANOVA.
The following dependent variables were investigated: mean change23 in 
scepticism, mean change in perceived social distance of climate change- and sea-
level rise, mean change in concern for the effects of climate change and sea-level 
rise, mean change in emotional engagement with climate change, support for; 
and efficacy of; financial regulation and adaptation.
3.2.4 Procedure
The start page of the survey provided general information regarding the 
survey, the responsible researchers, and information that was necessary for 
informed consent. Participants who gave consent to participate in the study, by 
clicking the appropriate button, were then able to access the questionnaire. 
Questionnaire sections and scales were presented in a randomized fashion where 
applicable. An initial screening question was put into place to determine 
whether participants were Welsh or English. Respondents who were neither 
were screened out at this point. The remaining participants were branched into 
two analogous versions of the questionnaire, which were adapted to an English 
or Welsh context. After completing the questionnaire participants were fully 
debriefed and provided with contact details again should they have any further 
questions or comments. At the end of the debrief webpage participants were 
presented with a link to participate in the prize draw, redirecting the web 
browser to a new and separate webpage where they were asked to submit their 
email address. This way any potentially identifiable data was stored separately 
23 Mean difference scores were calculated by subtracting the pre- from the post-score. A positive 
sign thus indicates an increase and a negative sign a decrease in the respective variable 
following the experimental manipulation.
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from the answers participants had given. Data collection started the 2nd of May, 
2014 and ended the 21st of May, 2014. Any partial responses that had not been 
completed by then were discarded. Participants were able to win one of three 
Amazon vouchers (£10, £20, £30,). After data collection had ended the winners 
were chosen randomly from the total collected sample using an online random 
number generator and were subsequently sent their Amazon vouchers via email.
3.2.5 Results
Descriptive Results
Climate change scepticism was not very prevalent in this sample (M = 
1.93, SD = .76)24. For example, only 3.18% were “not convinced that climate 
change is really happening”. As has been mentioned participants were skewed 
towards the left concerning their political orientation (M = 38.60, SD = 20.44)
and exhibited rather high environmental identity scores (M = 3.69, SD = .69). 
Efficacy beliefs were also considerably high (M = 3.86, SD = .62). This rather 
liberal and environmentally concerned character of the sample was contrasted 
by only a small portion of respondents (13.43%), who reported being a member 
of, or regularly donating to, environmental organisations. 
As can be seen in Figure 7, concern for the effects of climate change and 
sea-level rise showed a consistent pattern of lower proximal concern and higher 
distal concern with concern for climate change effects on the self, (M = 2.79, 
SD = .71) being lowest followed by concern for climate change effects on 
society, (M = 3.22, SD = .69) and concern for climate change effects on the 
world, (M = 3.51, SD = .65). Analogously concern for SLR increased as items 
moved from effects on the self, (M = 2.42, SD = .75) to higher order concerns 
24 Where pre- and post-measures existed descriptive statistics are reported for pre measures 
only.
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for the effect of SLR on society, (M = 2.96, SD = .73) and the world, (M = 
3.31, SD = .75). 2
Figure7.Meanconcernratingsfortheeffectsofclimatechangeandsealevelriseontheself,
society and theworld.Note.Answerswere givenon4point scale (1/not at all concerned to
4/veryconcerned).
This pattern was further reflected in the measures to approximate 
whether respondents thought that climate change and sea-level rise affects them 
and their families as opposed to other people. Perceptions overall were rather 
distant than proximal, with sea-level rise (M = 65.83, SD = 16.61) being viewed 
as affecting others more than climate change (M = 58.98, SD = 14.71).
Emotional engagement overall was only marginally bigger than the 
middle point (2.5) of the scale (M = 2.63, SD = .63). As visible in Figure 8 the 
emotion which was rated to be felt most intensely in relation to climate change 
was sadness (M = 2.90, SD = .82), while anger (M = 2.41, SD = .92) was 
reported to be least intensely felt.
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Figure8.Distributionofresponsesforemotionalengagementitems.
Descriptive statistics yielded the expected discrepancy between support 
for financial regulation and mitigation. Financial regulation measures, such as
encouraging people to save electricity (M = 2.32, SD = 1.09) or to consume less 
water (M = 2.36, SD = 1.06) through tax- and price-increases, were most 
unpopular. Mitigation policies like for example for the production of household 
green energy (M = 4.30, SD = .83) and investments in safe cycling- and 
walking-routes (M = 4.26, SD = .90) instead were most favoured by 
respondents. Overall adaption (M = 3.98, SD = .52) and mitigation (M = 4.18, 
SD = .59) were found to be similar in popularity trailed by financial regulation 
measures with nearly a 1.5 scale point drop (M = 2.56, SD = .85). Estimated 
efficacies of the measures yielded a very similar pattern. Mitigation (M = 3.05, 
SD = .49) and adaptation policies (M = 3.08, SD = .37) were judged to be 
approximately equally efficient, again trailed by financial regulation (M = 2.36, 
SD = .56). In terms of obtaining further information on climate change 
measures 25.44% were interested in such information on adaptation, compared 
to 31.10% for mitigation.
Concerning previous experiences with flooding 16.96% reported that 
flooding or erosion had directly affected them, their family, or a close friend. A 
larger share of 47.35% specified that flooding or erosion had indirectly affected 
them.
Effects of spatial framing, climate change measure framing and 
political orientation
Using Pillai’s trace, multivariate testing results revealed that there was a 
significant overall effect of two between group variables: climate change 
measure framing, V = .08, F(10, 232) = 2.12, p = .02 and political orientation 
V = .12, F(10, 232) = 3.23, p < .01. Analysis also revealed a significant three 
way interaction of all independent variables, V = .10, F(10, 232) = 2.62, p = 
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.01. Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 can thus already be rejected at this level of analysis. 
To follow up these basic results, ANOVAs were calculated to reveal a more 
nuanced picture.
Climate change measure framing
Mean change in climate change concern, F(1, 241) = 4.12, p = .04
differed between climate change measure framings. Participants showed an
increase in climate change concern ( = .07, SD = .36) in the mitigation 
condition and a less distinct decrease in concern ( = -.02, SD = .36) in the 
adaptation condition. A similar pattern was visible in scepticism ratings, F(1, 
241) = 5.59, p = .02, but with a less accentuated increase ( = .03, SD = .36)
in the mitigation framing and a more accentuated decrease ( = -.07, SD = 
.33) in the adaptation framing. ANOVA for the other dependent variables did 
not yield any significant effect of climate change measure framing. Opposed to 
hypothesis 2, which postulated that the effect of the climate change measure 
framing is mediated by political orientation, the effect of climate change 
measure framing applied to left and right-leaning individuals equally. 
Figure9.Changeofclimatechangeconcernandclimatechangescepticismbetweenadaptation
andmitigationframing.
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fact showed a bigger decrease in perceived social distance of sea level rise ( = 
-5.21, SD = 11.6), when compared to right-leaning participants ( = -1.84, SD
= 13.37). Support for financial regulation, F(1, 241) = 19.96, p < .01 and 
efficacy ratings of financial regulations, F(1, 248) = 21.65, p < .01 (Figure 10)
also differed between right and left-leaning participants. As visible in Figure 10
left-leaning participants were more in favour of financial regulations, (M = 2.80, 
SD = .86) than their political counterparts (M = 2.33, SD = .76). Based on the 
similarity of support and efficacy estimates it was not surprising to find that
accordingly left-leaning respondents rated the efficacy of financial regulations 
higher (M = 2.54, SD = .53) than right-leaning individuals (M = 2.22, SD = 
.54). The effects found are in line with hypothesis 1.
Figure 10. Change in perceived social distance of sea level rise; mean support for financial
regulation andmitigation; andmean efficacy ratings for financial regulation between left and
rightleaning participants.
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Interaction effect for spatial framing, climate change measure framing and 
political orientation
Follow up analyses concerning the full three-way interaction effects found 
significant results for change in emotional engagement, F(7, 241) = 4.25, p = 
.04 and change in concern for sea-level rise F(7, 241) = 5.26, p = .02. Figure 11
clearly depicts how the local adaptation frame increased emotional engagement 
in right-leaning participants, whereas left-leaning respondents showed a 
decrease. This relationship was inversed and less pronounced for local mitigation
but with a substantial increase for left-leaning participants. For global frames 
instead the picture differed significantly but was homogenous across climate 
change measure frames. Both climate change measure frames lead to an increase 
in emotional engagement in left-leaning and a decrease in right-leaning
participants. For emotional engagement contrary to hypothesis 5 it is the local 
adaptation condition that is disengaging. 
Figure11. Changeinemotionalengagementbetweenframesandpoliticalorientations.
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Concern for the effects of sea-level rise showed a substantially different 
set of results. While the local frames yielded what appeared to be a ceiling 
effect, the magnitude of change in concern for the effects of sea-level rise
strongly varied between global climate change measure frames as a function of 
political orientation. For left-leaning respondents there was no change in sea-
level rise concern in the global adaptation frame but a .25 increase (SD = .49) 
in the global mitigation frame. The opposite trend was visible for right-leaning
individuals with a .24 increase (SD = .45) in the global adaptation condition 
and only a marginal increase in the global mitigation condition ( = .03, SD = 
.43). These results are not in line with hypothesis 5 either, even though the 
finding that the global adaptation condition was the only condition to yield no 
increase in sea level rise concern for left-leaning respondents could be 
interpreted as a disengaging effect.
Figure 12. Change in concern for the effects of sealevel rise between frames and political
orientations.
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Answers to the single item outcome measures between political 
orientation and framing conditions were analysed on a descriptive basis. As can 
be seen in Table 1 the highest request for mitigation information among left-
leaning respondents was generated by the local mitigation (42.86% yes) closely 
followed by the global mitigation frame (41,94%). Right-leaning respondents, 
despite a lower percentage (32.26% yes), equally were most interested in 
mitigation information after reading the local mitigation article. The local 
mitigation frame also induced the highest demand for adaptation information in 
left-leaning respondents (40.48% yes). Right-leaning demand for more 
adaptation was highest in the local mitigation condition (22.58%) but yielded 
similar percentages in all but the global mitigation frame, which yielded the 
lowest interest (16,67%) in supplementary materials overall. The lowest rate of 
affirmative responses for left-leaning individuals instead showed for adaptation 
and mitigation (18.52%) in the global adaptation condition. On a descriptive 
basis this is thus fully in line with hypothesis 5.
Table7
Percentage of yes answers to the single item outcome measures in the 4 distinct framing
conditions.
Leftleaning Rightleaning
Mitigation
information
Adaptation
Frame
Mitigation
Frame
Adaptation
Frame
Mitigation
Frame
Local
Frame
40.63% 42.86% 18.42% 32.26%
Global
Frame
18.52% 41.94% 23.08% 30.00%
Adaptation
information
Adaptation
Frame
Mitigation
Frame
Adaptation
Frame
Mitigation
Frame
Local
Frame
34.38% 40.48% 21.05% 22.58%
Global
Frame
18.52% 29.03% 20.51% 16.67%
Note.Thetableissplitinordertoallowforacomparisonof left andrightleaning participants.
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3.3 Discussion
This study investigated how different ways of framing climate change 
would affect engagement with climate change, with particular attention to 
differential effects for left- and right-leaning publics. MANOVA revealed that 
overall participants’ responses were affected by whether they were presented 
with an adaptation- or mitigation-frame, by their political orientation and by a 
significant 3-way interaction effect including both experimental conditions and 
political orientation. Subsequent ANOVAs helped in painting a more detailed 
picture of the various effects. 
Whether climate change was presented in terms of local or global impacts 
did not affect participants’ responses. Hypotheses 3 and 4 were thus not 
confirmed. Admittedly the spatial framing manipulation was minimalist 
consisting merely in the substitution of a few words. This might explain why 
this kind of framing on its own did not yield an effect. Also it cannot be 
excluded that participants in the global conditions might have thought of a 
local background to the global faux newspaper article to better relate to it and 
as such would have superposed the experimental effect. This naturally would 
have a similar effect as providing a local reference frame.
Political orientation affected support for and efficacy ratings of financial 
regulation in the expected way. No significant difference was found for the 
adaptation measures. This finding further underpins the above-discussed idea of 
adaptation as a measure that does not seem to carry the same ideological
baggage as mitigation does. Interestingly, and unexpectedly, left-leaning
participants also showed a significantly higher decrease in perceived social 
distance of sea-level rise after the experimental manipulation. It is probable that 
for the potentially more receptive left-leaning audiences the tentative focus of 
the articles on flooding events might have triggered a stronger shift than in the 
potentially more dismissive right-leaning participants. 
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Contrary to hypothesis 2, adaptation frames decreased scepticism and
mitigation frames increased it, irrespective of participants’ political orientations.
Climate change concern showed the identical pattern. Considering that climate 
change concern and scepticism are negatively correlated (r = -.462, p < .001) 
the finding that both variables are phased in how they were affected by the 
climate change measure frames constitutes a somewhat surprising result, as it 
would be reasonable to expect the variables to be diametrical in their response 
to a certain manipulation. It appears however that their negative relationship 
does not hold true for how they are affected by the framing manipulations. A 
closer inspection of the overall spread of the effects (Figure 9) indicates that the
adaptation condition is in large part characterized by a decrease in scepticism, 
while concern for climate change yields a relatively smaller decrease. In the 
mitigation condition instead, the increase in climate change concern is central, 
as opposed to scepticism, which, in this case, increases by a comparably smaller 
margin. These findings suggest that, irrespective of political orientation, 
reference to adaptation measures decreases scepticism, while focusing on 
mitigation instead increases climate change concern. 
The effect for scepticism could be explained referring to construal level 
theory. Adaptation as a measure in the here and now helps to create a more 
proximal construal of climate change overall, thereby increasing certainty.
Contrary to hypothesis 2 this effect is not restricted to right-leaning audiences. 
Interestingly this result would suggest that the climate change measure framing 
carries more weight in creating such a shift in perceptions than whether one 
discusses climate change at the local or the global scale. One could argue, that 
the supposed threatening effect of mitigation, as a response contrary to many of 
the predominant consumerist tendencies in today’s world, is not necessarily 
restricted to specific ideologies or political orientations. Dickinson (2009), for 
example, building on work by Becker (1997), discusses materialism as a form of 
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‘immortality projects’ that help humanity deal with its all-dominant fear of the 
inevitability of death. She describes the so-called ‘people paradox’, delineating 
how the very things that we rely on as symbols of immortality, such as material 
goods, often conflict with our prospects for survival. In this line of thought
mitigation could be thought of as challenging some of these immortality 
projects, the freedom to travel, one’s own car, etc. Adaptation, on the other 
hand, does not interfere with these aspects of life. Additionally, by proposing 
ways of preparing and protecting one-self for the impacts of climate change, it 
might actually mediate some of the anxiety induced.
Not only scepticism was affected the climate change measure framing, 
but equally climate change concern. Bearing in mind that the present measure 
of climate change concern is in fact a composite of concern for the effects of 
climate change on the self but more importantly on society and the world I
hypothesize that the mitigation frame accentuates how individuals have to 
contribute their part to sustain the greater public good, invoking a certain sense 
of social responsibility, thereby increasing concern in both left- and right-leaning
individuals. However, separate exploratory ANOVAs for the three concern 
components found no significant difference between climate change measure 
framings. Combined with a marginal p-value of .04 for the main effect these 
findings advise caution in conclusively interpreting the results
A full three-way interaction effect affected emotional engagement and 
change in concern for the effects of sea level rise. Right-leaning participants’ 
emotional engagement increased in the local adaptation frame. In the local 
mitigation condition left-leaning emotional engagement increased. Contrary to 
hypothesis 5 it was in fact the local adaptation condition that appeared to be 
disengaging for left-leaning individuals, at least for emotional engagement. The 
global framing conditions instead did not yield a difference between climate 
change measure framing conditions. Left-leaning respondents increased their 
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emotional engagement in both the global mitigation and adaptation condition, 
whereas right-leaning participants’ emotional engagement decreased in both 
global climate change measure frames. This finding would thus suggest that 
political orientation does not seem to play a role in how individuals react to 
adaptation or mitigation frames at the global scale. It is, however, noteworthy
that the global adaptation frame shifted the cross-political mean change 
towards an increase rather than a decrease, as found in the global mitigation 
frame. This could hint at a positive effect of the adaptation framing 
counteracting some of the disengaging nature of the global framing. An 
interpretation that resonates with the previously discussed result that the 
adaptation framing decreases scepticism in both political camps. 
This finding further suggests that there is an ideology-specific effect of 
the climate change measure framing on emotional engagement restricted to the 
local framing conditions. It is important to note that, beyond an increase in 
what could be called politically congruent local climate change measure frames, 
this effect equally consisted of a substantial decrease in engagement, rather than 
no change in engagement, in politically incongruent local climate change 
measure frames. This disengaging effect was particularly visible for left-leaning
participants. One could speculate that the local frames convey some form of 
activation that is then provided with a positive or negative sign, depending on 
whether a politically congruent or incongruent climate change measure frame is 
presented. In this sense, an interpretation of these findings would be that the 
activation from local relevance boosts right-leaning participants’ emotional 
engagement in the politically congruent adaptation frame but equally decreases 
it in the politically incongruent mitigation frame. In left-leaning participants 
instead, local relevance translates into an increase in emotional engagement in 
the climate change measure frame that fits their political narrative – mitigation 
– but induces a decrease in the adaptation framing.
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Contrasting the result for emotional engagement, the effect of political 
orientation on concern for the effects of sea level rise concentrated in the global 
frames, whereas the local frames were characterized by what appears to be a 
ceiling effect. The local articles, possibly through the more immediate nature 
and urgency they conveyed, led to a virtually identical increase in concern for 
the effects of sea-level rise across ideologies and climate change measure frames.
This pattern of results is in line with what hypothesis 3 proposed. A possible 
explanation for why this generally engaging effect of local frames appeared for 
concern for the effects of sea-level rise only could be that it capitalized on a 
sensitisation for local effects of sea-level rise and the associated impacts as a 
consequence of the major flooding events during in the UK during winter 
2013/2014.
For global frames instead there is a clear interaction between political 
orientation and climate change measures frames with respect to the effect on 
change in concern for the effects of sea-level rise. The global adaptation frame 
succeeded in increasing concern for the effects of sea-level rise in right-leaning
audiences. The global mitigation frame instead only marginally increased right-
leaning concern. More interestingly the global adaptation frame seemed to 
consume any increase in concern that might have shown in left-leaning
audiences, as opposed to the mitigation frame in the global condition, where 
concern increased analogously to the local frames. These results further 
underpin the idea of disengaging politically incongruent climate change measure 
framings.
The answer patterns for the two single item measures that asked 
respondents if they wanted to receive more information on mitigation and 
adaptation measures help complete a discussion of the effects of the various 
conditions. The distribution of yes answers suggests that the local conditions 
generated more interest for additional information on adaptation and mitigation 
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than did the global conditions. For right-leaning individuals the local 
adaptation condition seemed to be an exception as it generated a markedly 
lower interest in mitigation information. Overall interest for adaptation 
information was generally lower and interestingly the highest request for 
adaptation was found in left-leaning individuals for the local mitigation 
condition. Interest in adaptation information for right-leaning individuals was 
generally the lowest out of all information and political orientation 
combinations. This means that there is no preference for adaptation information 
among right-leaning respondents and that generally, framing climate change in 
terms of adaptation did not induce more interest. The global adaptation 
condition revealed the lowest percentages of yes answers in left-leaning
individuals for additional adaptation and mitigation information. 
This descriptive finding provides further tentative evidence for hypothesis 
5. Framing climate change in terms of adaptation can be disengaging to left-
leaning individuals and this particularly seems to be the case when this framing 
is contrasted by a description of climate change as a global issue. Interest in 
adaptation information among right-leaning individuals in the global mitigation 
condition yielded the lowest overall percentage of yes answers. This trend 
however did not apply to mitigation information, which yielded the second 
highest percentage of yes answers in right-leaning individuals. In summary, the 
pattern of results points to the idea that the main effect of the framing 
conditions manifests when individuals are presented with politically incongruent 
frames rather than congruent ones. As such it represents a warning notice for 
rashly made communication choices, which could do more harm than good.
Beyond these results the fact that the framing manipulations did not 
affect a substantial part of variables central to climate change perceptions
represents an equally interesting finding of this study. As a possible explanation 
for this lack of findings and the generally lower effect size of the significant 
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effects I would like to underline the fact that both experimental manipulations 
were rather conservative. Only a few words distinguished the local from the 
global condition (compare for example Appendix 3.2.1 and 3.2.5); the main 
portion of the text was unaffected by the climate change measure framing and 
nearly a third did not manage to correctly recall the proposed climate change 
measure. Not only were the experimental manipulations weak but also the split
between right- and left-leaning participants was problematic. In general a 
median-split, as I chose to perform here, brings with it a loss of variance, as the 
variable is transformed from an assumed continuous to a dichotomous level.
Further, as a consequence of political orientation being skewed towards the left, 
the split sample did not capture an actual left-right split.
The repeated measures design despite an effort to randomize the 
sequence of items in order to obscure their recurrent nature might have 
prompted participants to seek for consistency in filling out the various items. 
This would be further aggravated by constructs that are of a rather stable 
nature. With climate change as an issue that has long entered public discourse 
and is commonly agreed to be an issue of importance it is reasonable to assume 
that most individuals have their mind made up about it, albeit on a very 
superficial level. As such there is little leverage for manipulations that try to 
alter perceptions concerning this issue. Sea-level rise on the other hand 
potentially represents a more volatile concept that people have not given much 
thought to yet and concerning which they are more easily swayed in their 
opinion, an assumption that finds tentative support in the two sea level rise-
related measures that yielded significant effects.
In this respect it is interesting to note that, again, similar to the results 
presented in chapter 2.3.2, emotional engagement emerged in a more central 
role than some of the more established measures. Considering the importance of 
emotional engagement in predicting a variety of outcome measures, as shown in 
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chapter 2.3.2 it is encouraging to find that despite the weaknesses of this 
study’s experimental manipulation this variable did in fact change considerably 
as a consequence of the two framing conditions and political orientation.
A few suggestions for future studies in this line of research can be made. 
Scholars should aim to ensure that the sample under investigation exhibits an 
adequate variation regarding the ideology dimension, which is expected to affect 
how participants react to the climate change measure- and spatial framing. 
Focusing on a non-student sample, for example, would certainly increase the 
likelihood for this to be true. Similarly, employing more pronounced
experimental manipulations could help produce more distinctive effects. In 
particular, the spatial framing could be accentuated more strongly. Referring to 
localized impacts in geographical areas that are well-known to participants 
could for example help increase local relevance and the potency of this 
experimental manipulation. For the climate change measure framing, a longer 
and potentially interactive manipulation, e.g. involving some sort of learning 
goal, would probably trigger a more meaningful interaction and thus a stronger 
manipulation. However, even though these measures could ensure stronger 
effects, the difficulty of changing rather stable constructs that are being 
repeatedly affirmed in daily interactions still prevails.
3.4 Conclusion
Consistent with work by Evans et al. (2014) this research found tentative 
support for the idea that the engagement with climate change is affected by 
whether climate change is presented referring to either adaptation or mitigation 
as a solution. The results presented here, however, can add some valuable 
insights regarding the effect of adaptation and mitigation in communicating 
climate change. Following the lead of Carrico et al. (2015) the findings in this 
chapter clearly indicate that is important to consider the ideological and 
political orientation of an individual as the effect of adaptation will differ 
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accordingly. The evidence gathered here suggests that adaptation cannot be a 
panacea for increasing engagement with climate change in everyone. On 
contrary, it appears to be likely that adaptation in some cases will be as 
disengaging to some individuals, as mitigation is to others. This effect seems to 
be a function of politically congruent aspects of adaptation for right-leaning and 
of mitigation for left-leaning individuals. The present research additionally 
shows that this effect equally depends on whether climate change is framed as a 
global or local issue and on the outcome variable under investigation. An 
important insight gained from this study is that, beyond the chance to engage 
certain publics, there is unfortunately also a definite potential for negatively 
affecting communication efforts by presenting politically incongruent frames and 
messages. Critically this risk is not restricted to previously unengaged or 
dismissive publics, but equally applies to concerned publics that are in fact 
already positively engaged.
From what this study could gather, climate change measures seem to 
form an important factor in people’s willingness to engage with the issue of 
climate change. This effect of climate change measures however hinges on 
political orientation and the local relevance of the issue at hand and is not the 
same for all issues at hand. As such, this study represents a first effort at 
pointing out how diverse the effects of framing climate change in terms of 
adaptation and mitigation can be. While more research has to be conducted to 
investigate the exact intricacies of the various effects the necessity to do so has 
certainly been confirmed here.
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Chapter 4 - How Personal 
Experience of Flooding Affects 
Flood Adaptation and Mitigation 
Intention
4.1 Introduction
The studies presented in chapters 2 and 3 have broadly investigated the 
relationship between risk perceptions of climate change and climate change 
adaptation. Climate change adaptation was investigated as an independent 
variable that might alter these perceptions but equally as a dependent variable 
in the form of behaviour intentions and policy support for adaptation. These 
investigations have precluded an important factor that potentially plays a vital 
role in determining adaptation behaviour and support for related measures but 
equally in shaping climate change perceptions: personal experience of climate 
change impacts. Similar to the previously presented study which explored how 
experimental manipulations intended to paint a more proximal and salient 
picture of climate change affected engagement with climate change 25 , this 
chapter does so for the specific case of personal experiences of flooding.
In terms of the theoretical background, this chapter builds heavily on 
literature and results outlined in previous chapters. As has been shown in 
chapters 2 and 3, public views of climate change are predominantly distant. 
Surveys consistently find that individuals think of climate change as something 
that affects other people and other places (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Nisbet & 
25 While in chapter 2 engagement with climate change included public perceptions of climate 
change but equally relevant behavioural and attitudinal outcomes, such as the intention to 
perform or support certain measures, this chapter focuses on flood adaptation and mitigation 
intentions only.
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Myers, 2007; Pidgeon, 2012). Furthermore significant proportions of the 
population in certain countries are to a greater or lesser extent unsure whether 
it is happening at all (Leiserowitz et al., 2010a, 2010b; Poortinga et al., 2011). 
This set of results, often summarized as the psychological distance of climate 
change, describes an overall experience of climate change that is somehow 
removed from peoples’ everyday lives (Spence et al., 2012). Weber (2010, p. 
333), in discussing this set of findings and public perceptions of climate change 
in general, observes that climate change as a “statistical phenomenon” is not 
easily “detected by personal experience”. Since individuals mostly lack personal 
experience with climate change, it is thus not surprising to find that the public’s 
perceptions of climate change are of a distant risk. The implicit assumption in 
this line of reasoning is that experiences of climate change impacts in the here 
and now can increase the salience of climate change as an issue and lead to less 
distant perceptions and even higher engagement by individuals. 
4.1.1Experiences of climate change impacts
Before reviewing existing literature that has investigated the effect of 
experiences of climate change impacts an important problematic aspect 
concerning the direction of this proposed effect needs to be highlighted. The 
classic chicken and egg problem regarding this research question translates into 
two possible directions of effect, which can be described as the experiential 
learning pathway (see chapter 1.3.2) and the motivated reasoning pathway
(Myers et al., 2013).
As mentioned in chapter 1.3.2, literature on the availability heuristic 
suggests that individuals’ risk evaluation of a particular issue, such as climate 
change, is influenced by the ease of which they can think of or remember 
incidences of the hazard (Kahneman, 2003). As individuals are exposed to what 
they could interpret as a climate change impact, such as flooding, the salience of 
such an event in their personal memory should increase the recall availability of 
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such a risk, therefore, leading to higher risk evaluations. Work on the affect 
heuristic proposes that it is in fact the strong affective reaction such events can 
evoke, that constitutes a large portion of the effect an experience has on the 
individual (Finucane, Alhakami, et al., 2000). Applying this scholarly insight to 
the experience of flooding Keller, Siegrist and Gutscher (2006) found that both 
mechanisms do lead to heightened flood risk perceptions in individuals.
A drawback of most studies that have investigated the experiential 
learning pathway is that, as experiences of climate change, such as flooding, 
cannot be experimentally induced, this research often relies on self-report 
measures. This however implies the possibility that like for any other 
correlational analysis, where one measure is not clearly controlled by the 
experimenter, one cannot make a definite judgement regarding the direction of 
the effect. In other words, it cannot be precluded that, for example, pre-existing 
climate change beliefs make people more or less likely to report having 
experienced climate change impacts. This explanation is in line with what has 
been labelled motivated reasoning describing how individuals tend to focus on 
and attend to information in a way that confirms their a priori conclusions 
(Kunda, 1990). With regards to climate change perceptions Corner, Whitmarsh 
and Xenias (2012) for example showed that individuals evaluated the 
convincingness and reliability of fictitious editorials in a characteristically 
different way depending on whether they were sceptical of climate change or 
not. Other work similarly showed that cultural and political orientation is 
strongly associated with perceptions of scientific consensus on climate change, 
the interpretation of the Climategate26 scandal and even the recall of recent 
26 Climategate describes the leaking of thousands of emails and computer files of the Climate 
Research Unit at the University of East Anglia and subsequent allegations of fraud or scientific 
misconduct which were dismissed by several committees (Nature, 2010).
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temperatures (Goebbert, Jenkins-Smith, Klockow, Nowlin, & Silva, 2012; 
Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith, & Dawson, 2013; Leiserowitz, 
2006). 
Myers et al. (2013) specifically addressed this issue of directionality and 
found causal evidence for both the experiential learning and motivated 
reasoning pathway. Their study thus demonstrated that individuals’ belief 
certainty influences their reported climate change experiences and vice versa. It 
is furthermore important to point out that these authors just like Capstick and 
Pidgeon (2014a) have found that motivated reasoning affects both extreme 
groups of a certain belief or identity, i.e. very sceptical as well as very convinced 
individuals will be inclined to interpret weather phenomena in a manner that is 
or is not consistent with climate change.
From a psychological research perspective it is this unexplained direction 
of effect, which makes it methodologically challenging to investigate the effect of 
personal climate change experiences on climate change perceptions. As has been 
mentioned, it is virtually impossible and certainly ethically objectionable to 
experimentally induce personal experiences of certain climate impacts. To 
circumvent this, researchers would have to rely on longitudinal studies of
participants’ responses before and after they have experienced a certain climate 
change impact. This kind of research design however is highly complex and 
laborious, and so most of the research up to date relies on correlational data. 
When relying on this type of study one would ideally want to eliminate, or at 
least limit, any subjective bias of the experience measure, which is what the 
subsequently presented research aimed to achieve.
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In this regard it is crucial to theoretically examine and distinguish how 
research in this line operationalizes personal experience of climate change. 
Broadly two categories of experience measures can be described. One group of 
studies asks individuals to indicate whether they have experienced climate 
change in their lifetime or similar (e.g. Myers et al., 2013). A second research 
strand in this field addresses specific events or weather phenomena such as 
floods, heat waves or temperature anomalies (e.g. Spence et al., 2011). Both of 
these approaches so far carry significant drawbacks. 
The first research strand, in asking individuals if they have experienced 
climate change, faces the inevitable critique aimed at the ambiguity of what 
participants might understand as experiences of climate change (Reser, Bradley, 
& Ellul, 2014). One can easily imagine how a process, such as motivated 
reasoning can have considerable bearing on what a person does or does not 
report or interpret as signs of climate change. And even if this measure is not 
affected by this sort of process, in the absence of a clear definition, the 
ambivalence of what actually constitutes a sign of climate change means that 
individuals will most likely respond to this sort of question in a rather 
inconsistent manner. This is aggravated by the fact that different types of 
phenomena, such as drought or flood, are experienced in different ways (Dessai 
& Sims, 2010) and will therefore most likely differ in how they affect the 
individual.
The second group of studies addresses this ambiguity by focusing on 
specific events and aspects, such as floods or abnormal temperatures. This, 
supposedly, clearly specifies the phenomenon the researcher is interested in. A 
drawback of this type of operationalization however is that these measures 
usually do not include any reference to climate change. It thus remains unclear 
whether respondents place the issue in question in a climate change reference 
frame or not. With regards to the present research question, however, of how 
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flooding as a personal experience of climate change influences engagement with 
climate change, it is sensible to hypothesize that whether respondents interpret 
flooding as a climate change impact, or a non-climate change related event, like 
a one-off freak weather event, will make quite a difference to the effect this sort 
of experience has.
Summarizing the above, three important methodological hurdles can be 
highlighted when studying the impact experiences of climate change have on 
engagement with climate change: first, to move beyond a basic detection of an 
association between the two constructs it is of paramount importance to ensure 
that the measure of a particular experience offers as little as possible room for 
subjective biases. Second, to ensure that respondents respond in a consistent 
manner the measure in use should refer to a particular type of experience rather 
than generically referring to an experience of climate change. Third, it is then 
equally important to account for differences in how individuals interpret the 
experience. Since this chapter is interested in the effect that personal experience 
of climate change has, it is essential to capture whether respondents understand 
the experience this chapter focuses on, namely flooding, as a climate change 
impact.
4.1.2Experiencing flooding
A considerable amount of literature has dealt with risk perception and 
personal experiences of flooding (see Kellens, Terpstra, & De Maeyer, 2013 for a 
review) but there appears to be only a handful of papers that have investigated 
the link between this type of experience and climate change related responses. 
Whitmarsh (2008) found no difference between flood and non-flood victims 
regarding their understanding of, and responses to, climate change. By contrast, 
Spence et al. (2011) did find more concern over climate change, greater 
certainty regarding climate change and greater personal efficacy concerning 
actions on climate change among flood-victims. A mediation analysis further 
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showed that all of these variables translate into greater willingness to save 
energy to mitigate climate change. Capstick et al. (2013) obtained similar 
results and further showed, that spontaneous associations of flooding and 
climate change were more frequent among individuals who had experienced 
flooding. 
Expanding this inconsistent evidence basis with articles that have looked 
at other climate change impacts and less clearly defined experiences of climate 
change paints a more consistent picture. Analogous to Spence et al.’s (2011)
research on flooding, other forms of personal experiences of climate change are 
associated with less uncertainty and higher belief in climate change (Lujala, 
Lein, & Rød, 2014; Myers et al., 2013; Taylor, de Bruin, & Dessai, 2014). And 
again, in accord with Spence et al.’s (2011) work, research has also 
demonstrated that this type of experience can translate into greater intentions
to act on climate change (Broomell, Budescu, & Por, 2015; M Siegrist & 
Gutscher, 2008). 
While the literature has discussed the direction of the effect, the sign of 
this effect has been seemingly unchallenged. According to the experiential 
learning approach experiences of climate change are probably best described as 
facilitative or stimulating. In doing so however, this theory gives little credit to 
the potentially overwhelming and traumatic nature of these events. As the 
earlier discussion of the cognitive theory of stress in chapter 3.1.1 highlighted, it 
is easily imaginable how the experience of extreme weather may not necessarily 
create more engagement but may instead constitute a stressful event that forces 
individuals into rather passive psychological states, such as denial and thus very 
low engagement. Some literature on exposure to flooding events does in fact 
address the question of non-protective responses such as denial and fatalism and 
a few studies have confirmed this sort of effect for personal experiences of 
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flooding on flood adaptation intentions (Lin, Shaw, & Ho, 2008; Zaalberg et al., 
2009). 
Insight into this type of effect can come from the environmental stress 
literature. Applying a classification of environmental stressors by Evans and 
Cohen (1987) flooding is best described as falling into the category of 
cataclysmic events. These events are characterized by high coping requirements. 
Flooding further has certain qualities that in environmental stress studies have 
been shown to have detrimental effects on subjects’ intention to engage the 
stressor. Above all, the uncontrollability or loss of control flood victims 
experience, must be highlighted, as by definition it entails that there is very 
little a person can do other than to endure the event. Control over a stressor 
has been shown to remedy some of the negative effects the stressor has, whereas 
sustained experiences of uncontrollable stressors can lead to what is called 
learned helplessness (Averill, 1973; Cohen, Evans, Krantz, & Stokols, 1980; 
Cohen, 1980). The controllability of a flooding event naturally is determined by 
whether a person feels that he/she uses problem focused coping strategies to 
address it. It is thus reasonable to assume that coping ability with regards to 
flooding will have an effect on whether individuals proactively engage with the 
stressor, as measured through their flood adaptation intentions. This chapter 
further addresses the question whether coping ability, equally determines 
mitigation intentions. This particular research interest builds on the assumption 
that individuals, who are unable to cope with future flooding, will have little 
resources left to address climate change.
This relates directly to a series of studies specific to the UK context, 
which have qualitatively explored the experience of individuals in the aftermath 
of the floods of June 2007 in Hull, UK (Medd et al., 2015; Whittle, Walker, 
Medd, & Mort, 2012). The insights gained from this research highlight the 
importance of the recovery process as a major stressful component of being 
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flooded. In fact, the researchers find that the floods themselves frequently do
not represent the most stressful component of the entire process of recovery in 
individuals’ accounts (Medd et al., 2015). The researchers (Medd et al., 2015; 
Whittle et al., 2012) find that, rather than steady improvement to a state of 
normalisation, recovery is characterized by ups and downs towards an end state 
that is not necessarily a return to a ‘normal’, or ideally, ‘regenerated’ living 
conditions (The Cabinet Office, 2008). This characterization of recovery as a 
tedious, lengthy and discontinuous process is important as it implies that the 
process of recovering itself can leave affected individuals more vulnerable to 
future instances of the disaster than they were in the first place. 
Whittle et al. (2012) attribute a central role in defining this taxing and 
strenuous nature of recovery to emotion work (Hochschild, 1979). Analysing
diary entries by respondents in the aftermath of flooding, they are able to show 
that focusing on physical and economic recovery neglects an important 
emotional component and hidden vulnerabilities. They highlight a number of 
insights that a focus on the emotional experience of affected individuals can 
produce. The concept of emotional labour and emotion work can help create a 
fuller account of what constitutes the experience of long-term disaster recovery
and the various actors that are involved. Their data also underline how the 
emotional and physical aspects of recovery are tightly interwoven. The insights 
gained from a focus on emotion are also very relevant to inform practices and 
politics in disaster management. Particularly relevant to this thesis’ focus on 
adaptation are the insights regarding the protracted nature of recovery and the 
direct implications of how this process shapes existing vulnerabilities and will 
also create new ones, actually impeding adaptation (Whittle et al., 2012).
The experience of flooding in general, however, is considered to be 
positively engaging in terms of flood adaptation. White’s (1945) fundamental 
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research on human adjustments to floods in the US has in fact been some of the 
first risk perception research, finding that individuals’ past experiences of 
flooding influenced their preparations for future flooding. Various studies since 
then have found a positive relation of previous experiences of flooding and 
flood-related behaviour (Kellens et al., 2013). What is absent in this kind of 
studies though, is the question of how climate change perceptions affect the 
intention to adapt to extreme weather events. As adaptation has firmly 
established its place alongside mitigation it seems necessary to equally include 
specific adaptation intentions. Belief in climate change for example should 
implicate some form of expectation of more frequent and intense extreme 
weather events and so even individuals, who did not experience flooding, should 
in some way be more willing to prepare for flooding. It is thus reasonable to 
expect that the effect of experiencing flooding on intentions to adapt to future 
flooding specifically, should be to some extent moderated by whether 
respondents interpret it as a sign of what is to be expected in the future of 
climate change. This chapter thus presents an integrated research effort that 
looks at the experience of flooding and climate change perceptions as predictors 
of mitigation intentions and flood adaptation intentions. 
4.1.3 Summary and research questions
In summary, the above-mentioned theoretical aspects translate into two 
main research questions this chapter addresses:
• Does the personal experience of flooding serve as predictor of flood 
adaptation and mitigation intentions, and if yes, what is the sign of these 
effects?
• Is this potential effect of personally experiencing flooding moderated by 
whether individuals attribute flooding to climate change or not?
4.2 Method
Between December 2013 and February 2014 the UK saw an 
extraordinary sequence of storms and heavy precipitation events. The UK Met 
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Office (2014) reported that in Scotland the wettest December in history was 
recorded and the same applied to January in southern England. These weather 
phenomena led to widespread flooding across the UK that triggered responses at 
national and local levels, by environmental and public health agencies as well as 
various NGOs, voluntary organisations and the private sector. Media at the 
national and international level equally covered these events extensively. 
The data presented here were collected in a large research project funded 
by an ‘Urgent’ grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), 
which was carried out by a research team from Cardiff University and 
Nottingham University in response to these events. I was employed as a 
research assistant in this project and collaborated with my colleagues on the 
development of the survey instrument, data analysis and the final project report
(Capstick et al., 2015). This presented me with an excellent opportunity to 
collect nationally representative data relevant to the research question 
presented here. The study and questionnaire in particular were developed by
the research team (Capstick et al., 2015) in cooperation with the social research 
company Ipsos MORI that carried out the data collection and an advisory panel 
composed by representatives from NGOs, government departments, and 
research groups. My particular input consisted in aiding with the collection of 
relevant scales and items through a literature review and involvement in a 
theory-guided discussion to establish the sequence of the constructs in the 
questionnaire.
4.2.1Participants
The sample studied consists of a nationally representative sample (NS) of 
1002 respondents. Additionally,  approximately 200 individuals from each of the 
following five areas were added for a total sample size of 1997. These 
oversampling areas were: the City of Hull next to the river Humber (n=200), an 
area between Sunbury and Windsor (n=199) along the River Thames, a region 
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between Tewkesbury and Gloucester (n=198) along the River Severn, in the 
town and region of Aberystwyth (n=200) in Ceredigion, Wales, and finally the 
area along the coast at Dawlish in Devon (n=198). Relying on media reports 
and input from the advisory panel and Ipsos MORI, these areas were identified 
by the research team as disproportionately affected by the winter floods. The 
five oversampled areas were further chosen to allow for a depiction of the 
diverse geographical and physical (e.g. riverine, coastal) characteristics of the 
floods experienced during winter 2013/2014.
Participants more generally were chosen from so-called Double Output 
Areas. An Output Area is defined as the lowest level at which census 
information is available. Combining the geographically closest Output Areas 
within a local authority, which are further within the same electoral ward and
connected by a road, then creates double Output Areas. Further, participation 
of all respondents was conditional upon having established residence prior to 
February 2014.
Out of the total of 995 participants in the oversampled areas, 135 were 
classified as having had a direct experience of flooding. This flooded sample 
(FS) included approximately 10% more male participants, was marginally 
younger and yielded a more than 10% larger group of respondents who fell into 
the highest social grade.
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Table8
Distributionofgender,agegroupandsocialgradeintheNS(N=1002)andFS(N=135)
Gender Agegroups Socialgrade27
NS FS NS FS NS FS
Female 48.6% 35.6% 1624 14% 16.3% AB 29.1% 45.2%
Male 51.4% 64.4% 2534 12.2% 10.4% C1 31.3% 31.9%
3544 15.1% 18.5% C2 18.4% 8.9%
4554 19% 16.3% DE 21.2% 14.1%
5564 15.4% 11.9%
6574 14.5% 17.8%
75+ 10% 8.9%
4.2.2Materials
The survey instrument used for the purpose of this study can be divided 
into three sections. The first section was concerned with general climate change 
perceptions, including a series of so-called tracker items that had also been used 
in previous nationally representative studies (Capstick, Pidgeon, & Whitehead, 
2013; Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014a; Spence et al., 2011). The following section
examined how participants had experienced the flooding. Some measures were 
only presented to respondents who indicated that they had been affected by 
flooding in some way and explored their experience in more detail. The last 
section then focused more generally on individual perceptions of the flooding. 
Additionally the survey included measures that probed participants’ cultural 
and environmental values, questions regarding newspaper readership and a 
27 The social grades are based on definitions by the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising and 
reflect the occupation of the chief income earner. The grades are defined as: A: higher 
managerial, administrative or professional; B: intermediate managerial, administrative or 
professional; C1: supervisor or clerical and junior, administrative or professional; C2: skilled 
manual workers; D: semi and unskilled manual workers; and E: state pensioners and similar 
with no other earnings at the lowest levels of subsistence.
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series of socio-demographic variables. The statistical analysis presented here 
only used a selection of these measures and so the following more detailed 
description will focus on this only. Table 9 provides an overview of these 
measures and their origin. The exact item wording and topline results are 
presented in Appendix 4.1.
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Table9
Measures used; their corresponding question number, reliability score where applicable and
origin ofthescale/items.
Measure Type a Origin
Floodingexperience Q25 n.. Cpsticketl.,(2015)
)Personlfloodrisk Q47 n.. Cpsticketl.,(2015)
Floodingemotions Q41.16,41.10 .81 Cpsticketl.,(2015)
Mentlhelthconsequences Q38.13 n.. Adptedfrom Prnjothyetl.,2011
Floodcopingbelief Q48.1 n.. Cpsticketl.,(2015)
Attribution Q44.1;Q45.1/3/7/11 .85 Cpsticketl.,(2015)
Psychologicldistnce Q7.13 .81 Spence,Poorting,ndPidgeon,(2012)
Climtechngeconcern Q4 n.. Cpstick,Pidgeon,ndWhitehed,(2013)
Personlefficcy Q14.3 n.. Cpsticketl.,(2015)
Collectiveefficcy Q14.4 n.. Cpsticketl.,(2015)
Climtechngebelief Q11.2 n.. Cpstick,Pidgeon,ndWhitehed,(2013)
EnvironmentlIdentity Q50.7/8 .82 Whitmrshnd ONeill(2010)
Individulism Q50.4/5/6 .39 Cpstick,Pidgeon,ndWhitehed,(2013)
Eglitrinism Q50.1/2/3 .57 Cpstick,Pidgeon,ndWhitehed,(2013)
Flooddpttionintentions Q49.16 .85 Cpsticketl.,(2015)
Mitigtionintentions Q13.16 .75 Cpsticketl.,(2015)
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Personal experience of flooding
This block of measures contained measures to better describe the 
personal experience of flooding individuals had. Most importantly it contained 
the variable used to categorize the FS. Flooding Experience (Q25). This 
question was central to defining the FS. It asked participants whether the 
2013/2014 flooding had affected their current or previous property28. It was 
further specified that this could include any land surrounding their home such 
as a garden or drive, or communal areas such as a car park or hallway. 
Participants were further instructed to answer yes if they stopped the water 
from flooding their property by using some form of flood defence. This measure 
was dichotomous in nature, comparing participants (n=135) who had indicated 
that their property had been flooded and who also lived in the oversampled 
areas (1) with participants (n=1002) from the national sample (2)29 . The 
reported statistics for flooding experience thus describe the effect that having 
one’s property flooded has on the outcome measure in question.
Further personal flood risk (Q47) as a standard risk perception item 
measured whether participants agreed (5-point scale, strongly agree to strongly 
disagree) with a statement, which indicated that they believed that their 
property is at risk of flooding in the next 10 years.
28 The exact question wording was as follows: ‘Was your current or previous property affected 
by the floods between November 2013 and February 2014? This could include any land 
surrounding your home such as a garden or drive. If you live in a flat it might include 
communal areas such as a car park or hallway. Please also answer yes if you stopped the water 
from flooding your property by using some form of flood defence such as sand bags or a flood 
gate‘.
29 It is important to note that the national sample also included a small number of respondents 
(n=27, 2.69%) who indicated that their property had been flooded. These individuals were 
retained in the national sample and were not added to the flooded sample. This was done to 
preserve the representativeness of the national sample. The reported results thus constitute a 
rather conservative test of the effects of flooding experience because adding the individuals with 
flooding experience from the national sample to the flooded sample most likely would have 
accentuated any differences between respondents with and without flooding experience.
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To assess participants’ emotional experience with regards to the 2013/14 
flooding flooding emotions (Q41.1-6, 41.10) were measured using a list of five 
emotions (a = .81) such as ‘sadness’, ‘anxiety’ and ‘distress’30. Participants had 
to indicate on a 10-point scale (I have not felt this at all to I have felt this 
extremely) to what extent they had felt each emotion when the 2013/14 flooding 
occurred. 
Two variables were employed to investigate whether the 2013/14 flooding 
represented a considerably stressful event to participants. Mental health 
consequences (Q38.1-3) of the 2013/14 flooding were assessed asking 
respondents to indicate whether, as a consequence of the flooding, they had 
experienced one or more out of a list of three conditions. The list included: 
‘anxiety when it rains heavily’, ‘increased stress levels’ and ‘sleeping problems’. 
The more of these were confirmed, the higher the score on this scale. Flood 
coping belief (Q48.1) was measured using a single item asking respondents 
whether they agreed (5-point scale, strongly agree to strongly disagree) with a 
statement indicating that they felt that they would be able to cope if flooding 
was to affect their property this year.
Lastly, an Attribution scale (a = .85) was used to capture the belief that 
the 2013/14 flooding can be attributed to climate change. Five of the 
constituting items (Q45.1/3/7/11/12) measured attribution as agreement (5-
point scale, strongly agree to strongly disagree) with a set of statements such as: 
‘The floods were a sign that the impacts of climate change are happening now.’ 
and ‘The floods were caused, in part, by climate change’. Additionally, 
exploratory factor analysis (see Appendix 4.2.2) indicated that, the extent to 
which participants thought that climate change contributed to the 2013/14 
flooding and the impact it had (Q44.1) out of a list of possible causes including 
30 Exploratory factor analysis for the flooding emotion items can be found in Appendix 4.2.1
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aspects such as poor river and coastal management or insufficient investment in 
flood defences (4-point scale, not at all to a great deal) also formed part of this 
scale. 
Key climate change perceptions
Key climate change perception variables largely corresponded to 
measures used in previous chapters, the difference being that some were 
operationalized as single-item measures as a result of constraints to the total 
survey length. Psychological distance (Q7.1-3). This three-item scale (a = .81) 
asked respondents to judge how serious a threat they thought climate change 
was to: the UK as a whole, them and their family and people in developing 
countries. Answer options were provided on a 5-point scale (extremely serious to 
not at all serious) 31.
Climate change concern (Q4) was measured with the following item: 
‘How concerned, if at all, are you about climate change, which is sometimes 
referred to as global warming.’ Answer categories ranged from very concerned
to not all concerned on a 4-point scale.
Personal efficacy (Q14.3). To measure this respondents were asked to 
indicate their agreement (5-point scale, strongly agree to strongly disagree) with 
the statement: ‘Changing my lifestyle will make little difference with regards to 
climate change.”32
Collective efficacy (Q14.4). Analogously to personal efficacy this was 
measured as the level of agreement (5-point scale, strongly agree to strongly 
disagree) with the statement: ‘If everyone does their bit we can tackle the 
causes of climate change’
31 In addition to the answer categories reported in the following paragraphs all items also 
included a ‘Don’t know’ answer option and some also provided a ‘Refused’ option.
32 All negatively worded items were recoded so that a high number corresponded to a high on 
the corresponding variable. 
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Climate change belief (Q11.2) was assessed by asking respondents 
whether they agreed (5-point scale, strongly agree to strongly disagree) with a 
statement indicating that it was clear to them that climate change is really 
happening.
Identity measures
The study also included identity measures for reasons outlined in the 
procedure section. Environmental Identity (Q50.7/8) was assessed using a scale 
(a = .82) which measured participants’ agreement (5-point scale, strongly agree
to strongly disagree) with two statements: ‘Being environmentally friendly is an 
important part of who I am’ and ‘I think of myself as someone who is very 
concerned with environmental issues’.
Individualism (Q50.4/5/6) 33 . This cultural cognition dimension was 
measured using a three-item scale (a = .39) including items such as ‘When I 
have problems I try to solve them on my own’ and asked individuals to indicate 
their agreement with these on a 5-point scale (strongly agree to strongly 
disagree).
Egalitarianism (Q50.1/2/3). This cultural cognition scale (a = .57) 
analogously to the ‘Individualism’ scale asked respondents to indicate their 
agreement (5-point scale, strongly agree to strongly disagree) with 3 statements 
including the following: ‘The world would be a better place if its wealth were 
divided equally among nations’. 
Socio-demographic variables included were gender, age group and social 
grade.
Outcome variables
33 Both cultural cognition measures had very low reliability values. The reported results
concerning these two scales, or rather, their non-significant contribution to the regression 
models reported here, therefore have to be interpreted with the necessary caution.
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Flood adaptation intention was measured using a scale (a = .85) 
consisting of six items (Q49.1-6) and it was one of two outcome measures that 
were investigated in this study. The six items proposed actions asking 
individuals which answer category best expressed what they thought about this 
particular measure. The following answer options were provided: ‘I don’t think 
this is relevant to me’; ‘It is very unlikely I would do this’; ‘I would possibly 
consider doing this’; ‘I would definitely consider doing this’; ‘I am intending to 
do this’; and ‘I’ve done this’. Proposed actions included: ‘Buying flood 
protection products such as flood boards or sand bags’; ‘Making sure I have 
insurance cover for flooding’; and ‘Attending meetings or joining a community 
group related to flooding’.
Mitigation intention analogously was measured using a scale (a = .75) 
containing 6 actions (Q13.1-6). For these, participants were asked to indicate on 
a 5-point scale (very likely to very unlikely) how likely they thought they were 
to perform or continue performing said action in the next few years. The 
suggested measures included cutting down travel by car, reducing the amount of 
energy used at home and signing a petition about climate change.
4.2.3Design
As the paragraphs in the introduction highlighted, self-report measures of 
experiences can be affected by biases. The survey and study design incorporate 
a few key aspects that were intended to limit these biases:
• Oversampling was carried out in areas that had been heavily affected by 
the 2013/14 flooding to ensure that the final sample included a 
sufficiently large FS for meaningful statistical analyses to be carried out.
• Questions regarding climate change perception were asked before any 
reference to flooding was made. This way no potential link between 
climate change and flooding was made salient to respondents before they 
reported their climate change perceptions. The assumption behind this 
choice of order is that the flood experience measure chosen here is more 
robust to motivated reasoning biases then the climate change perceptions 
items. 
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• Finally, flooding experience was in fact surveyed in a variety of ways. 
Measures explored rather objective physical exposure to the floods but 
also asked respondents if they felt the 2013/14 flooding had personally 
affected them. In this chapter participants that experienced flooding are 
defined as those who lived in one of the oversampled areas and indicated 
that their property was affected by the 2013/14 flooding. Out of all 
measures of flooding experience included in the survey, I argue that this 
is the one that leaves the least scope for interpretation and will thus 
limit biases, such as motivated reasoning, best. 
4.2.4Procedure
Once the School of Psychology, Cardiff University, granted ethical 
approval, Ipsos MORI collected data using computer assisted personal 
interviews, which took 35 minutes on average to be completed. Ipsos MORI 
conducted both the sampling and the remuneration of participants. While being
considerate of practical and ethical limitations, fieldwork was conducted as close 
to the flooding event as possible. Data collection started the 28th of August, 
approximately half a year after the floods had occurred, and ended the 31st of 
October.
Data analysis carried out consisted of two multiple regression models
using the Enter procedure. The investigated outcomes measures are flood 
adaptation intentions and mitigation intentions. Both models are identical in 
terms of the predictors entered, which were: psychological distance of climate 
change, climate change concern, personal and collective efficacy, climate change 
belief, individualism, egalitarianism and environmental identity34, personal flood 
experience, attribution, mental health consequences, flooding emotions, flood 
coping belief, personal risk perception, the interaction term attribution X flood 
34 Identity measures were included as an additional way to account for motivated reasoning 
biases. By including these variables in the model I aimed to warrant that any identity-related 
variance in the regression model would be explained by these variables as to cancel any effect 
by flood experience measures that might exist as a consequence of an association mediated by 
identity measures.
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experience, social grade, gender and age. To ensure the stability of the 
regression model and to avoid multicollinearity the interaction terms were 
calculated applying residual centring (Little, Bovaird, & Widaman, 2006).
Missing values were deleted listwise, resulting in a final sample size of n=35435
for flood adaptation intention and n=1763 for mitigation intention.
Predictor variables that did not yield significant regression weights in a 
first exploratory regression were excluded from further calculations. Non-
significant predictors were excluded to minimize the likelihood of 
multicollinearity issues. In three cases predictors36 with marginal p-values were 
kept to run a second exploratory regression, to account for the fact that some of 
the variables potentially split up explained variance among them resulting in 
non-significant contribution to the model, while the single strongest predictor 
by itself does yield a significant effect. The final regression models as presented 
here were then run applying boot strapping with bias corrected accelerated 
confidence intervals. For ease of comparison standardized beta weights are 
reported together with significance values from the bootstrapping procedure. 
Intercorrelations of the significant predictors37 and the outcome variables in the 
two regression models can be found in the table presented in Appendix 4.3.
35 The relatively small sample size is explained by a high number of missing values for the 
mental health consequences variable (n=1176) and the excluded participants (n=860) in the 
oversampled areas that had reported no flooding on their property.
36 Gender(p = .069) for flood adaptation intentions and flood coping belief (p = .066) and 
climate change belief (p = .057) for mitigation intentions.
37 For both the correlation matrix and the subsequently presented regression models the 
following variables’ answer scales were recoded by inversing the scores so that higher values 
reflected a higher score for the variable in question: mitigation intentions, Personal flood risk, 
Flooding experience, Climate change concern, Environmental identity, Collective efficacy, 
Climate change belief and Social grade.
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 Flood adaptation intention
The regression model for flood adaptation intentions explained 41.9% of 
the total variance and included 5 significant predictors. The strongest predictor 
of flood adaptation intentions was personal flood risk (b = .38, p = .001)
followed by flooding emotions (b = .20, p = .001), flooding experience (b = .19, 
p = .001), mental health consequences (b = .12, p = .015) and social grade (b = 
.11, p = .008). Answering the first research question this means, that, yes, 
personal experience of flooding does have a positive effect on intentions to adapt 
to future flooding. Regarding research question two, however, no direct or 
moderating effect of attribution beliefs is evident for adaptation intentions.
Table10
Linearmodelofpredictors offloodadaptationintention
Floodadaptationintention B SEB  dj.R2 p£
Model1 (n=354) .419 .001
Constant 2.12( 1.69, 2.56) .211 .001
Personalfloodrisk .369( .279, .466) .051 .377 .001
Floodingemotions .191( .084, .298) .051 .195 .001
Floodingexperience .408( .209, .615) .110 .194 .001
Mentalhealthconsequences .471( .091, .822) .197 .119 .015
Socialgrade .104( .017, .187) .040 .111 .008
Note. 95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals reported in parentheses.
Confidence intervals and standard errors based on 1000 bootstrap samples (dfRegression=5,
dfResidual=348,dfTotal=353)
4.3.2 Mitigating intention
Table 3 displays the results of the multiple regression analysis for 
mitigation intentions. As can bee seen the seven significant predictors included 
in the regression model accounted for 43.7% of variance. Climate change 
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concern (b = .24, p = .001) yielded the strongest regression weight. The other 
significant predictors in order of the magnitude of their beta weights are: 
environmental identity (b = .24, p = .001), collective efficacy (b = .23, p = 
.001), climate change belief (b = .16, p = .001), age (b = .13, p = .001), flooding 
emotions (b = .72, p = .001) and flood coping belief (b = .43, p = .024). 
Relating back to research question one and two, no evidence for an effect of 
flooding experience on mitigation intentions was found here, even after 
considering attribution beliefs.
Table11
Linearmodelofpredictorsofmitigationintention
Mitigationintention B SEB b adj.R2 p£
Model1 (n=1763) .437 .001
Constant 2.08( 2.24, 1.93) .073 .001
Climatechange concern .254( .208, .305) .025 .241 .001
Environmentalidentity .229( .181, .271) .023 .236 .001
Collectiveefficacy .188( .149, .228) .020 .226 .001
Climatechangeelief .138( .099, .177) .022 .159 .001
Age .060( .044, .077) .009 .131 .001
Floodingemotions .069( .033, .106) .020 .072 .002
Floodcopingelief .030( .002, .056) .013 .043 .022
Note. 95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals reported in parentheses.
Confidence intervals and standard errors based on 1000 bootstrap samples (dfRegression=7,
dfResidual=1755,dfTotal=1762)
4.4 Discussion
This chapter focused on exploring the association between the experience 
of flooding and flood adaptation and mitigation intentions. Similar research 
questions have fuelled a series of studies in recent years investigating the role of 
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extreme weather events and personal experiences of climate in shaping climate 
change perceptions and engagement with climate change. Many of these 
however carry significant methodological and conceptual drawbacks that further 
limit the researcher’s ability to study the effect of these experiences, beyond the 
existing limitation of not being able to causally interpret correlational data, 
which most of these studies rely on. The present study was designed to address 
three major critiques that can be directed at these research efforts: (1) The 
absence of study-design aspects aimed at limiting the potential for motivated 
reasoning and similar biases affecting how individuals report experiences of 
climate change. (2) The conceptual ambiguity introduced by asking about 
‘signs’ or ‘experiences’ of climate change rather than asking about specific 
extreme weather events or climatic aspects. (3) Lack of control over whether 
individuals actually link specific events to climate change when asking them 
about the experience of those. The research presented here was designed to 
address these issues in analysing the association between personal flooding 
experience and intentions to perform flood adaptation and mitigation measures 
as outcome measures. These issues were remediated by the flood experience 
measure, which was designed to measure personal exposure to such events as 
soberly as possible, by the order the measures were presented in, putting 
climate change relevant items before any mentioning of flooding was made and 
by controlling for whether participants attributed the flooding to climate 
change.
Flooding experience was found to be a significant positive predictor of 
flood adaptation intentions. Participants who indicated that the 2013/14 floods 
had affected their property showed more intentions to take actions to prepare 
for future flooding. This is not a particularly surprising result as it appears 
logical that individuals who experienced such an event are more likely to 
prepare for this type of occurrences and is in line with previous research 
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(Kellens, Zaalberg, Neutens, Vanneuville, & De Maeyer, 2011; Terpstra, 2011; 
Zaalberg et al., 2009). Whether respondents attributed the flooding to climate 
change did not make a significant difference to how much flood adaptation 
intentions they reported. Equally the interaction term for these two variables 
did not significantly contribute to the regression model, indicating that 
intentions to adapt to future flooding are not affected by how much individuals 
thought climate change contributed to the 2013/14 flooding. 
This set of findings clearly contradicts the hypothesis that the experience 
of flooding serves as a disengaging factor, in that it causes individuals to 
withdraw into passive states such as denial and learned helplessness. Related to 
this, statistical analysis found that the more mental health consequences 
individuals reported, the higher their intentions to prepare for future flooding. 
This further underlines the stimulating character experiencing flooding seems to 
possess, as even individuals, who report considerable psychological distress are 
more inclined to adapt to future flooding than those who do not. 
The strongest significant predictor of flood adaptation intentions is 
personal flood risk. So, more than having experienced flooding in the past, it is 
the expectation of future flooding that is most strongly associated with flood 
adaptation intentions. Analysis found the second largest regression weight for 
flooding emotions. The stronger participants indicated feeling various flooding 
emotions with regards to the 2013/14 flooding, the higher their flood adaptation 
intentions were. Again, this goes to show how tightly emotional experiences and 
behaviour intentions are linked and is in line with previous research (Terpstra, 
2011). 
Finally, social grade also significantly predicted flood adaptation 
intentions. Respondents from higher social grades reported higher flood 
adaptation intentions. It might not be surprising to find this association as two 
of the proposed measures to prepare for flooding involve costs, which might act 
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as a barrier to engagement for lower income families. Factor analysis of the 
scale however did not highlight these two items as particularly representative of 
the scale and the other four measures in fact did not involve any costs. 
Therefore, I would speculate that the economic aspect alone might not be the 
sole driving force behind this association and that other aspects, such as lacking 
awareness, might help to explain this relationship. This interpretation is 
underpinned by a UK study which found that class is the most influential factor 
in predicting flood risk awareness (Burningham, Fielding, & Thrush, 2008). In 
terms of civil protection this is a rather worrying result. Individuals and families 
from lower social grades are more vulnerable to begin with, just by virtue of 
being more likely to live in zones at risk of flooding (Fielding, 2012). The idea 
that there is an additional vulnerability aspect beyond this existing inequality is
particularly disconcerting and illustrates the limitations of addressing inequality 
issues on a purely economic level, without raising awareness in the relevant 
social groups.
The regression model for mitigation intentions with regards to the effect 
of flooding experience yielded no significant contribution. According to the data 
presented there, whether an individual was affected by the 2013/14 flooding 
makes no difference to how much he or she intends to mitigate. Two significant 
predictors related to the 2013/14 flooding however yielded significant regression 
weights. The stronger individuals reported feeling emotions with respect to the 
2013/14 flooding the higher their intentions to mitigate. One could hypothesize 
that the strong emotional experience the flooding events triggered motivates 
people to act on climate change. This reasoning to some extent presupposes that 
individuals link the flooding to climate change and therefore see personal 
mitigation as an appropriate answer. The fact that neither the flooding 
experience by itself, nor the combined interaction term for attribution and 
flooding experience had a significant impact on mitigation intentions does 
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however put this proposed causal chain into question. Alternatively, one could 
explain this finding arguing that respondents who intend to mitigate are also 
more likely to experience stronger emotions regarding the flooding, which 
explains the positive association found here. As shown in chapter 2.3.2 there is a 
strong link between emotional engagement, identity constructs, such as 
environmental identity, and higher mitigation intentions. A proposed mediation 
effect of environmental identity, however, can be ruled out here, as 
environmental identity was included in the model as a significant predictor 
alongside flooding emotions. This points to a potential effect of experiencing 
flooding on mitigation intentions, mediated through emotions that is apparently 
decoupled from actually experiencing flooding, or attributing it to climate 
change, or any ideological component.
An interesting finding with respect to a proposed link of flooding 
experience and mitigation is the positive association between flood coping belief 
and mitigation intentions. This finding indicates that a lower perceived ability 
to cope with future flooding events is related to lower mitigation intentions. In 
other words, participants who think that future flooding events will potentially 
pose a considerable challenge for them to overcome, are less inclined to 
mitigate. One could argue that respondents who fear that future flooding events 
might overwhelm their ability to cope turn their attention to preparative 
actions, flood adaptation measures that is, and thus show lower intentions to 
mitigate. The non-significant contribution of flood coping belief in the flood 
adaptation intentions regression model and an exploratory test of mean 
differences for the ratio of flood adaptation to mitigation intentions score
between respondents high and low in flood coping belief that finds no difference 
(t(1731) = -1.00, p = .319), however, makes this a rather implausible 
proposition. The exact pathway via which this happens cannot be satisfactorily 
investigated here and the relatively small beta weight for flood coping belief 
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cautions against any definite conclusion regarding this association. Future 
studies must aim to confirm this finding and investigate it in more detail.
The predictor that best explained mitigation intentions was concern for 
climate change. Unsurprisingly the more concerned individuals indicated they 
were about climate change, the stronger their intentions to mitigate were. 
Environmental identity (r(1896) = .419, p < .01) and belief in climate change 
(r(1896) = .482, p < .01) analogously were positively associated with mitigation 
intentions.
Collective efficacy yielded the third largest regression weight. It is 
somewhat surprising that collective efficacy rather than personal efficacy is 
significantly associated with personal mitigation intentions. This result suggests 
that individuals who intend to mitigate also share a stronger belief in the ability 
of society to address the issue of climate change. This illustrates how individual 
intention to act is linked to the belief that a collective effort to address climate 
change will be possible and effective. Similar to the finding for flooding 
emotions one could argue that potentially this type of efficacy belief is linked to 
a broader mind set that generally includes a more optimistic view of collective 
efforts, in line, for example, with communitarian convictions regarding the 
importance and power of collective action and that it is therefore linked to 
mitigation intentions. Again, however, the fact that variables associated with 
this type of mind set are included in the model as significant predictors 
challenges this assumption, supporting an interpretation of collective efficacy 
beliefs as an independent correlate of mitigation intentions.
Lastly, age was significantly associated with mitigation intentions. The 
younger participants were, the stronger their intentions were to mitigate. This 
is in line with studies that have found an analogous relationship and generally 
lower engagement with climate change among older respondents (Hersch & 
Viscusi, 2006; Spence, Venables, Pidgeon, Poortinga, & Demski, 2010). 
196
4.5 Conclusion
This study’s main goal was to investigate whether the personal 
experience of flooding combined with the attribution of such events to climate 
change was linked to mitigation intentions but also flooding adaptation 
intentions. The experience of flooding is clearly associated with intentions to 
prepare for future flooding events. Flood adaptation overall is associated with 
various flood related variables, such as the perceived risk of future flooding 
affecting one’s property and negative emotional consequences of flooding. It is 
perhaps unsurprising that no climate change related measures predict flood 
adaptation intentions but it illustrates a considerable mismatch, in that 
preparative actions for future flooding – a phenomenon intrinsically linked to 
climate change – are determined by experiences in the past rather than 
projections of and beliefs about the future climate change will bring. This 
evidently harbours a disadvantage in terms of the appropriateness of flood 
preparedness on a population level, as individuals, who have not been affected 
yet by flooding lack a substantial number of drivers towards preparedness. 
Those who have experienced flooding instead, as Green, Tunstall, and Fordham 
(1991) note, will most likely base their actions on past experiences rather than 
projections of what could be and will thus be ill prepared.
Consistent with existing literature (Whitmarsh, 2008; Zaalberg et al., 
2009) the evidence presented here strongly suggests that experiencing flooding is 
only relevant to individuals’ intention to prepare for future flooding. This rebuts 
any speculation around a potentially disengaging effect, such as learned 
helplessness, induced by experiencing flooding. Mitigation intentions on the 
other hand are not related to flooding experience. For personal experiences of 
flooding the effect described by the experiential learning pathway thus seems to 
apply to flood adaptation measures but does not extend to mitigation measures. 
It is reasonable to infer from these findings that flooding is not sufficiently 
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strongly linked to climate change, as to influence individuals’ engagement with 
climate change once they experience it. Participants who link the flooding to 
climate change, as measured through the attribution variable, do not show any 
difference regarding their mitigation intentions either and qualifying the 
flooding experience with participants’ tendency to attribute the flooding to 
climate change also does not yield any significant contribution for both flood 
adaptation intentions and mitigation intentions. In other words, the effect that 
flooding experience does or does not have on flood adaptation and mitigation 
intentions is unaffected by whether participants believe that the flooding was in 
part caused by climate change. 
These results challenge previous findings that have linked the experience 
of climate change impacts and/or extreme weather events and engagement with 
climate change. A major criticism of previous research in this area concerns the 
various operationalizations of experiences of climate change that exist. Myers et 
al. (2013) for example asked participants to rate their agreement with the 
statement ‘I have personally experienced the effects of global warming’ to 
measure perceived personal experience of global warming. The introduction has 
highlighted the issues this sort of formulation raises, in particular with regards 
to addressing the question of directionality38 between experiences and climate 
change engagement, but also beyond that in terms of what type of experience is 
retrieved. The study presented here included a similar measure, which asked 
respondents whether they had noticed any sign of climate change during their 
lifetime. This measure was only very weakly related to the main flooding 
experience measure (r(1126) = .07, p < .05). An exploratory regression for 
mitigation intentions that included this alternative experience measure, yielded 
a significant contribution of this variable to the regression model, indicating 
38 Ironically it is precisely this issue the above-mentioned authors intend to address.
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that respondents who had noticed signs of climate change in their lifetime, 
exhibited higher intentions to mitigate. 
While ‘noticing signs of climate change’ contributes to explaining 
mitigation intentions and is also significantly related to other climate change 
perceptions such as belief in climate change (r(1906) = .48, p < .01), the 
measure used in this study, which could be argued to measure a very similar, 
albeit more specific, experience finds no association. I would argue that this 
finding illustrates how there is a strong value/identity component in 
measurements that ask for ‘experiences’ or ‘signs’ of climate change and that, to 
a large extent, it is this component in fact that drives the significant association 
between personal experiences of climate change and the various outcome 
measures found in previous studies.
This study carried certain shortcomings. Due to constraints to the overall 
length of the survey, some of the constructs included were measured using single 
items only. Future studies to verify the results presented here should aim to 
incorporate scale measurements for all the relevant variables. Only intention 
measures were included and so comparisons with the results gathered for policy 
support measures in chapter 2 and 3 cannot be made. This could be crucial 
measures to consider for future studies, in particular if one assumes that certain 
individuals did not intend to adapt to future flooding or to mitigate because the 
felt that it was essentially someone else’s, such as the state’s, responsibility to 
act in response to the flooding.
The design of the survey tried to limit the issues regarding the question 
of directionality as outlined in the introduction to a minimum. Still this 
research relied on correlational data and as such is open to similar criticisms. 
To better address the question of directionality future studies would have to 
employ a longitudinal research design with measurements before and after a 
flood has occurred. The long-term unpredictability of extreme weather events 
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and the potentially futile recurrent measurement of certain variables for large 
sample sizes that comes with such a research project, however, present a serious 
challenge to this type of scholarly effort.
A potential limitation to the results presented here is the fact that the 
national sample included 27 respondents that had experienced flooding. In order 
to retain the representativeness of the national sample, however, these 
individuals were not added to the flooded samples. This could mean that the 
flood experience measure’s effect is potentially weakened by the fact that the 
non-flooded nationally representative sample includes a minor percentage (2.7%) 
of participants who experienced flooding on their property.
The results presented here challenge various previous studies that have 
linked the experience of climate change and engagement with climate change. I 
find that the experience of flooding is unrelated to mitigation intentions, even 
after controlling for whether respondents attribute the flooding to climate 
change. The fact that this study used an experience measure markedly different 
from previously used indicators goes to show how different operationalizations 
of ‘experiencing climate change’ can lead to very different results. This 
underlines the importance of carefully designing the experience measure, as well 
as the survey overall. Future studies directed at investigating the relationship of 
experiences of climate change and engagement with climate change should seek 
to incorporate a measure similar to the measure used here. 
In terms of insights regarding the predictors of flood adaptation and 
mitigation intentions one variable should be highlighted. The emotional 
reaction to flooding, that is, how intensely participants indicated feeling certain 
emotions with regards to the 2013/14 flooding predicted both flood adaptation 
and mitigation intention. This result falls into a consistent pattern established 
in this thesis which attributes a strong role to the affect heuristic in determining 
behaviour, both for a variety of climate change actions, as well as very specific 
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protective actions aimed at a single type of climate change impact. Risk 
communicators would thus be very well advised to transmit this type of 
affective experience in trying to motivate relevant behaviour. While caution
with regards to scaring individuals into in/action are justified, the findings 
presented here strongly suggest that the tolerance for this kind of effect is 
considerably high, as even participants who report suffering from several mental 
health issues as a consequence of the 2013/14 flooding are still more inclined to 
prepare for future flooding than those who do not.
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Chapter 5 - Conclusions
This chapter summarizes and discusses the findings presented in this 
thesis. First I draw on the main findings to answer the three principal research 
questions that guided this work. I then discuss applied, theoretical and 
methodological implications of the studies presented here. A brief conclusion 
completes this chapter.
5.1 The research questions
5.1.1What is the relationship between adaptation and
mitigation in public perceptions?
This question was answered on multiple levels of analysis. Correlational 
data indicated that public perceptions of adaptation and mitigation were 
positively connected. At this very basic level of analysis this points to the 
understanding that, at least in terms of public intentions and support, there are
no trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation. Since correlations do not allow 
any causal inferences one should not, however, expect to find that increasing 
adaptation intentions, through public awareness campaigns for example, 
automatically increases mitigation intentions. 
Investigating the results of the multiple regression analyses for the 
various outcome measures helped further elucidate the relationship of 
adaptation and mitigation and allowed for a more nuanced picture. In terms of 
explained variance, all the regression models performed comparably well, except 
the regression model for support for financial regulation. Predictor patterns 
yielded some parallels. For both adaptation and mitigation intentions for 
example, personal efficacy and emotional engagement with climate change were 
positive predictors – results that are in line with previous research (Gifford, 
2011; Stern, 2000).
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Overall, however, differences between predictor patterns for adaptation 
and mitigation predominated. The single most striking result in this regard was 
that adaptation intentions and scepticism were positively associated. Contrary 
to what has been assumed in work on predictors of climate change engagement 
(Akter et al., 2012; Lorenzoni et al., 2007) this result hints at the idea that 
climate change adaptation at the individual level and in terms of psychological 
correlates does not depend on belief in climate change. This leads to the next 
research question the present thesis addressed. If being sceptical about climate 
change is linked to greater climate change adaptation intentions, can climate 
change adaptation then be understood as a catalyst to help engage this typology 
of previously unengaged publics?
5.1.2 In what way does focusing on one or the other climate 
change action affect the public’s engagement with climate 
change overall?
To address this question I investigated how framing climate change as an 
issue of adaptation vs. mitigation affected people´s engagement with climate 
change. Overall the effects on participants’ engagement with climate change 
were significant for climate change action frames and political orientation. 
Following up these main effects, however, revealed that a large share of the 
effects for the individual variables were small and non-significant. Mitigation 
frames increased climate change concern and adaptation frames decreased 
scepticism, supporting an understanding of an adaptation framing as a 
corrective to a dismissive stance towards climate change. Further analysis found 
that significant effects of the climate change action framing for emotional 
engagement and concern for the effects of sea level rise depend on the political 
orientation of the individual and whether climate change was presented as a 
local or global issue. 
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The adaptation frame led to more emotional engagement in right-leaning
and less engagement in left-leaning participants. For the mitigation condition 
the effect was inversed. This difference proved true only when climate change 
was presented as a local issue. In both global conditions emotional engagement 
dropped among right-leaning individuals and increased among left-leaning. 
Change in concern for the effects of sea-level rise was also affected by an 
interaction of climate change action framing, spatial framing and political 
orientation. Contrary to emotional engagement, interaction effects were 
concentrated in the global conditions. The effect of the climate change action
framing, however, roughly followed the direction of effects found for emotional 
engagement, with the adaptation condition increasing right-leaning concern and 
the mitigation doing so for left-leaning individuals. 
In summary, this study found preliminary support for how focusing on 
one or the other climate change action can have a differential effect on 
individuals’ engagement with climate change in line with existing research 
(Evans et al., 2014). Beyond this, however, the current research proved that it 
was important to consider the political orientation of the target audience and at 
which scale climate change was presented. In line with similar work on cultural 
cognition (Braman et al., 2012) adaptation frames were engaging to right-
leaning participants and mitigation frames were disengaging to them. The 
opposite was true for left-leaning individuals. Whether climate change was 
presented as a local or a global issue seemed to interact with the type of 
outcome measure that was being analysed. 
Overall, however, a majority of the outcome variables were unaffected by 
the experimental manipulations. This lack of significant findings must not 
necessarily mean that framing climate change in terms of adaptation and 
mitigation does not affect individuals’ engagement with climate change. It is 
possible that the conservative nature of the experimental manipulations, the 
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skewedness of political orientation in the sample and the repeated measures 
design, which potentially prompted participants to seek consistency in 
responding to the survey contributed to this weak set of outcomes. In spite of 
this the significant effects that this study did find, and the fact that these were 
in line with the theoretical assumptions made beforehand, represent a promising 
foundation for further research in this line. 
Due to restrictions to the investigated samples an important predictor 
was precluded in the above-mentioned analyses: personal experiences of climate 
change. Personal experiences with a particular hazard have been highlighted
very early on in risk literature as relevant predictors of self-protective action
(White, 1945) and, increasingly so, in literature dealing with mitigation 
intentions (e.g. Spence et al., 2011). This research question was addressed here 
for the specific case of personal flooding experiences and their effect on 
adaptation and mitigation intentions.
5.1.3What influence does the experience of flooding have on 
intentions to perform flood adaptation and mitigation?
To answer this question I relied on a data subset from a nationally 
representative study, which was launched in the aftermath of severe flooding 
events in the UK in winter 2013/14, investigating the effects of experiencing 
flooding on engagement with climate change. 
The analysis presented here found that experiencing flooding was 
strongly associated with flood adaptation intentions but not connected to 
mitigation intentions. Results yielded very distinct predictor patterns for flood 
adaptation and mitigation intentions. In line with what one would expect from 
previous research (Kellens et al., 2013) individuals who had their property 
flooded showed stronger intentions to prepare for future instances of flooding. 
Whether participants attributed the flooding to climate change, however, did 
not make any difference to their flood adaptation intentions. 
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This dissociation from any climate change related constructs was an 
overall characteristic of the predictor pattern for flood adaptation intention. 
Personal flood risk and the amount of negative emotions felt regarding the 
2013/14 flooding were more strongly associated with flood adaptation intentions 
than the actual experience of flooding on one’s property. Further, the more 
mental health consequences due to the 2013/14 flooding respondents reported, 
the higher their intentions to adapt to future flooding were. This last finding in 
particular contradicts any speculations about a potentially disengaging effect of 
flooding experience as a consequence of psychological processes such as learned 
helplessness or cognitive coping. 
Mitigation intentions on the other hand were more strongly associated 
with climate change-related constructs. The experience of flooding instead was 
not directly linked to mitigation intentions. This contrasts with some of the 
existing literature in this research area, which has linked personal experience of 
flooding and other extreme weather events with climate change engagement 
(e.g. Spence et al., 2011). One could speculate that there is an indirect effect of 
flood experience on mitigation intentions as negative flooding emotions 
significantly predicted mitigation intentions. It is questionable though, whether 
flooding emotions are linked to mitigation intentions via the actual experience 
of flooding. Attributing the flooding to climate change, a reasoning that one 
would assume to be an essential premise, connecting flooding experience and 
action on climate change, did not help explain mitigation intentions, nor did it 
help moderate the non-significant influence of flooding experience on mitigation 
intentions. It thus seems more plausible that the association of flooding 
emotions with mitigation intentions constitutes an independent aspect, 
unrelated to whether one was affected or not.
Low coping belief significantly predicted lower mitigation intentions. It is 
tempting to suggest that it is the associated expectation of being excessively
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challenged by future flooding that reduces intentions to mitigate, as attention 
and motivation to act are more strongly focused on flood-adaptation. Additional 
analysis, however, found no difference in the ratio of flood adaptation intentions 
and mitigation intentions between respondents high and low in coping belief. In 
any case, the relatively small contributions of these latter two flood-related 
variables in explaining mitigation intentions cautions against any overly 
confident interpretations of these effects.
In summary, the body of evidence gathered here clearly indicates that 
the intention to adapt to future flooding has a very strong experiential 
component but lacks any association with climate change related constructs. 
Mitigation intentions, on the other hand, are not directly related to the 
experience of flooding even after controlling for attribution beliefs that could 
potentially moderate such associations (cf. Clayton et al., 2015).
5.2 Implications
5.2.1Engaging the public
The evidence collected in this thesis shows that, in terms of psychological 
correlates, adaptation and mitigation share more dissimilarities than 
similarities. Based on this insight, it is not advisable to treat these two 
adaptation and mitigation as equal in communication efforts. Doing so harbours 
a considerable potential for ill-informed strategies. The one major finding to 
illustrate this is that, contrary to what one would expect, statistical analysis 
showed that climate change scepticism is a positive predictor of adaptation 
intentions.
For professionals who aim to engage the public in action on climate 
change, this finding should serve as a warning against efforts to promote 
individual adaptation and mitigation conjointly. The opposite effect of climate 
change scepticism on adaptation intentions clearly demonstrates that what 
207
might work for mitigation, may well not work for adaptation. Applying the 
same formula to adaptation could in fact do more harm than good.
This result for scepticism hints at how certain individuals might engage 
quite differently with adaptation as opposed to mitigation. Tentative support 
for these differential aspects of climate change actions comes from the distinct 
effects that mitigation and adaptation frames have on individuals’ emotional 
engagement and concern for sea-level rise as a function of political orientation 
and the spatial frame in which climate change is presented. The results found 
here regarding political orientation but also regarding certain value orientations, 
I argue, can be interpreted as outputs of mechanisms outlined in chapter 1.3.3 
discussing cultural theory of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983; Wildavsky & 
Dake, 1990). The study presented in chapter 3 did not follow the established 
group-grid classification in measuring cultural orientations but despite relying
on a crude categorization, such as ‘left-leaning’ and ‘right-leaning’, it was able 
to show that whether individuals do increase or decrease their engagement in 
reaction to one or the other climate change action is a function of ideological 
orientation. Speaking of local or global climate change further adds variance to 
create a very fragile network of interdependent communication aspects. Similar 
to Brügger et al. (2015) I can thus conclude that public engagement campaigns 
can quickly yield unwanted effects if the subtleties of the involved publics and 
various message aspects are not sufficiently understood and observed. A highly 
problematic aspect this thesis raises and one that warrants particular attention 
and caution is that misguided campaigns do not only run the risk of further 
disengaging an already disengaged audience but also risk disengaging those
previously engaged.
It is also important to point out that while the processes and mechanisms 
in cultural theory of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983; Wildavsky & Dake, 
1990) are highly relevant in this regard, the original group-grid classification 
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need not necessarily be. This latter conclusion is based on the results for the 
cultural orientation scales presented here. For one study I was not able to 
confirm the intended factor structure (see chapter 3.2.2) and while I was able to 
find a clear factor structure in the other study, the achieved scales were 
characterized by unacceptable reliability scores (see chapter 4.2.2). Cultural 
theory of risk and the associated group-grid classification and scales are 
theoretically rooted in an American context and in line with existing literature 
(cf. Brenot, Bonnefous, & Marris, 1998; Kahan, Silva, Tarantola, Jenkins-Smith, 
& Braman, 2014) it is not overly surprising to find that the associated 
measurement scales do not work comparably well in a British context.
Based on the evidence presented here one could speculate that 
communication focusing on climate change mitigation, in particular if discussed 
at the local level, has the potential to drive right-leaning publics into even more 
disengagement. This contradicts some of the literature that generally assumes 
and has found a positive effect of ‘localizing’ climate change (Scannell & 
Gifford, 2011). From the results presented here it is in fact reasonable to 
assume that existing undifferentiated campaigns to increase public engagement 
with climate change in combination with the predominant focus on mitigation 
might have already made certain publics more dismissive of climate change, 
inadvertently contributing to the deeply polarized positional play on climate 
change, as it exists in some contexts today. This could be particularly relevant 
to NGOs that have a track record in promoting climate change mitigation, as 
their role is strongly associated with this type of perception. A stronger focus on 
adaptation would thus not only help to communicate more successfully to the 
kind of publics described above, but could equally help to change an overly one-
sided image of these NGOs, increasing the efficacy of communication efforts
overall.
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An adaptation frame could be equally beneficial to governmental 
communication efforts that accompany the introduction of new policies aimed at 
reducing the population’s carbon footprint, especially if these policies require 
potentially inconvenient behaviour changes or additional financial 
commitments. An adaptation frame in this scenario could again increase 
engagement in previously unengaged audiences but also help to highlight 
additional benefits and thereby increase compliance. 
A crucial advantage of adaptation in is that, as a more recent climate 
change response category, it has not yet been associated with the specific 
ideological triggers that surround climate change mitigation and that make it 
simply less restricted in terms of the impartial engagement it can attract. Also, 
adaptation has been a constant in human evolution, long before climate change 
became an issue. So, even as adaptation gets increasingly associated with 
climate change, this legacy as an “anthropological constant” (Stehr & von 
Storch, 2005, p. 538) could, at least for some time, prevent an all too one-sided
engagement with it. This is visible in the results on flood adaptation intentions, 
where climate change related constructs are strikingly absent. This should not, 
however, invalidate the applicability of these results to the issue of climate 
change engagement. Flood adaptation is clearly relevant in a climate-changed 
future, even if these findings indicate that the intentions to adapt might not be 
associated with climate change. Following this logic, I would argue that 
promoting specific adaptation actions need not necessarily be embedded within 
a climate change context either, especially if this type of framework is likely to 
turn certain audience segments away. Even if individuals then do not 
consciously address climate change, the design of the actions could still 
accommodate the various climate change projections to ensure that this 
important aspect is accounted for.
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Considering the format these communication efforts and engagement 
activities should take is an important issue. Messages focusing on adaptation as 
a climate change measure that is rather novel would certainly benefit from more 
in depth communication modes. I would argue that larger campaigns, including 
participatory and two-way communication efforts, would be most useful and 
effective. This could include workshop formats and public discussions on the 
wider implications of climate change, starting from a discussion of the necessary 
future adjustments as exemplified by the various outlined adaptation measures. 
Adaptation could play an important role as a catalyst for audiences that 
struggle with the existing focus on mitigation. The positive aspect of an initial 
focus on adaptation is that one potentially does not have to completely 
renounce mitigation. On the contrary, there is research (Furth & Gantwerk, 
2013), which shows that focusing on adaptation naturally leads to consideration 
of mitigation, even among climate change sceptic individuals. This is a 
promising indicator of the potential for adaptation to serve as a gateway to 
attracting audiences that would otherwise not engage with climate change. A 
focus on adaptation would not only create positive effects in terms of simply 
engaging more individuals in addressing climate change, but in doing so it could 
also make climate change a less divisive issue, which ideally would lead to a 
situation where climate change legislation and the associated policies and 
interventions become less contested.
In light of the results described here, the current shift in climate change 
policy towards a more balanced representation of mitigation and adaptation 
holds opportunities and risks. Focusing on adaptation could serve as an antidote 
to sceptical beliefs and potentially increase engagement in audiences that are 
turned away by communication efforts that focus on mitigation. Unfortunately 
the study presented in chapter 3 found that this focus is equally disengaging to 
publics that respond well to mitigation, as focusing on mitigation is to their 
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ideological counterparts. To resolve this catch-22 situation the differentiation 
between transformative and incremental adaptation might be of great value.
It is in fact important to point out that the various adaptation-related 
actions were based on an incremental adaptation definition. Incremental 
adaptation broadly describes efforts geared at maintaining a given status quo 
under changing environmental conditions. The results presented here regarding 
adaptation accordingly concern this form of adaptation. Transformative 
adaptation on the other hand describes an approach that, rather than 
preserving things as they are, aims to address the aspects that create 
vulnerabilities, and thus the need to adapt, in the first place. As the scholarly 
dialogue on climate change adaptation is increasingly pointing to transformative 
adaptation in order to avoid heading down an unsustainable and maladaptive 
pathway, a transition to a much stronger focus on this adaptation category 
appears inevitable. Some authors suggest that to do so, existing power relations 
and social structures have to be challenged (Bassett & Fogelman, 2013; Ribot, 
2011). This stands in stark contrast to incremental adaptation’s main goal to 
conserve the status quo. This discrepancy constitutes a major limitation to this 
thesis’ discussion of focusing on adaptation as a way to engage an audience 
whose cultural orientation conflicts with mitigation. It is conceivable that 
individuals who oppose mitigation for the reasons discussed in chapter 2.4 will 
most probably be equally reluctant to engage with transformative adaptation. 
In summary, incremental adaptation can serve as an access point to the 
wider climate change debate, which then necessarily must focus on mitigation 
and transformative adaptation. If this transition is communicated in a fashion 
that is mindful of the publics it seeks to address, transformative adaptation 
could play a key mediator role in this. After incremental adaptation facilitates a 
positive first engagement with climate change for individuals who oppose
mitigation, transformative adaptation, by means of focusing more on adaptation
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than on transformation, could represent a less ideologically charged policy 
option compared to mitigation. For audiences that positively engage with 
mitigation instead, transformative adaptation could apprehend the risk of 
disengaging the engaged by focusing on transformation, rather than on 
adaptation, which in multiple ways resonates much more with mitigation than 
incremental adaptation.
Regarding mitigation, this thesis finds a clear pattern. Mitigation, to a 
large part, resonates with individuals, who hold pro-environmental and self-
transcendence values; who believe in climate change and are concerned about it; 
and who feel that mitigation is something they and society as a whole can 
accomplish. Efforts geared at promoting mitigation at the individual level, will 
thus most likely fall on fertile ground if this type of audience is targeted. It is 
questionable, however, whether it is cost-effective to communicate to these 
audiences to further engage them. I would suggest that it is in fact more 
important to concentrate efforts on not disengaging this audience, as outlined 
above. 
The rather global character of mitigation intention and the lack of an 
experiential component in particular do in fact represent a major disadvantage 
to efforts geared at promoting individual mitigation actions. From this point of 
view increasing individual mitigation intentions represents a constant uphill 
battle against more immediate and specific needs, needs on which adaptation 
intentions seem to feed. Following this line of reasoning the question of trade-
offs between adaptation and mitigation might have to be revisited. Climate 
change is not yet perceived to be a particularly pressing issue on the public 
agenda. Once it is however, or more importantly, once the increasing intensity 
and frequency of climate impacts shifts public attention to more immediate 
instances, it is reasonable to assume that adaptation will assume a more 
prominent role, further pushing away mitigation. 
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Considering the historical dominance of mitigation as the prototypical 
climate change response, it is a question of significant importance how 
adaptation as an alternative and equally important climate change response will 
influence overall public engagement with climate change. To illustrate the 
potential consequences this shift in policy focus can have it is informative to 
imagine a future policy scenario that is dominated by adaptation. From the 
tentative evidence this thesis gathered, such a dramatic shift in policy emphasis 
would potentially lead to disengagement in audience segments that have 
identified, or better, identified with, mitigation as the method of choice to 
address climate change. The somewhat paradoxical situation that could follow 
from this would see some of the former supporters and opponents of timely and 
extensive action on climate change swap sides.
I believe, however, that if the necessary caution and diligence is used to 
manage this transition it could be equally plausible that climate change 
adaptation can serve to depolarize the current climate change debate and 
simultaneously attract new audiences to engage in addressing climate change. 
An essential premise for turning the current policy reorientation into a success 
story, rather than a sequel to the current situation, is knowledge of how 
individuals react to the various elements that characterize the new policy mix. 
This thesis provided some of these necessary insights that should help avoid 
engaging audiences at the expense of disengaging others but more research in 
this line is needed to better understand the subtle interdependencies of the 
various aspects that define public engagement with climate change, such as the 
various climate change actions and the scale at which climate change is 
presented.
Equally important will be to further our understanding of how 
experiences of climate change affect individuals’ engagement with climate
change. Regarding the role of personal experiences of flooding the research 
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presented here was not able to replicate existing literature which has shown 
that a significant link exists with mitigation intentions (e.g. Spence et al., 2011). 
Based on the results that were gathered here it is thus doubtful whether 
communication efforts can harness extreme weather to induce greater mitigation 
intentions, when even individuals who were directly exposed to this sort of 
events do not intend to mitigate more. Consistent with existing risk perception 
literature (Kellens et al., 2013) statistical analysis did, however, confirm a direct 
link between the experience of flooding and greater flood adaptation intentions. 
Flood adaptation in turn was not associated with any climate change-related 
construct. This result means that adaptation essentially depends on experiences 
of past events, as opposed to projections of what could be, in particular with 
regard to future climate change scenarios. This could prove problematic, as it 
creates the potential to underestimate or falsely identify actual adaptation 
needs.
Also worth mentioning here is the finding that higher social grades were 
found to be associated with higher adaptation intentions, pointing to another
important constraint on individual flood preparedness. The fact that only two 
out of six proposed flood adaptation actions were actually associated with costs 
indicates that influence of class goes beyond the mere economic aspect. This 
would mean that, in addition to existing vulnerabilities, lower social classes are 
burdened with an additional vulnerability factor that is not necessarily linked to
economic inequality, or at least won’t be remedied by eliminating it. This 
combination of vulnerabilities illustrates how efforts to guarantee appropriate 
adaptation have to operate on multiple levels, from addressing the monetary 
disadvantages to providing education and building awareness. This further 
underlines the importance of transformative adaptation as a key policy objective 
for the future that does not conserve the existing status quo and its inherent 
inequalities but instead creates a more favourable situation for everyone.
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5.2.2Theoretical and methodological implications
Climate change adaptation does not seem to fall victim to the above-
mentioned one-dimensionality of climate change engagement. This thesis found 
clear indications for specific constructs that seem to be of particular relevance 
to climate change adaptation only, or constructs that, concerning their role as 
predictors of climate change engagement, do not behave, as one would expect 
based on previous findings for mitigation intentions. Compared to mitigation 
intentions, adaptation intentions are characterized by a strong egocentric and 
experiential component. Adaptation intentions are linked to specific concerns, 
concern for the self rather than the world as a whole and concerns for the 
specific issue of sea-level rise rather than climate change as a whole. Further, 
personal experiences seem to play a central role with regards to adaptation 
intentions not directly linked to climate change. Summarizing this set of results 
one could speak of a more immediate quality pertaining to correlates of 
adaptation intentions. This immediate quality might also help to explain the 
previously discussed finding for climate change scepticism, which turned out to 
be a positive predictor of adaptation intentions. This result needs to be 
replicated and explored in more detail in future studies to fully validate and 
better understand this first exploratory finding here. I would, however, 
hypothesize that, applying a cultural cognition understanding (Kahan, Jenkins-
Smith, & Braman, 2011), the association between sceptical beliefs and 
adaptation intentions is an expression of this immediate quality of adaptation 
that appeals to people with specific cultural orientations, such as individualists, 
which have been found more frequently among climate change sceptical
audiences (cf. Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014b).
For mitigation, egocentric concerns and an experiential component were 
not found to be significant predictors. To this effect, the lacking predictive 
value of flood experiences for mitigation intentions needs to be highlighted. 
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Various articles have suggested that this type of link exists for mitigation 
intentions (e.g. Spence et al., 2011). While some contrary evidence (Whitmarsh, 
2008) does exist, the majority of studies has found that the experience of 
extreme weather events, specific climate change impacts and similar is 
connected to more engagement with climate change. Personal experiences of 
flooding are connected to greater concern for climate change and stronger 
personal efficacy beliefs, which mediate greater willingness to mitigate climate 
change (Capstick et al., 2013; Spence et al., 2011). I would argue that the 
contrasting result found here, to a large extent, can be traced back to the 
experience measure used. As argued by Demski, Pidgeon, Sposato and Spence
(2016, manuscript submitted for publication) asking respondents whether they 
had had water in their property provided a very stringent measure of personal 
experience, limiting the room for interpretation and thus potential biases such 
as motivated reasoning. Inspecting the existing research on personal experiences 
of climate change impacts (e.g. Myers et al., 2013) it is relatively evident that 
this does not apply to many of the measures used. It should be obvious that 
individuals who respond more positively to climate change in general will more 
frequently answer questions about experiences of climate change in the 
affirmative. To then reason that this positive association proves that 
experiences of climate change can induce more engagement with climate change 
is highly misleading. The results presented here can be interpreted as prolonging
the scholarly debate on whether motivated reasoning or experiential learning 
best explain the links that have been found for experiences of climate change 
impacts and climate change engagement (cf. Reser et al., 2014). This work now 
raises the question of whether findings supportive of linking personal 
experiences and more climate change engagement are not just artefacts of 
motivated reasoning processes after all, facilitated by insufficiently stringent 
experience measures. Further research is needed to resolve the long-standing 
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debate on whether an experiential pathway exists, connecting experiences of 
climate change impacts and engagement with climate change.
Future research in this line should rely on a narrowly defined measure, as 
was used here. This type of measure can shield against finding the type of 
redundant correlations motivated reasoning provokes, as it only allows for a 
very limited scope of interpretation. As such, it should be less likely to trigger 
what appear to be quite well established associative networks, when it comes to 
how people engage with climate change-related measures. While it is precisely 
these associative networks that psychologists are interested in, the one-
dimensionality – either ‘for climate change’ or ‘against climate change’ – that 
seems to surround this issue, is a serious methodological challenge limiting the 
predictive value of many of the variables investigated. This is somewhat 
symptomatic of this research area and major efforts should be investigated into 
finding variables and measurement forms that do not encounter this problem.
A variable that deserves attention in this regard is emotional
engagement. A constant that emerged from the results presented in this thesis is 
the central role the emotional experience of individuals assumed clearly pointing 
to the affect heuristic as a central theoretical construct.
Emotional engagement with climate change was a significant predictor 
of both mitigation and adaptation intentions and, more importantly, support for 
financial regulation. In comparison to the support for adaptation and mitigation 
policy scales these three measures share one distinct characteristic: they all 
imply some form of costs. Emotional engagement is the only measure that 
shows a consistent contribution to all the regression models of this set of 
outcomes measures. Further contributing to emotional engagement’s unique 
position is the fact that out of all variables it is also the best predictor for 
support for financial regulation, for which the regression model, and thereby the 
other variables that were studied here, yielded the lowest predictive value. This 
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set of findings thus clearly supports the affect heuristic’s principal assumption 
that feelings influence our risk decisions (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2007). Beyond that, it actually illustrates the limits of the other 
constructs investigated here in yielding a consistent association with this cluster 
of ‘costly’ engagement measures. The strong correlation between the emotional 
engagement measure and the intention measures, but equally the support for 
financial regulation measures, position the affect heuristic as a central construct 
when it comes to predicting some of the essential support and intentions 
relevant to tackling climate change. 
Negative emotional responses to flooding were equally associated with 
flood adaptation intentions and mitigation intentions. The link for mitigation 
intentions and for flood adaptation intentions, again, points to the importance 
of emotional experience and the affect heuristic as a predictor of behavioural 
intentions alongside conventional risk perception constructs. In the framing 
study emotional engagement with climate change was the only climate change 
related action that was affected by the experimental manipulations. One could 
conjecture that this latter result is to some extent a consequence of the 
immediate and often unconscious mechanisms of the affect heuristic (Slovic et 
al., 2004), which could prevent efforts to consciously and consistently respond to 
pre- and post-measures. This in turn could mean that response patterns emerge, 
which are no longer masked by ambitions to give uniform answers before and 
after.  This is of course highly speculative but the multiple regression results do 
clearly indicate that the affect heuristic even at the very abstract level it was 
operationalized here, provide a valuable addition in terms of explained variance. 
The effect of emotional engagement appears to be largely independent of the 
other variables included, further accentuating the particular role our feelings 
seem to play in informing our engagement with various climate change related 
issues.
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In summary, these outcomes suggest that emotional engagement is a 
good indicator of committed climate change engagement for both adaptation 
and mitigation. I hypothesize that this is a consequence of the specific quality of 
the affect heuristic, which seems to be less susceptible to pressures from pre-
existing biases. Just like has been found for simple risk judgement and decision 
making tasks (Damasio, 1996) there is evidence here that individuals do
crucially rely, whether consciously or unconsciously, on their emotions when 
engaging with climate change. Researchers should follow suit, relying on 
emotional engagement as a valuable diagnostic tool that allows them, at least to 
some extent, to break free of the one-dimensional space that climate change 
engagement constructs seem to be spanning otherwise. In doing so it would be 
commendable to reproduce some of the effects found here. Relying on 
alternative measures of emotional engagement would add further strength to 
this type of study – in particular, if physiological measures of arousal, such as 
skin conductance levels, could be collected alongside the more conventional 
psychometric scale measurements, as were used here.
In terms of studying the effect that an increasing policy focus on 
adaptation has on public engagement with climate change a few key 
methodological aspects can be highlighted. If future research efforts rely on a 
similar methodological approach scholars must pay attention to the strength 
and quality of the experimental manipulations. Researchers should try, as far as 
possible, to ensure that manipulations are strong and that participants are 
motivated to meaningfully engage with these. This should be done to ensure 
that experimental manipulations are not potentially superimposed by 
confounding factors, such as social desirability pressures, or efforts to answer in 
a consistent manner. Concerning this latter source of interference, the 
suitability of the pre-post design chosen here needs to be critically reviewed. 
Since the effects of the experimental manipulations used here hinge on 
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ideological and political orientation, the investigated sample should ideally be 
split equally regarding these latter dimensions.
This last aspect relates to a potential limitation of any framing study 
similar to the one presented here that is carried out in a UK context. It could 
be argued that polarization regarding the issue of climate change, compared to 
an US-context is not sufficiently pronounced in the UK and that this has 
contributed to small effect sizes. Recent research has shown that on a European 
level polarization regarding climate change is in fact less pronounced even 
though a left-right divide still exists (McCright, Dunlap, & Marquart-Pyatt, 
2016). The question this raises is whether the effect of an adaptation frame 
relies on a polarized discussion, or whether the specific characteristics of 
adaptation, which individuals from different ideological camps will react to 
differently, are sufficient. To fully address this question it would be 
commendable to rerun the survey in an US context comparing it to results from 
a less polarized context, as can be found in many European countries. The 
results presented here from a UK background, where climate change certainly is 
a less contested issue, suggest that there is something distinct about adaptation 
and mitigation that does not necessarily rely on a polarized public debate to 
prepare the ground. Similar results from New Zealand, where the public debate 
on climate change should be comparable to that in the UK further support this 
assumption (Evans et al., 2014)
In light of a new change of course in the IPCC’s policy discourse (IPCC, 
2014b), from incremental to transformative adaptation, looming on the horizon, 
it is important to point out that the results and discussion presented here 
concern one adaptation category only. This thesis investigated adaptation 
actions that are best described as incremental adaptation. In doing so it 
precluded transformative adaptation as an alternative form of adaptation. 
Critical climate change literature has highlighted how this type of adaptation 
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response will play a central role in preparing for climate change in the future 
(O’Brien, 2012). A focus on this adaptation category is thus strongly 
recommended for future research efforts investigating public perceptions of 
climate change. 
I propose that focusing more strongly on transformative adaptation is 
important for two reasons. First, in studying incremental adaptation only, 
researchers run the risk of falling behind yet again in relation to current policy 
developments, which increasingly highlight the importance of transformative 
adaptation. A quick change of course regarding the research focus could 
guarantee a more prompt evaluation of public views on this new form of 
adaptation as the policy discourse changes, thus providing timely input for 
communicators and policy-makers, as it is needed. 
Second, I hypothesize that existing research on incremental adaptation 
will be of little value to research focusing on transformative adaptation. It is 
reasonable to expect that research will find that this novel adaptation category 
is substantially different from mitigation and incremental adaptation in 
particular. In fact, it would not be surprising to find that more parallels can be 
drawn between mitigation and transformative adaptation, than between the two 
adaptation categories. Future research efforts will have to explore these 
differences. The novelty of transformative adaptation and its disjunction from 
non-climate change related adaptation forms in terms of its strong socio-
political focus are two major aspects to consider. In this respect it might prove 
most fruitful to qualitatively explore how the public engages with 
transformative adaptation first. Initial insights from qualitative research could 
then be followed up with framing studies, as were used here.
5.3 Concluding remarks
This thesis has shown that a considerable difference exists between 
climate change adaptation and mitigation perceptions in terms of the variables 
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associated with intentions to perform and support these climate change 
responses. Equally differential is the effect that messages focusing on one or the 
other action have on people’s engagement with climate change. More research is 
needed for replication and to investigate some of the findings reported here in 
more detail. The present work has demonstrated that this type of research 
could prove to be critical as the policy discourse focuses more on adaptation. 
What is clear from this research is that this change opens a window of 
opportunity to steer the public debate on climate change into a less polarized 
and thus more constructive direction. This thesis, however, has shown that 
uninformed communication choices equally hold the potential for worsening the 
current situation. The findings reported here can provide some preliminary 
guidance to avoid this. Predictors of intention to perform and support for 
adaptation actions are to some extent characterized by what I have described 
here as an immediate quality. Generalizing, one could state that adaptation 
seems to be engaging to right-leaning and disengaging to left-leaning 
individuals. As such, it can potentially serve to engage climate sceptic 
audiences. The opposite is true for mitigation. The effect of focusing 
communications on a certain climate change response category is further 
affected by whether climate change is presented as an issue of local or global 
relevance. Personal experience of flooding is linked to flood adaptation 
intentions but not to mitigation intentions. Whether individuals attribute 
flooding to climate change does not make a difference to any of these effects.
These results also provide some more general theoretical input for 
research in this line. Environmental psychology literature on climate change 
related perceptions and behavioural outcomes has built heavily on scholarly 
work on pro-environmental attitudes and behaviour. This has narrowed the 
focus on a limited number of constructs that are tightly interlinked: value 
orientations and ideologies, such as benevolence and individualism, more specific 
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identity aspects, such as environmental identity, climate change specific 
constructs such as climate change scepticism and concern and finally 
behavioural outcome measures, such as mitigation intentions. The research 
presented here has highlighted that this narrow focus on constructs in a pro-
environmentalist research tradition is only of limited value to research on 
adaptation. Even for mitigation, this one-dimensionality of the investigated 
variables is potentially limiting a comprehensive understanding of the various 
determinants of climate change relevant behaviour. In this respect the value of 
the emotional engagement measures has to be highlighted. They play a central 
role in all the studies presented here and represent a valuable and original 
addition to the set of existing climate change engagement measures.
Specific adaptation actions in particular seem more closely related to the 
experiences of the phenomenon they are aimed at, than they are to any climate 
change-related, or value- and identity-related construct. This underlines the 
detached quality of adaptation relating to mitigation and what has been 
discussed here as the one-dimensionality of the variables studied in this context. 
Adaptation up until now appears to have been somewhat resistant to getting 
entangled in the strong associative networks that have established around 
mitigation and climate change in general. This lacking association, however, is 
somewhat problematic, in that any adequate adaptation planning must consider 
projections of future climate change. 
In summary, the potential effects of a policy shift towards a more 
balanced focus on both climate change adaptation and mitigation to replace the 
long lasting dominance of mitigation are characterized by both opportunities 
and risks. Adaptation holds the potential to engage audiences that mitigation 
cannot, or that mitigation will actually disengage. The relative novelty of 
adaptation and its dissociation from climate change provide a less biased access 
point to the wider debate on climate change. This comes at a cost however. 
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Audiences that have positively engaged with mitigation so far are potentially 
equally disengaged by adaptation. The dissociation of adaptation from climate 
change related constructs and the findings that individuals strongly rely on past 
experiences with climate impacts for future planning constitute another 
drawback. This means that the various climate change-related projections, 
which should have a significant bearing on appropriate preparations for future 
climate impacts are not considered. This creates the risk of being ill-prepared, 
or worse, creating additional vulnerabilities. Professionals should therefore take 
care in designing and promoting adaptation with a ‘built in’ consideration of 
climate change so that communications must not necessarily be placed in a 
climate change reference frame.
The final discussion has further highlighted the category of 
transformative adaptation as a potential mediator between traditional 
incremental adaptation and mitigation. Transformative adaptation carries 
aspects of both climate change response categories and can thus, if carefully 
communicated, help to provide a neutral ground for individuals who adhere to 
one or the other climate change action. It also does not rely on a strong climate 
change focus and will not lead to maladaptive responses, even if foresight 
regarding future climate change projections is lacking. More research however 
has to be invested to develop additional strategic approaches that exploit the 
current policy change to turn it into the beginning of comprehensively, 
adequately and sustainably addressing climate change. This thesis has provided 
some initial input in this regard, highlighting some of the challenges ahead for 
research, policy development and communication.
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Appendices
Appendix Chapter 2
2.1 Study 1 survey items and topline results
Q1. Please indicate your level of agreement for the following 
statements by clicking the corresponding answer option.
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Strongly
agree
Tendto
agree
Neither
agreenor
disagree
Tendto
disagree
Strongly
disagree
1 Iamconvincedthat
climatechangeisreally
happening (N=288)
31% 38% 17% 9% 5%
2 Idonotbelieveclimate
changeisarealproblem
(N=284)
30% 36% 17% 11% 6%
3 Claimsthathuman
activitiesarechangingthe
climateareexaggerated
(N=287)
21% 35% 17% 18% 9%
4 Iamuncertainabout
whetherclimatechangeis
reallyhappening (N=286)
26% 37% 12% 20% 5%
5 Theevidenceforclimate
change
isunreliable (N=286)
16% 32% 21% 25% 7%
6 Toomuchfussismade
aboutclimatechange
(N=285)
24% 31% 20% 17% 8%
Q2. Please use the scale below to indicate to what extent you agree 
with the following statements. Climate Change will affect ...
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Strongly
agree
Tendto
agree
Neither
agreenor
disagree
Tendto
disagree
Strongly
disagree
1 ...myself (N=287) 5% 11% 24% 32% 28%
2 ...myfamily(N=287) 4% 11% 21% 38% 27%
3 ...thelocalcommunity
(N=286) 3% 12% 20% 35% 30%
266
4 ...theUK(N=286) 2% 5% 15% 42% 36%
5 ...Europe(N=285) 3% 5% 13% 41% 39%
6 ...theworld(N=288) 2% 4% 11% 36% 47%
7 ...plantsandanimal
species (N=288) 2% 3% 9% 39% 47%
8 ...mylocalarea (N=286) 4% 8% 20% 37% 32%
9 ...developingcountries
(N=286) 3% 4% 13% 41% 39%
10...mychildrenand
grandchildren (N=286) 4% 5% 18% 35% 37%
Q3. Please answer the following questions by clicking the 
corresponding answer option. 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item:
Notatall
concerned
Notvery
concerned
Fairly
concerned
Very
concerned
Dont
know
1 Howconcerned,ifatall,
areyouaboutclimate
change?(N=287)
8% 25% 44% 21% 0%
2 Howconcerned,ifatall,
areyouaboutsealevel
rise?(N=284)
7% 25% 45% 18% 4%
Very
negative
Fairly
negative
Neither
positive
nor
negative
Fairly
positive
Very
positive
3 Onapurelyemotional
level,howdoyou
personallyfeelabout
climatechange?(N=285)
10% 30% 47% 10% 4%
4 Onapurelyemotional
level,howdoyou
personallyfeelaboutsea
levelrise?(N=284)
9% 34% 43% 11% 4%
Q4. To what extent do you feel each of the following emotions 
when thinking about climate change? 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Notatall Verylittle Somewhat
Toagreat
extent
Dont
know
1 Joy(N=286) 76% 16% 2% 0% 6%
2 Interest (N=287) 11% 19% 46% 18% 5%
3 Fatigue (N=288) 49% 27% 13% 2% 9%
4 Attentiveness (N=285) 25% 25% 31% 8% 9%
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5 Serenity (N=284) 52% 24% 11% 1% 11%
6 Disgust (N=286) 37% 24% 23% 10% 6%
7 Contempt (N=284) 50% 23% 13% 5% 8%
8 Outrage(N=287) 33% 25% 29% 7% 6%
9 Anger (N=287) 33% 25% 30% 8% 4%
10Disappointment (N=287) 29% 17% 38% 10% 6%
11Regret (N=288) 27% 24% 35% 8% 6%
12Sadness (N=286) 21% 18% 39% 18% 3%
13Sympathy(N=286) 33% 23% 30% 7% 7%
14Guilt(N=287) 33% 30% 28% 4% 5%
15Shame(N=286) 37% 26% 27% 5% 5%
16Fear (N=285) 27% 27% 32% 11% 2%
17Hopelessness (N=286) 29% 25% 34% 8% 4%
18Worry (N=286) 17% 26% 42% 13% 2%
Q5. How concerned, if at all, are you about any potential effects of 
climate change which there might be on ... 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Notatall
concerned
Notvery
concerned
Fairly
concerned
Very
concerned
Dont
know
1 ...YOUpersonally
(N=282) 15% 32% 35% 14% 1%
2 ...SOCIETYingeneral
(N=283) 11% 21% 43% 21% 3%
3 ...theWORLD(N=282) 8% 17% 41% 30% 2%
Q6. How concerned, if at all, are you about any potential effects of 
sea-level rise which there might be on ... 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Notatall
concerned
Notvery
concerned
Fairly
concerned
Very
concerned
Dont
know
1 ...YOUpersonally
(N=287) 17% 32% 33% 14% 4%
2 ...SOCIETYingeneral
(N=287) 10v 22% 45% 19% 4%
3 ...theWORLD(N=282) 8% 16% 47% 27% 4%
Q7. The following questions focus on values, attitudes and world 
views. Please remember that all answers are completely 
anonymous. 
In the following questions we briefly describe some people and 
ask you to think about how much each person is, or is not like 
you. These questions are available in either a female or a male 
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version. Please indicate by clicking the appropriate button 
which version you would like to be provided with. 
Please choose only one of the following:
Male
version
Female
version
41% 58%
Q8. Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each 
description and think about how much each person is, or is not 
like you. Then please click on the answer option that indicates 
best how much the person in the description is like you. 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Notatall
likeme
Notlike
me
Alittle
likeme
Somewh
atlike
me Likeme
Very
much
likeme
1 Thinkingupnewideas
andbeingcreativeis
importanttohim/her.
He/Shelikestodothings
inhisownoriginalway.
(N=283)
3% 15% 20% 27% 24% 11%
2 Itisimportanttohim/her
toberich.He/Shewants
tohavealotofmoney
andexpensivethings.
(N=284)
22% 32% 23% 15% 6% 2%
3 He/Shethinksitis
importantthatevery
personintheworldbe
treatedequally.He/She
wantsjusticefor
everybody,evenfor
peoplehe/shedoesnt
know.(N=285)
3% 5% 15% 25% 27% 25%
4 tisveryimportantto
him/hertoshowhis/her
abilities.He/Shewants
peopletoadmirewhat
he/shedoes.(N=282)
6% 18% 25% 23% 24% 4%
5 Itisimportantto him/her
toliveinsecure
surroundings.He/She
avoidsanythingthat
mightendangerhissafety.
(N=288)
1% 6% 16% 24% 30% 23%
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6 He/Shelikessurprises
andisalwayslookingfor
newthingstodo.He/She
thinksitisimportantto
dolotsofdifferentthings
inlife.(N=283)
5% 21% 22% 27% 16% 9%
7 He/Shebelievesthat
peopleshoulddowhat
they'retold.He/She
thinkspeopleshould
followrulesatalltimes,
evenwhennooneis
watching.(N=284)
5% 15% 27% 22% 22% 9%
8 Itisimportanttohim/her
tolistentopeoplewho
aredifferentfrom
him/her.Evenwhen
he/shedisagreeswith
them,he/shestillwants
tounderstandthem.
(N=284)
1% 5% 15% 27% 34% 17%
9 He/Shethinksit's
importantnottoaskfor
morethanwhatyouhave.
He/Shebelievesthat
peopleshouldbesatisfied
withwhattheyhave.
(N=285)
2% 18% 21% 28% 21% 9%
10Havingagoodtimeis
importanttohim/her.
He/Shelikestospoil
him/herself.Itis
importanttohim/herto
makehisowndecisions
aboutwhathe/shedoes.
He/Shelikestobefreeto
planandtochoosehis
activitiesforhim/herself.
(N=285)
10% 19% 27% 24% 15% 5%
11 Itisimportanttohim/her
tomakehisowndecisions
aboutwhathe/shedoes.
He/Shelikestobefreeto
planandtochoosehis
activitiesforhim/herself.
(N=284)
0% 2% 13% 23% 36% 26%
12It'sveryimportantto
him/hertohelpthe
peoplearoundhim/her.
He/Shewantstocarefor
otherpeople.(N=283)
2% 5% 14% 27% 31% 22%
13Beingverysuccessfulis 19% 24%% 25% 17% 12% 3%
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importanttohim/her.
He/Shelikestoimpress
otherpeople.(N=282)
14Itisveryimportantto
him/herthathiscountry
besafefromthreatsfrom
withinandwithout.
He/Sheisconcernedthat
socialorderbeprotected.
(N=284)
1% 5% 17% 24% 25% 27%
15He/Shelooksfor
adventuresandlikesto
takerisks.He/Shewants
tohaveanexcitinglife.
(N=283)
16% 28% 22% 18% 12% 4%
16Itisimportanttohim/her
alwaystobehave
properly.He/Shewants
toavoiddoinganything
peoplewouldsayis
wrong.(N=285)
1% 12% 17% 25% 26% 19%
17Itisimportanttohim/her
tobeinchargeandtell
otherswhattodo.
He/Shewantspeopleto
dowhathe/shesays.
(N=284)
20% 26% 29% 16% 7% 3%
18Itisimportanttohim/her
tobeloyaltohisfriends.
He/Shewantstodevote
him/herselftopeople
closetohim/her.(N=283)
1% 4% 11% 24% 29% 31%
19He/Shestronglybelieves
thatpeopleshouldcare
fornature.Lookingafter
theenvironmentis
importanttohim/her.
(N=283)
1% 5% 15% 23% 28% 28%
20Religiousbeliefis
importanttohim/her.
He/Shetrieshardtodo
whathisreligionrequires.
(N=284)
41% 21% 17% 8% 6% 9%
21He/Sheseeksevery
chancehe/shecanto
havefun.Itisimportant
tohim/hertodothings
thatgivehim/her
pleasure.(N=283)
6% 15% 31% 22% 19% 7%
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Q9. Please indicate your level of agreement for the following 
statements by clicking the corresponding answer option. 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Strongly
agree
Tendto
agree
Neither
agreenor
disagree
Tendto
disagree
Strongly
disagree
1 Iconsidermyselftobe
environmentally
conscious(N=287)
1% 10% 18% 48% 22%
2 Beingenvironmentally
friendlyisanimportant
partofwhoIam(N=287)
5% 13% 28% 35% 20%
3 Ithinkofmyselfas
someonewhois
concernedaboutthe
environment(N=287)
2% 11% 18% 46% 23%
4 Iwouldbeembarrassed
tobeseenashavingan
environmentallyfriendly
lifestyle (N=287)
1% 7% 18% 33% 41%
Q10. How would you vote if there were a General Election 
tomorrow?
Which party would you be most inclined to support?39
Please choose only one of the following: 
N=288
1 Conservative 18%
2 Labour 22%
3 LiberalDemocrats(LibDem) 5%
4 PlaidCymru 6%
5 GreenParty 5%
6 UKIndependenceParty 13%
7 Other;wouldnotvote;refused;
undecided 32%
Q11. Please click the button next to the picture that best describes 
your relationship with your community. 
Please choose only one of the following: 
39 The two questions were collapsed into one outcome variable and the “other”, “would not vote”, 
"refused” and “undecided” answer categories were collapsed into one here.
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N=286
1
disconnec
ted
2barely
touching
3slight
overlap
41/3
overlap
52/3
overlap
6nearly
full
inclusion
7full
inclusion
19% 23% 21% 26% 2% 5% 5%
Q12. Please click the button next to the picture that best describes 
your relationship with the Severn Estuary. 
Please choose only one of the following: 
N=284
1
disconnec
ted
2barely
touching
3slight
overlap
41/3
overlap
52/3
overlap
6nearly
full
inclusion
7full
inclusion
45% 25% 16% 8% 2% 3% 3%
Q13. Please click the button next to the picture that best describes 
your relationship with nature. 
Please choose only one of the following: 
N=286
1
disconnec
ted
2barely
touching
3slight
overlap
41/3
overlap
52/3
overlap
6nearly
full
inclusion
7full
inclusion
8% 15% 20% 26% 14% 9% 9%
The following sections are concerned with responses to climate change 
and sea-level rise. 
Q14. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements?
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Strongly
agree
Tendto
agree
Neither
agreenor
disagree
Tendto
disagree
Strongly
disagree
1 Icanpersonallyhelpto
reduceclimatechangeby
changingmybehaviour
(N=286)
6% 15% 26% 43% 10%
2 Avarietyofexternal
factorsmakeitdifficult
formetotakeactions
thathelptoreduce
climatechange(N=286)
8% 35% 36% 17% 5%
3 Itishardtotakeaction
againstclimatechange
evenifIwantto(N=287)
12% 37% 27% 21% 3%
4 IpersonallyfeelthatIcan 9% 22% 33% 28% 8%
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makeadifferencewith
regardtoclimatechange
(N=285)
5 Ifeelasenseofurgency
tochangemybehaviour
tohelptoreduceclimate
change(N=285)
11% 19% 38% 23% 8%
6 Itismyresponsibilityto
helptodosomething
aboutclimatechange
(N=286)
5% 7% 32% 42% 15%
Q15. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements?
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Strongly
agree
Tendto
agree
Neither
agreenor
disagree
Tendto
disagree
Strongly
disagree
1 People in our society can
personally help to reduce
climate change by
changing their behaviour
(N=284)
3% 8% 20% 45% 24%
2 A variety of external
factors make it difficult
for people from our
society to take actions
that help to reduce
climatechange(N=285)
10% 37% 34% 17% 3%
3 For people from our
society it is hard to take
action against climate
changeeven if theywant
to(N=287)
6% 32% 34% 23% 5%
4 Our society can make a
difference with regard to
climatechange(N=287)
3% 7% 20% 46% 24%
5 There is a feeling of
urgency in our society to
change our behaviour to
help to reduce climate
change(N=285)
6% 25% 32% 28% 8%
6 It is our responsibility to
help to do something
about climate change
(N=285)
3% 7% 30% 46% 24%
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Q16. Which one, if any, of these do you think should be mainly 
responsible for taking action against sea-level rise?
Please select at most one answer 
Please choose all that apply:
N=281
1 Environmentalgroups 1%
2 Individualsandtheirfamilies 10%
3 Industry/Companies 19%
4 Localauthorities 1%
5 NationalGovernmentsandAgencies 31%
6 TheEuropeanUnion 3%
7 Theinternationalcommunity 17%
8 Everyone 4%
9 Dontknow 13%
10Other(pleasespecify):Everyone 4%
Q17. Which one, if any, of these do you think should be mainly 
responsible for taking action against climate change?
Please select at most one answer 
Please choose all that apply:
N=283
1 Environmentalgroups 5%
2 Individualsandtheirfamilies 2%
3 Industry/Companies 7%
4 Localauthorities 0%
5 NationalGovernmentsandAgencies 37%
6 TheEuropeanUnion 4%
7 Theinternationalcommunity 21%
8 Everyone 3%
9 Dontknow 21%
10Other(pleasespecify):Everyone 3%
Q18. Below are some steps we might take as a society to decrease 
the amount of greenhouse gases (e.g. CO2) released to the 
atmosphere. Keeping in mind that all these proposals might be 
associated with considerable costs and/or inconveniences, 
please indicate for each of these steps how you would vote in a 
national referendum. 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Definitely Probably Unsure Probably Definitely
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yes yes no no
1 Congestion charging for
cars in all city areas
(N=287)
23% 19% 26% 23% 9%
2 Ban the production of
vehicles with
petrol/diesel mileage
below75milespergallon
(very fuel efficient)
(N=288)
8% 18% 33% 27% 14%
3 Increased petrol and
dieseltaxes(N=286) 40% 27% 22% 8% 3%
4 Increased household
electricitytaxes (N=287) 43v 31%% 20% 6% 1%
5 Use iron to boost sea
plankton growth (absorbs
CO2 from the
atmosphere)(N=286)
2% 3% 47% 30% 18%
6 Place a limit on personal
airtravel (N=287) 22% 26% 27% 16% 10%
7 Use overseas aid for the
protectionof tropical rain
forests(N=288)
6% 4% 30% 37% 23%
8 Increasedgeneraltaxation
topayforpublictransport
(N=285)
30% 25% 32% 10% 4%
9 Subsidies for electric
(emissionfree) vehicles
(N=287)
2% 7% 25% 41% 25%
10Subsidies for house
insulation(N=286) 1% 1% 15% 46% 36%
11Teach children about the
causes,consequencesand
potential solutions to
climatechange(N=288)
2% 1% 13% 31% 55%
12Subsidies for the
household production of
green energy (e.g. solar
panels)(N=288)
1% 7% 16% 37% 39%
13More investments in safe
cycling and walking
routes (N=287)
2% 7v 16% 42v 33%
Q19. How likely are you to take the following actions in the future 
to combat climate change? 
Please note: If you are already taking or already took an action and
intend to continue to do so, please choose "likely" or "very likely". In 
addition to that, click the button on the far right, indicating that you are 
already taking or took this action. 
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Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Very
likely Likely neither Unlikely
Very
unlikely
Iam al
ready
taking
this
action/
Ial
ready
took
this
action
1 Choose a car that gets
good petrol/diesel
mileage (high mpg)
(N=286)
3% 4% 19% 37% 25% 19%
2 Install more insulation at
home (N=286) 4% 9% 15% 32% 18% 31%
3 Carsharing (N=287) 20% 18% 24% 22% 8% 14%
4 Using public transport
(moreoften) (N=287) 17% 20% 18% 21% 13% 19%
5 Walking and cycling
(moreoften)(N=287) 11% 10% 16% 31% 18% 26%
6 Replace older appliances
with more energy
efficientnewmodels (e.g.
refrigerators)(N=288)
4% 9% 16% 37% 21% 23%
7 Join an environmental
group(N=288) 35% 30% 19% 12% 3% 4%
8 Restrict the number of
flights you take per year
(N=288)
15% 15% 22% 18% 15% 25%
9 Eatlessmeat(N=283) 23% 24% 18v 17% 10% 17%
10Reduce the number of
new things you buy
(N=284)
9% 16% 25% 24% 15% 20%
Q20. Scientists argue that due to past emissions of greenhouse gases 
the planet is already committed to a certain amount of climate 
change over the next couple of decades. This makes adaptation 
to the positive and negative impacts of climate change 
unavoidable. 
There are many steps we can take as a society to adapt to climate 
change. Keeping in mind that each of these proposals might be associated with 
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considerable costs and/or inconveniences please indicate for each of these steps 
how you would vote in a national referendum.
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Definitely
yes
Probably
yes Unsure
Probably
no
Definitely
no
1 Reduce pressure on
systems or areas at risk
(e.g. less fishing and
huntinglicenses)(N=286)
5% 9% 32% 36% 19%
2 Protectionandcreationof
wetlands (improves flood
protection and
contributes to
biodiversity)(N=286)
1% 2% 23% 45% 30%
3 Requirementtofithouses
withwater resistant door
and window frames in
floodriskareas(N=287)
2% 6% 24% 43% 25%
4 Relocation of smaller
towns away from flood
riskareas(N=286)
7% 19% 41% 22% 12%
5 Increase prices for water
consumption(N=287) 30% 31% 29% 7% 3%
6 Increase national
development assistance
to help developing
countries to adapt to
climatechange(N=288)
8% 9% 41% 32% 9%
7 Produce and distribute
guidance on how people
can avoid heat stress
(averse health effects
suffered during heat
waves)(N=287)
5% 9% 34% 34% 17%
8 Improvement and better
maintenance of existing
flooddefences(N=288)
0% 2% 14% 51% 33%
9 Build new flood defences
(N=286) 0% 2% 20% 47% 30%
10A new tax to establish a
fund to alleviate
unavoidable climate
impacts in the UK
(N=287)
18% 17% 40% 20% 5%
11Creation of habitat
corridors for animals (e.g.
bridges over motorways)
(N=287)
2% 5% 25% 40% 28%
12Increased financial 1% 6% 22% 48% 24%
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support for better flood
prediction, emergency
planning and warning in
the case of a flood event
(N=288)
13Morefundingforresearch
and monitoring to better
understand sealevel rise
on the Severn Estuary
(N=288)
2% 5% 29% 44% 20%
Q21. How likely are you to take the following actions in the future 
to adapt to climate change? 
Please note: If you are already taking or already took an action and
intend to continue to do so, please choose "likely" or "very likely". In 
addition to that click the button on the far right, indicating that you are 
already taking or took this action. 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Very
unlikely Unlikely Neither Likely
Very
likely
Iamal
ready
taking
this
action/
Ial
ready
took
this
action
1 Repaint your house in a
brighter colour (less heat
absorptioninthesummer)
(N=288)
27% 21% 26% 16% 4% 8%
2 Buy flood insurance
(N=288) 33% 19% 29% 12% 4% 6%
3 Install a water reuse
system at home (avoid
water shortages during
droughts)(N=287)
19% 22% 31% 21% 6% 5%
4 Persuade relatives or
friends to move away
from flood risk areas
(N=287)
24% 19% 32% 18% 6% 1%
5 Read about how to avoid
heat stress during heat
waves(N=286)
14% 18% 25% 31% 10% 5%
6 Fitwatersavingdevice in
yourcisterntosavewhen 10% 13% 14% 33% 13% 26%
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flushing(N=287)
7 Buy purposebuilt flood
boards that can be
installedwhen flooding is
imminent(N=287)
31% 22% 30% 12% 5% 1%
8 Put irreplaceable or
valuable items on high
mountedshelves(N=288)
15% 17% 24% 29% 9% 8%
9 Use horizontal plaster
board or limebased
plaster insteadofgypsum
(N=287)
24% 20% 40% 11% 5% 1%
10Laytilesratherthanfitted
carpets,whichoftenneed
to be replaced after a
flood(N=288)
22% 23% 26% 16% 6% 10%
11Raise electrical sockets,
fuse boxes, controls and
wiring above floor level
(1.5m) (N=287)
26% 24% 25% 16% 7% 5%
The following questions will ask you about your general knowledge of 
climate change. If you do not know an answer, this does not matter - just 
give it your best shot. 
Q22. The following list contains statements about Climate Change 
that are either true or false. Please indicate by ticking the 
appropriate answer option whether you believe the 
corresponding statement to be true or false. If you do not know 
the answer, please indicate by ticking the Don't know answer 
option. 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Correct Incorrect
Dont
know
1 The increaseofgreenhousegases is
mainly due to human activity
(N=288)
63% 17% 21%
2 It is very likely that the increase of
carbon dioxide (CO2) in the
atmosphere is the main cause of
climatechange(N=286)
56% 14% 30%
3 Today's global carbon dioxide (CO2)
concentrationhasalreadyoccurredin
thepast650,000years(N=287)
11% 33% 56%
4 The global carbon dioxide (CO2)
(concentrationintheatmospherehas
increased during the past 250 years
68% 6% 26%
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(N=287)
5 Theozonehole is themain causeof
thegreenhouseeffect(N=285) 26% 47% 27%
6 Atthesamequantity,carbondioxide
(CO2) ismoreharmfultotheclimate
thanmethane(N=287)
21% 22% 57%
7 Carbon dioxide (CO2) is a
greenhousegas(N=288) 70% 6% 24%
8 Carbon dioxide (CO2) is harmful to
plants(N=287) 56% 18% 26%
Q23. For the next few decades, the majority of climate scientists 
expect ... 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
True False
Dont
know
1 ...anincreaseinextremeevents,such
as droughts, floods and storms
(N=287)
82% 4% 14%
2 ... a warmer climate, increasing the
melting of polar ice, which will lead
toanoverallsealevelrise(N=285)
81% 5% 14%
3 ...aprecipitation(e.g.rain)increasein
everyregionworldwide(N=287) 20% 52% 28%
4 ... a cooling down of the
climate(N=287) 46% 23% 31%
5 ... increased acidification of oceans
(N=282) 53% 5% 42%
The final questions are designed to make sure that we have asked a range 
of people to allow us to compare responses between different groups. 
Q24. Please indicate the age bracket you are in. 
Please select at most one answer
Please choose all that apply: 
N=287
1 1824 7%
2 2534 14%
3 3544 22%
4 4554 25%
5 5564 18%
6 6474 13%
7 75+ 1%
8 Don'tknow;Refuse 0%
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Q25. Please indicate your gender. 
Please select at most one answer 
Please choose all that apply: 
N=283
1 Male 41%
2 Female 59%
3 Prefernottosay 0%
Q26. Do you have ... 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item:
Yes No
Dont
know/Re
fuse
1 children?(N=284) 60% 37% 1%
2 grandchildren? (N=279) 27% 69% 1%
Q27. Please indicate which of the following represents your 
household's total income, before tax and any other deductions. 
This includes earnings from employment or self-employment, 
income from benefits and pensions, and income from other 
sources such as interest from savings. 
Please select at most one answer 
Please choose all that apply: 
N=288
1 <£15,000 19%
2 £15,000 £19,999 10%
3 £20,000 £29,999 23%
4 £30,000 £39,999 14%
5 £40,000 £49,999 9%
6 £50,000 £59,999 5%
7 £60,000 £69,999 4%
8 £70,000 £99,999 2%
9 £100,000 £149,999 0%
10>£150,000 0%
11Dontknow/Refuse 13%
Q28. Please indicate your working status.
Please select at most one answer 
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Please choose all that apply: 
N=286
1 Working  full time (30+ hours per
week) 44%
2 Working part time (929hoursper
week) 14%
3 Unemployed seekingwork 5%
4 Unemployed notseekingwork 0%
5 Notworking retired 18%
6 Not working  looking after the
house/children 8%
7 Notworking disabled 7%
8 Student 4%
9 Don'tknow;Refuse 0%
10Other(pleasespecify): 0%
Q29. How many return flights have you taken last year (2012)? 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
none 12 34 56 78 >9
Dont
know
/Re
fuse
1 Flights within Europe
(N=283) 57% 30% 7% 2% 0% 0% 2%
2 Transcontinental flights /
long distance flights
(N=277)
72% 19% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3%
Q30. Please indicate which, if any, is the highest educational or 
professional qualification you have obtained. 
Please select at most one answer
Please choose all that apply: 
N=286
Noformalqualifications 21%
1 GCSE/Olevel/CSE 8%
2 Vocationalquals(=NVQ1+2) 22%
3 Alevelorequivalent(=NVQ3) 31%
4 Bachelor Degree or equivalent
(=NVQ4) 9%
5 Masters/PhDorequivalent 6%
6 Stillstudying 3%
7 Dontknow/Refuse 1%
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Q31. Please fill in your postcode.
Please write your answer here: 
Q32. In which of these ways does your household occupy this 
accommodation? 
Please select at most one answer
Please choose all that apply: 
N=284
1 Buying withmortgage/loan 40%
2 Ownitoutright 30%
3 Partrent/partmortgage 1%
4 Rents (including rents paid by
housingbenefit) 25%
5 Livinghererentfree 1%
6 Dontknow/Refuse 1%
Q33. Roughly at what distance do you live from the coastline? 
Please select at most one answer
Please choose all that apply: 
N=284
1 Lessthan1mile 12%
2 More than 1 mile but less than 5
miles 26%
3 510miles 26%
4 Morethan10miles 32%
5 Don'tknow 4%
Q34. How long have you lived in the area? 
Please select at most one answer 
Please choose all that apply:
N=285
1 Lessthan6months 2%
2 6monthslessthan1year 4%
3 1year lessthan3years 6%
4 3 lessthan5years 8%
5 5 lessthan7years 10%
6 7 lessthan10years 7%
7 10 yearsormore 63%
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8 Dontknow/Refuse 0%
Q35. Do any of the following apply to you? This question refers to 
your experiences in the last 15 years, either around the Severn 
Estuary or elsewhere.
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Yes No
Dont
know/Re
fuse
1 Myhomeorotherpropertyhasbeen
damaged by flooding or erosion
(N=285)
2% 94% 2%
2 I have been directly affected by
flooding or erosion (e.g. through
travel disruption or my ability to
work)(N=285)
10% 85% 4%
Otherpeoplewithin5milesofwhere
I live have experienced property
damage from flooding or erosion
(N=284)
30% 54% 15%
2.2 Factor analyses for scale constructs
Factor analysis human values scale2.2.1
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5
Q8.8 .841
Q8.3 .716
Q8.19 .714
Q8.12 .646
Q8.18 .565
Q8.14 .465 .341
Q8.1 .439
Q8.11 .333
Q8.20
Q8.13 .775
Q8.17 .734
Q8.2 .712
Q8.4 .644
Q8.21 .782
Q8.10 .753
Q8.15 .686
Q8.6 .554
Q8.7 .774
Q8.16 .596
Q8.9 .532
Q8.5 .548
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Factor analysis environmental identity scale2.2.2
Factor1
Q9.3 .923
Q9.1 .900
Q9.2 .888
Q9.4 .306
Factor analysis emotion engagement scale2.2.3
Factor1 Factor2
Q4.18 .911
Q4.12 .906
Q4.10 .867
Q4.16 .849
Q4.11 .799
Q4.2 .750
Q4.15 .734
Q4.14 .716
Q4.9 .680
Q4.17 .665
Q4.4 .650
Q4.8 .633
Q4.6 .610 .308
Q4.13 .555
Q4.7 .629
Q4.5 .613
Q4.1 .567
Q4.3 .462
Factor analysis personal efficacy scale2.2.4
Factor1 Factor2
Q14.5 .847
Q14.1 .807
Q14.4 .790
Q14.6 .741
Q14.3 .998
Q14.2 .543
Factor analysis collective efficacy scale2.2.5
Factor1 Factor2
Q15.4 .904
Q15.6 .876
Q15.1 .867
Q15.5
Q15.3 1.019
Q15.2 .581
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Factor analysis adaptation intentions scale2.2.6
Factor1
Q21.7 .851
Q21.9 .814
Q21.11 .800
Q21.10 .739
Q21.8 .731
Q21.4 .679
Q21.1 .669
Q21.3 .658
Q21.5 .633
Q21.2 .554
Q21.6 .508
Factor analysis mitigation intentions scale2.2.7
Factor1 Factor2
Q19.3 .685
Q19.4 .670
Q19.10 .649
Q19.9 .616
Q19.8 .554
Q19.5 .545
Q19.7 .520
Q19.6 .700
Q19.2 .663
Q19.1 .509
Factor analysis support adaptation policies scale2.2.8
Factor1 Factor2
Q20.9 .796
Q20.8 .780
Q20.12 .771
Q20.2 .701
Q20.13 .649
Q20.3 .563
Q20.7 .527
Q20.11 .441
Q20.4
Q20.10 .765
Q20.5 .668
Q20.6 .529
Q20.1 .450
Factor analysis support mitigation policies scale2.2.9
Factor1 Factor2
Q18.10 .707
Q18.12 .668
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Q18.13 .662
Q18.11 .637
Q18.9 .588
Q18.5 .439
Q18.7 .417
Q18.2 .326
Q18.4 .845
Q18.3 .813
Q18.8 .718
Q18.1 .608
Q18.6 .479
Factor analysis support for financial regulation2.2.10
Factor1
Q18.4 .849
Q20.5 .772
Q18.3 .770
Q18.8 .717
Q20.10 .618
Q18.1 .585
2.3 Correlation Matrix outcome measures and 
predictors
CC
concern
SLR
concern
oneself
Age Income Distancefromcoast
Pers.
effic. CCscept.
Env.
Ident.
Emot.
Engagem.
Self
transc. Conserv.
Adapt.
policies .307
** .326** .218** 0,05 0,1
.296*
* .325** .365** .308** .392** .266**
Financial
regulatio
n
.438** .269**

.133
*
.146* 0,01 .329
*
* .370** .290** .435** 0,1 0,07
Mitigatio
npolicies .455
** .387** 0,01 0 0,02 .415
*
* .529** .461** .412** .379** .175**
Adapt.
intention
s
.392** .464** 0,02 0,03 0,05 .424
*
* .196** .388** .406** .327** 0,08
Mitigatio
n
intention
s
.499** .406** 0,07 .204
** 0,06 .500
*
* .434** .386** .490** .300** 0,06
CC
concern
1 .635** 0,11 0,09 0,06
.630*
* .736** .579** .737** .398** 0,09
SLR
concern
oneself
.635** 1

.123
*
0,09 0,05 .522
*
* .507** .385** .570** .353** 0,1
Age 0,11 .123* 1 0,02 .215**

.169*
*
.148* 0,06 .168** 0,05 0,05
Income 0,09 0,09 0,02 1 0,12

0,05 0,1 0,1 0,11 0,08 0,02
Distance
from
coast
0,06 0,05

.215
**
0,12 1 0,03 0,12 0 0,04 0,05 0,08
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Pers.
efficacy .630
** .522**

.169
**
0,05 0,03 1 .603** .585** .595** .411** .136*
CC
scepticis
m
.736** .507** .148* 0,1 0,12

.603*
*
1 .509** .661
** 
.317** 0,06
Env.
identity .579
** .385** 0,06 0,1 0 .585
*
* .509** 1 .486** .551** .227**
Emot.
engagem
ent
.737** .570**

.168
**
0,11 0,04 .595
*
* .661** .486** 1 .460** 0,1
Self
transcen
dence
.398** .353** 0,05 0,08 0,05
.411*
* .317** .551** .460** 1 .298**
Conserva
tism
0,09 0,1 0,05 0,02 0,08 .136* 0,06 .227** 0,1 .298** 1
Correlation Matrix for outcome measures and significant predictors (** p
< .01; * p< .05)
2.4 Stepwise regression adaptation intentions
Adaptationintention B SEB b adj.R2 p£
Scepticism .227 .061 .228 .048 .001
Scepticism .100 .076 .101 .182 .187
Emotionalengagement .477 .074 .494 .001
Scepticism .217 .077 .218 .248 .005
Emotionalengagement .344 .076 .357 .001
Personalefficacy .358 .075 .350 .001
Scepticism .259 .076 .261 .276 .001
Emotionalengagement .316 .075 .328 .001
Personalefficacy .269 .078 .264 .001
Environmentalidentity .220 .066 .225 .001
Constant .313 .001
Scepticism .297 .001
Emotionalengagement .248 .002
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Personalefficacy .207 .007
Environmentalidentity .215 .001
Concernfortheeffectsof
SLRononeself .252 .001
Appendix Chapter 3
3.1 Study 2 survey items and topline results
Q1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements?
Strongly
disagree
Tendto
disagree
Neither
agreenor
disagree
Tendto
agree
Strongly
agree
1 The evidence for climate
change is unreliable
(N=283)
28% 47% 14% 10% 1%
2 I am convinced that
climate change is really
happening(N=283)
1% 3% 9% 42% 46%
3 I do not believe climate
change is a real problem
(N=283)
48% 41% 6% 4% 2%
4 Too much fuss is made
about climate change
(N=283)
40% 41% 9% 9% 1%
5 Claims that human
activitiesarechangingthe
climate are exaggerated
(N=283)
30% 41% 10% 15% 4%
Q2. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements?
Strongly
disagree
Tendto
disagree
Neither
agreenor
disagree
Tendto
agree
Strongly
agree
1 I consider myself to be
environmentally
conscious(N=283)
1% 3% 18% 65% 12%
2 Being environmentally
friendly is an important
partofwhoIam(N=283)
2% 21% 28% 41% 9%
3 I think of myself as
someone who is
concerned about the
1% 6% 13% 66% 14%
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environment (N=283)
Q3. Using the sliders below please indicate who you think will be 
more affected by sea-level rise. 
The closer you move the slider to the left, the more you think that you 
and your family will be affected. The closer you place the slider to the 
right, the more you think other people will be affected. 
If you think that everyone will be affected equally place the slider at the 
middle point (50). If you think no one will be affected click "Neither".
myselfandmyfamily otherpeople
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Sealevel
risewill
affect...
(N=278)
M=65.83,SD=16.61 Neither
Q4. How concerned, if at all, are you about any potential effects of 
sea-level rise which there might be on ... 
Notat all
concerned
Notvery
concerned
Fairly
concerned
Very
concerned
1 ...YOUpersonally(N=283) 9% 48% 36% 7%
2 ...SOCIETYingeneral(N=283) 3% 20% 56% 22%
3 ...theWORLD(N=283) 1% 13% 39% 47%
Q5. Using the sliders below please indicate who you think will be 
more affected by sea-level rise. 
The closer you move the slider to the left, the more you think that you 
and your family will be affected. The closer you place the slider to the 
right, the more you think other people will be affected. 
If you think that everyone will be affected equally place the slider at the 
middle point (50). If you think no one will be affected click "Neither".
myselfandmyfamily otherpeople
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Climate
change will
affect...
(N=276)
M=58.98,SD=14.71 Neither
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Q6. How concerned, if at all, are you about any potential effects of 
climate change which there might be on ... 
Notatall
concerned
Notvery
concerned
Fairly
concerned
Very
concerned
1 ...YOUpersonally(N=283) 2% 31% 52% 15%
2 ...SOCIETYingeneral(N=283) 1% 12% 52% 36%
3 ...theWORLD(N=283) 1% 6% 35% 59%
Q7. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements?
Strongly
disagree
Tendto
disagree
Neither
agreenor
disagree
Tendto
agree
Strongly
agree
1 It is my responsibility to
act on climate change
(N=283)
2% 4% 16% 63% 16%
2 It is already to late to do
anything about climate
change (N=283)
19% 57% 17% 6% 2%
3 There is no point in me
doing anything about
climate change because
nooneelseis(N=283)
31% 52% 10% 6% 1%
4 The actions of a single
person don't make any
difference in tackling
climatechange (N=283)
18% 48% 14% 15% 5%
5 Climate change is so
complicated that there is
very little politicians can
doaboutit(N=283)
32% 46% 9% 12% 2%
6 Icanpersonallyhelptodo
something about climate
change by changing my
behaviour(N=283)
2% 7% 15% 59% 18%
Q8. To what extent do you feel each of the following emotions 
when thinking about climate change? 
Notatall Verylittle Somewhat
Toagreat
extent
1 Anger (N=283) 19% 32% 38% 11%
2 Disappointment (N=283) 9% 23% 52% 17%
3 Sadness (N=283) 7% 18% 54% 22%
4 Fear (N=283) 11% 31% 46% 12%
5 Guilt (N=283) 13% 33% 45% 9%
Editorial Intro 
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The following text is taken from a newspaper and discusses climate 
impacts. (Note: we cannot show logos or other illustrations associated 
with the text and newspaper for copyright reasons.) 
Please read the following text carefully as you will be asked a number of 
questions about it afterwards.
Q9. I have understood that I need to read the following text 
carefully.
Yes No
100% 0
Frames
Q10. Now please spend some time thinking about what you’ve just 
read. What thoughts came to mind when you were reading the 
information? 
Q11. What type of actions did this article propose in response to 
climate impacts.
Q12. Which country or area was the article concerned with? 
Q13. Below are some steps we might take as a society to prepare for 
climate impacts. 
Please indicate for each of these steps: 
1. How you would vote if these steps were proposed in a national 
referendum (Please keep in mind that these proposals might be 
associated with considerable costs and/or inconveniences for you and 
other citizens) 
2. How effective you think these measures would be in preparing for 
climate impacts
Defin
itely
Pr
ob
Un
sur
Pr
ob
De
fini
Not
at
Not
ver
Qui
te
Ver
y
293
no abl
y
no
e abl
y
yes
tel
y
yes
all
effe
ctiv
e
y
effe
ctiv
e
effe
ctiv
e
effe
ctiv
e
1 Artificial maintenance of
beach levels through
beach nourishment
(adding sand from other
sources to replace sand
thathasbeenlosttowind
andwavesovertheyears)
(N=283/269)
2% 23%
30
%
36
% 9% 7% 42% 44% 7%
2 Increase prices for water
use to encourage people
to save water
(N=283/272)
21% 41%
22
%
12
% 4% 17% 55% 23% 6%
3 Build new flood and
coastaldefences
(N=283/271)
0% 3% 11%
53
%
34
% 1% 9% 59% 32%
4 Managed realignment 
Allowing the shoreline to
move naturally, but
managing the process to
direct it in certain areas
(N=283/270)
3% 12%
28
%
42
%
15
% 3% 28% 61% 8%
5 Protectionandcreationof
wetlands Improvesflood
protection and
contributes to
biodiversity(N=283/272)
1% 4% 10%
48
%
38
% 1% 13% 56% 31%
6 Increased financial
support for better flood
prediction, emergency
planning and warning in
the case of a flood event
(N=283/271)
1% 5% 13%
47
%
35
% 1% 13% 51% 34%
7 Stricter planning control
infloodriskareas,tolimit
construction on flood
plains(N=283/271)
1% 3% 8% 39%
49
% 1% 8% 46% 45%
8 A new tax to establish a
fund to alleviate
unavoidable climate
impacts in the UK
(N=283/267)
10% 28%
29
%
23
%
10
% 8% 42% 40% 10%
9 Morefundingforresearch
and monitoring to better
understand sealevel rise
(N=283/270)
1% 10%
16
%
47
%
26
% 1% 17% 59% 23%
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Q14. Below are some steps we might take as a society to decrease 
the extent of climate change that drives climate impacts. 
Please indicate for each of these steps: 
1. How you would vote if these steps were proposed in a national 
referendum (Please keep in mind that these proposals might be 
associated with considerable costs and/or inconveniences for you and 
other citizens) 
2. How effective you think these measures would be in decreasing the 
extent of climate change that drives climate impacts 
Defin
itely
no
Pr
ob
abl
y
no
Un
sur
e
Pr
ob
abl
y
yes
De
fini
tel
y
yes
Not
at
all
effe
ctiv
e
Not
ver
y
effe
ctiv
e
Qui
te
effe
ctiv
e
Ver
y
effe
ctiv
e
1 Increasedgeneraltaxation
topayforpublictransport
(N=281/269)
16% 27%
22
%
25
%
10
%
14
%
42
%
30
%
13
%
2 Subsidies for house
insulation(N=282/268) 1% 5%
10
%
45
%
40
% 1%
14
%
62
%
24
%
3 Subsidies for electric
(emissionfree) vehicles
(N=282/269)
1% 7% 15%
46
%
31
% 4%
19
%
52
%
25
%
4 Increased petrol and
diesel taxes to encourage
people to drive less
(N=282/269)
30% 35%
17
%
12
% 6%
18
%
41
%
29
%
12
%
5 Increased household
electricity taxes to
encourage people to
consume less electricity
(N=282/269)
25% 39%
19
%
14
% 3%
13
%
47
%
34
% 7%
6 More investments in safe
cycling and walking
routes(N=282/270)
0% 7% 7% 37%
48
% 3%
23
%
49
%
25
%
7 Subsidies for households
to produce their own
greenenergy(e.g.through
solarpanels)(N=282/270)
0% 5% 7% 39%
48
% 2%
13
%
51
%
34
%
Q15. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements?
Strongly
disagree
Tendto
disagree
Neither
agreenor
disagree
Tendto
agree
Strongly
agree
1 The evidence for climate 30% 46% 15% 9% 1%
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change is unreliable
(N=283)
2 I am convinced that
climate change is really
happening(N=283)
0% 3% 7% 49% 41%
3 I do not believe climate
change is a real problem
(N=283)
47% 43% 6% 2% 2%
4 Too much fuss is made
about climate change
(N=282)
36% 45% 11% 7% 1%
5 Claims that human
activitiesarechangingthe
climate are exaggerated
(N=283)
31% 44% 9% 15% 1%
Q16. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements?
Strongly
disagree
Tendto
disagree
Neither
agreenor
disagree
Tendto
agree
Strongly
agree
1 I consider myself to be
environmentally
conscious(N=283)
1% 7% 13% 64% 15%
2 Being environmentally
friendly is an important
partofwhoIam(N=283)
3% 21% 29% 38% 10%
3 I think of myself as
someone who is
concerned about the
environment (N=283)
1% 5% 13% 66% 16%
Q17. Using the sliders below please indicate who you think will be 
more affected by sea-level rise. 
The closer you move the slider to the left, the more you think that you 
and your family will be affected. The closer you place the slider to the 
right, the more you think other people will be affected. 
If you think that everyone will be affected equally place the slider at the 
middle point (50). If you think no one will be affected click "Neither".
myselfandmyfamily otherpeople
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Sealevel
risewill
affect...
(N=280)
M=62.42,SD=16.27 Neither
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Q18. How concerned, if at all, are you about any potential effects of 
sea-level rise which there might be on ... 
Notatall
concerned
Notvery
concerned
Fairly
concerned
Very
concerned
1 ...YOUpersonally(N=283) 6% 39% 47% 9%
2 ...SOCIETYingeneral(N=283) 1% 11% 56% 32%
3 ...theWORLD(N=283) 18% 33% 39% 10%
Q19. To what extent do you feel each of the following emotions 
when thinking about climate change? 
Notatall Verylittle Somewhat
Toagreat
extent
1 Anger (N=280) 18% 33% 39% 10%
2 Disappointment (N=280) 11% 19% 51% 19%
3 Sadness (N=280) 8% 19% 53% 21%
4 Fear (N=280) 12% 26% 45% 16%
5 Guilt (N=280) 14% 32% 43% 11%
Q20. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements?
Strongly
disagree
Tendto
disagree
Neither
agreenor
disagree
Tendto
agree
Strongly
agree
1 It is my responsibility to
act on climate change
(N=281)
2% 3% 15% 58% 21%
It is already to late to do
anything about climate
change (N=281)
33% 51% 10% 4% 1%
2 There is no point in me
doing anything about
climate change because
no oneelseis(N=280)
30% 54% 11% 4% 2%
3 The actions of a single
person don't make any
difference in tackling
climatechange(N=281)
22% 50% 13% 13% 3%
4 Climate change is so
complicated that there is
very little politicians can
doaboutit(N=281)
37% 43% 8% 10% 1%
5 Icanpersonallyhelptodo
something about climate
change by changing my
behaviour(N=281)
1% 5% 12% 64% 18%
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Q21. Using the sliders below please indicate who you think will be 
more affected by climate change. 
The closer you move the slider to the left, the more you think that you 
and your family will be affected. The closer you place the slider to the 
right, the more you think other people will be affected. 
If you think that everyone will be affected equally place the slider at the 
middle point (50). If you think no one will be affected click "Neither".
myselfandmyfamily otherpeople
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Climate
change will
affect...
(N=276)
M=57.65,SD=14.01 Neither
Q22. How concerned, if at all, are you about any potential effects of 
climate change which there might be on ... 
Notatall
concerned
Notvery
concerned
Fairly
concerned
Very
concerned
1 ...YOUpersonally(N=280) 3% 25% 58% 14%
2 ...SOCIETYingeneral(N=280) 1% 10% 51% 37%
3 ...theWORLD(N=280) 2% 6% 33% 59%
Q23. Please indicate your overall political orientation using the slider 
below. 
The closer you move the slider to the left, the more you think of yourself 
as a left wing oriented person. The closer you place the slider to the 
right, the more you think of yourself as a right wing oriented person. 
N=283
Leftwing Rightwing
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
PoliticalOrientation M=38.60,SD=20.44
Q24. How would you vote if there were a General Election 
tomorrow?
N=281
1 Conservative 11%
2 Labour 26%
3 LiberalDemocrats(LibDem) 8%
4 PlaidCymru 5%
5 GreenParty 13%
6 UKIndependenceParty 4%
298
7 Other 1%
8 Wouldnotvote 8%
9 Undecided 25%
Q25. Which party would you be most inclined to support? 
N=86
1 Conservative 23%
2 Labour 34%
3 LiberalDemocrats(LibDem) 14%
4 PlaidCymru 7%
5 GreenParty 13%
6 UKIndependenceParty 1%
7 Other 8%
Q26. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements? 
Strongly
disagree
Tendto
disagree
Neither
agreenor
disagree
Tendto
agree
Strongly
agree
1 The world would be a
better place if its wealth
were divided equally
amongnations(N=283)
6% 19% 27% 35% 13%
2 Discrimination against
minorities is still a very
serious problem in our
society(N=283)
3% 10% 11% 44% 32%
3 People shouldbeallowed
to make as much money
as they can for
themselves,evenifothers
arenotableto(N=283)
7% 29% 28% 29% 6%
4 In my ideal society, all
basic needs (food,
housing,education,health
care) would be
guaranteed by the
government for everyone
(N=283)
3% 7% 13% 38% 40%
5 When I have problems, I
try to solve them on my
own(N=283)
0% 8% 7% 62% 23%
6 If the government spent
less time trying to fix
everybodys problems,
wedallbealotbetteroff
(N=283)
18% 47% 22% 11% 3%
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Q27. Thinking back to the article you read please indicate how 
convincing you found it.
N=283
Very
convincing
Quite
convincing
Neither
convincingnor
unconvincing
Quite
unconvincing
Very
unconvincing
6% 51% 31% 10% 2%
Q28. Are you ... 
N=283
Female Male
72% 28
Q29. Please indicate your age in years. 
I am ...
N=281
Q30. I am ...
N=282
1 ... working full time (30+ hours per
week) 15%
2 ...workingpart time (929hoursper
week) 4%
3 Unemployed 0%
4 Notworking retired 0%
5 Not working  looking after the
house/children 0%
6 Notworking disabled 0%
7 Don'tknow/Refuse 1%
8 Student Bachelor 64%
9 Student Master 12%
10Student PhD 5%
Q31. Do you regularly donate to, or are you a member of, any 
environmental organisations (e.g., Friends of the Earth, 
Worldwide Fund for Nature)? 
N=283
Yes No
13% 87%
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Q32. Do any of the following apply to you? This question refers to 
your experiences in the last 15 years, either around the Severn 
Estuary or elsewhere.
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
Yes No
1 Me and/or my family and/or close
friends have been directly affected
by flooding or erosion (e.g. through
damage to the family's home, other
accommodation and property)
(N=283)
17% 83%
2 I have been indirectly affected by
flooding or erosion (e.g. through
traveldisruption) (N=283)
47% 53%
Q33. Would you like to receive further information on measures to 
prepare for the impacts of climate change - Adaptation 
measures. 
N=283
Yes No
25% 75%
Q34. Would you like to receive further information on measures to 
reduce emissions that cause climate change - Mitigation 
measures? 
N=283
Yes No
31% 69%
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3.2 Faux newspaper articles for framing 
conditions
English adaptation condition3.2.1
302
English mitigation condition3.2.2
303
Welsh adaptation condition3.2.3
304
Welsh mitigation condition3.2.4
305
Global adaptation condition3.2.5
306
Global mitigation condition3.2.6
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3.3 Factor analyses for scale constructs
Factor analysis policy support measures3.3.1
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4
Q13.2 .857
Q14.5 .808
Q14.4 .625
Q13.6 .638
Q13.9 .462
Q13.3 .457
Q13.1 .448
Q13.7 .423
Q13.5 .401
Q14.6 .691
Q14.2 .484
Q14.7 .450
Q14.3 .348
Q14.1 .553
Q13.8 .530
Q13.4 .329
Factor analysis final policy support measures3.3.2
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3
Q13.2 .791
Q14.5 .758
Q14.4 .709
Q14.1 .509
Q13.8 .508
Q13.6 .642
Q13.3 .459
Q13.9 .446
Q13.1 .431
Q13.7 .386
Q13.5 .353
Q14.6 .693
Q14.2 .474
Q14.7 .445
Q14.3 .340
Factor analysis cultural orientation3.3.3
Factor1
Q26.6Individualism .611
Q26.1Egalitarianism .562
Q26.5Individualism .555
Q26.3Egalitarianism .537
Q26.2Egalitarianism .500
Q26.4Individualism .178
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3.4 Reliability analysis for scale constructs
Reliability analysis support for adaptation3.4.1
CronbachsAlphaifitemdeleted
Q13.6 .562
Q13.3 .622
Q13.9 .589
Q13.1 .646
Q13.7 .587
Q13.5 .571
Reliability analysis support for mitigation3.4.2
CronbachsAlphaifitem
deleted
Q14.3 .542
Q14.2 .497
Q14.7 .463
Q14.6 .552
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Appendix Chapter 4
4.1 Study 3 survey items and topline results
Q4. How concerned, if at all, are you about climate change, which 
is sometimes referred to as ‘global warming?
N=1002
Veryconcerned 18%
Fairlyconcerned 49%
Notveryconcerned 24%
Notatallconcerned 7%
Dontknow 1%
Q7. How serious a threat, if at all, is climate change to each of the 
following? Please read out the letter that applies.
Extremel
yserious
Very
serious
Fairly
serious
Notvery
serious
Notatall
serious
Dont
know
1 You and your family
(N=1002) 5% 13% 39% 34% 7%
1%
2 The UK as a whole
(N=1002) 9% 26% 44% 17% 3%
2%
3 People in developing
countries (N=1002) 23% 38% 26% 6% 1% 5%
Q11. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
Strongly
agree
Tendto
agree
Neither
agree
nor
disagree
Tendto
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Dont
know
2 It is clear to me that
climate change is really
happening (N=1002) 33% 45% 11% 6% 2% 2%
Q13. In the next few years, how likely or unlikely do you think you 
would be to do each of the following?
(If respondents say they have already taken action: How likely would you 
be to do this again or to continue to do this in the next few years?)
Very
likely
Fairly
likely
Aboutas
likelyas
not
Fairly
unlikely
Very
unlikely
Dont
know
1 Change to a green
energy supplier which
would reduce the impact
on the environment from
16% 33% 24% 14% 9% 5%
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the electricity you use in
yourhome
(Youranswerswill notbe
shared with any energy
companies for marketing
oranyotherpurpose,and
theyhavenoinvolvement
in this research, which is
being conducted by
Cardiff and Nottingham
Universities.) (N=1002)
2 Cutdowntheamountyou
travelbycar (N=1002) 12% 28% 18% 21% 17% 4%
3 Buy appliances that are
more energyefficient
(N=1002) 43% 41% 8% 5% 2% 1%
4 Reduce the amount of
energy you use at home
(N=1989) 31% 49% 12% 6% 2% 0%
5 Write letters, email, or
phone your local MP
about climate change
(N=1002) 4% 10% 13% 27% 46% 0%
6 Sign a petition about
climate change, either
online or in person
(N=1002) 17% 36% 14% 14% 19% 0%
Q14. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements?
Strongly
agree
Tendto
agree
Neither
agree
nor
disagree
Tendto
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Dont
know
3 Changingmy lifestylewill
makelittledifferencewith
regardstoclimatechange
(N=1002) 12% 33% 21% 25% 7% 1%
4 If everyonedoes their bit
we can tackle the causes
of climate change
(N=1002) 28% 47% 12% 8% 3% 1%
Q25. Was your current or previous property affected by the floods 
between November 2013 and February 2014? 
This could include any land surrounding your home such as a garden or 
drive. If you live in a flat it might include communal areas such as a car 
park or hallway. Please also answer yes if you stopped the water from 
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flooding your property by using some form of flood defence such as sand 
bags or a flood gate.
N=1002
Yes 3%
No 97%
Dontknow 0%
Q38. Which, if any, of the following have you experienced as a 
consequence of the flooding?
1 Anxietywhenitrainsheavily (N=821) 17%
2 Increasedstresslevels (N=821) 15%
3 Sleepingproblems (N=821) 6%
Q41. When you think about the floods how strongly, if at all, have 
you felt each of the following emotions? Please rate each 
emotion on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 means you have not felt
it at all and 10 means you have felt it extremely.
(If you have experienced flooding at other times, please just think about 
the feelings you have experienced in relation to the floods, which 
occurred last winter, between November 2013 and February 2014. If you 
would like to say something about your other experiences then you will 
be able to do so towards the end of the interview.)
1
I
have
not
felt
this
at
all 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10
I
have
felt
this
extr
emel
y
1 Sadness (N=1002) 14% 7% 8% 5% 12% 9% 15% 13% 6% 11%
2 Anxiety (N=1002) 43% 15% 9% 6% 9% 7% 4% 3% 2% 3%
3 Pride (N=1002) 57% 8% 4% 4% 12% 5% 2% 3% 3% 2%
4 Gratitude (N=1002) 46% 7% 3% 5% 13% 6% 5% 5% 3% 6%
5 Anger (N=1002) 40% 10% 7% 5% 10% 7% 7% 6% 3% 5%
6 Helplessness (N=1002) 36% 8% 6% 5% 10% 5% 8% 9% 4% 8%
10Distress (N=1002) 38% 12% 10% 5% 11% 7% 7% 5% 2% 3%
Q44. Thinking about the floods and the impact they had. To what 
extent do you think each of the following contributed to the 
floods?
Notatall Justalittle Afair Agreat Dont
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amount deal know
1 Climatechange (N=1002) 7% 25% 40% 21% 7%
Q45. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements about the floods that happened between November 
2013 and February 2014?
Strongl
yagree
Tendto
agree
Neither
agree
nor
disagre
e
Tendto
disagre
e
Strongl
y
disagre
e
Dont
know
No
opinio
n
1 The floods were caused,
inpart,byclimatechange
(N=1002) 11% 52% 19% 8% 4% 5% 0%
3 The floods were a sign
that the impacts of
climate change are
happeningnow (N=1002) 19% 47% 18% 8% 4% 4% 1%
7 The floods showed us
whatwecanexpectinthe
future from climate
change (N=1002) 22% 50% 17% 6% 4% 1% 0%
11People I know thought
thefloodswerecausedin
part by climate change
(N=1002) 8% 46% 24% 10% 3% 8% 1%
Q47. Do you believe your property is at risk of flooding in the next 
10 years?
N=1002
Definitelyatrisk 2%
Probablyatrisk 10%
Probablynotatrisk 29%
Definitelynotatrisk 55%
Dontknow 3%
Refused 0%
Q48. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements?
Strongl
yagree
Tendto
agree
Neither
agree
nor
disagre
e
Tendto
disagre
e
Strongl
y
disagre
e
Dont
know
No
opinio
n
1 If floods were to affect
my property this year, I
would feel able to cope 9% 36% 14% 24% 11% 3% 1%
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withthis (N=1002)
Q49. The following actions can be taken by individuals to help 
respond to the risks and the impacts of flooding. Which of the 
options best describes what you think about each of these?
Idont
think
thisis
relevan
ttome
Itis
very
unlikely
Iwould
dothis
Iwould
possibl
y
conside
rdoing
this
Iwould
definite
ly
conside
rdoing
this
Iam
intendi
ngto
dothis
Ive
done
this
already
Dont
know
1 Buying flood protection
products such as flood
boards or sand bags
(N=1002) 39% 24% 22% 12% 1% 1% 1%
2 Making sure I have
insurance cover for
flooding (N=1002) 23% 10% 15% 19% 3% 26% 3%
3 Signing up for flood
warnings from local
agencies (N=1002) 30% 18% 24% 20% 2% 4% 2%
4 Seeking advice (for
example, from a building
surveyor) on how to
protect my property
againstflooding (N=1002) 34% 24% 21% 16% 1% 1% 2%
5 Thinking through or
preparingaplanofwhatI
should do in a flood
(N=1002) 31% 18% 28% 17% 2% 2% 2%
6 Attending meetings or
joining a community
group related to flooding
(N=1002) 31% 29% 26% 11% 1% 0% 2%
Q50. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements? (We are interested in people’s wider beliefs about society 
and how these relate to attitudes on the environment.)
Strongl
yagree
Tendto
agree
Neither
agree
nor
disagre
e
Tendto
disagre
e
Strongl
y
disagre
e
Dont
know
No
opinio
n
1 Discrimination against
minorities is still a very
serious problem in our
society (N=1002)
27% 39% 18% 9% 2% 4% 1%
2 The world would be a 24% 33% 18% 15% 6% 3% 1%
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better place if its wealth
were divided equally
amongnations (N=1002)
3 In my ideal society, all
basicneeds suchas food,
housing, education and
health care would be
guaranteed by the
government for everyone
(N=1002)
37% 37% 10% 12% 4% 0% 0%
4 People shouldbeallowed
to make as much money
as they can for
themselves,evenifothers
arenotableto (N=1002)
17% 34% 19% 16% 10% 2% 1%
5 When I have problems, I
try to solve them on my
own (N=1002)
38% 47% 8% 5% 1% 0% 0%
6 If the government spent
less time trying to fix
everybodys problems,
wedallbealotbetteroff
(N=1002)
19% 26% 22% 17% 10% 4% 1%
7 Being environmentally
friendly is an important
part of who I am
(N=1002)
20% 47% 21% 8% 2% 1% 1%
8 I think of myself as
someone who is very
concerned with
environmental issues
(N=1002)
16% 42% 25% 12% 4% 0% 1%
4.2 Factor analysis for scale constructs
Factor analysis flooding emotions4.2.1
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3
Q41.10 .812
Q41.2 .750
Q41.6 .687
Q41.5 .623
Q41.1 .549 .302
Q41.8
Q41.3 .797
Q41.4 .616
Q41.7 .883
Q41.9
Factor analysis climate change attribution4.2.2
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3
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Q45.3 .840
Q45.7 .776
Q45.1 .718
Q44.1 .706
Q45.12 .445 .302
Q45.11 .436 .319
Q45.10 .640
Q45.8 .526
Q45.4 .533
Q45.5 .479
Q45.2 .410
Q45.6 .407
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4.3 Correlation Matrix outcome measures and 
predictors
Flood
adapt.
intentio
ns
Mitig.
intentio
ns
Pers.
flood
risk
Flood
emot.
Flood
exp.
Mental
health
conseq
u.
CC
concer
n
Env.
Ident.
Collect.
efficacy
CC
belief
Flood
coping
belief
Social
grade Age
Flood
adapt.
intent
ions
1 0 0 .259** .403** .317** .215** .129** .167** .118** .012 .104** .077**
Mitig.
intent
ions
.252** 1 .148** .213** .037 .115** .505** .456** .466** .436** .008 .154** .143**
Pers.
flood
risk
.515** .148** 1 .185** .475** .325** .163** .083** .131** .102** .037 .013 .153**
Flood
emoti
ons
.259** .213** .185** 1 .122** .455** .221** .259** .123** .137** .168** .029 .091**
Floodi
ng
experi
ence
.403** .037 .475** .122** 1 .311** .070* .045 .049 .041 .117** .116** .012
Ment
al
health
conse
qu.
.317** .115** .325** .455** .311** 1 .175** .098** .059 .093** .105** .077* .046
CC
conce
rn
.215** .505** .163** .221** .070* .175** 1 .419** .329** .482** .079** .143** .008
Env.
Identi
ty
.129** .456** .083** .259** .045 .098** .419** 1 .309** .307** <.001 .096** .146**
Collec
t.
effica
cy
.167** .466** .131** .123** .049 .059 .329** .309** 1 .319** .043 .007 .146**
CC
belief .118
** .436** .102** .137** .041 .093** .482** .307** .319** 1 .086** .036 .115**
Flood
copin
g
belief
.012 .008 .037 .168** .117** .105** .079** <.001 .043 .086** 1 .086** .055*
Social
grade
.104** .154** .013 .029 .116** .077* .143** .096** .007 .036 .086** 1 .067**
Age .077** .143** .153** .091** .012 .046 .008 .146** .146** .115** .055* .067** 1
Correlation Matrix for outcome measures and significant predictors that 
were included in the two regression models (** p < .01; * p< .05, two 
tailed)
